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ABSTRACT 
This study challenges the notion that incremental steps taken by current Army 
modularity initiatives are bold enough to allow ground forces to properly conduct 
operations in twenty-first century irregular environments.  This thesis argues that infantry 
brigade combat teams should be better optimized for the challenges of irregular warfare 
through structural changes that decentralize resources, flatten the command structure, and 
increase the capacity and integration of intelligence personnel, mobility assets, and 
population-focused capabilities at the battalion and company level.  First, this study 
describes changes to the United States’ threat environment and the evolving national 
security policies that are attempting to address these changes.  A review of the Army’s 
“transformation” identifies an obvious gap between capabilities inherent to the current 
force design and those directed by more recent policy documents.  The study then 
examines a wide array of policy and structural alternatives from a variety of military 
analysts.  Organizational theory is used to establish theoretical concepts, supported  with 
historical insights, Army doctrine, contemporary articles, presentations, and interviews to 
assess the ability of tactical units to conduct intelligence, security, and civil-military 
operations.  Finally, this study outlines a proposal to modify the current modular-brigade 
design, as a consideration for defense planners.  
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The Army ended up trying to fight the kind of conventional war that it was 
trained, organized, and prepared to fight instead of the counterinsurgency 
war it was sent to fight.1  
A.  PURPOSE   
During the final years of the Soviet Union, a theoretical discussion commonly 
known as the revolution in military affairs (RMA) began.  Despite consistent U.S. 
involvement in irregular conflict, many of the influential authors of the 1990s imagined 
ways in which the U.S. could use information technologies and emerging weapon 
systems to dominate future battlefields.  Assessments of the capabilities required for 
stabilization and counterinsurgency operations were largely ignored.  After U.S. 
invasions, the rapid collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001 and the Baath Party in 2003 
seemed to further solidify assumptions regarding “rapid decisive operations” and the 
power of information technology.  However, defense planners’ enthusiasm quickly 
waned as the difficulties of post-conflict stabilization operations became apparent.    
Meanwhile, the United States Army launched a restructuring plan in 1999 
described as “the most comprehensive transformation of its force since World War II.”2  
According to the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, the short-term “decisive 
operation” within the Army Campaign Plan “is the creation of modular, combined arms 
maneuver brigade combat teams, or BCTs.”3  The Army has dismantled divisional 
support units and created battalion and company-level combat support and combat 
service support units assigned directly to the brigade, while increasing the command and 
control capabilities of the brigade task force.  In doing so, the brigade is advertised as 
                                                 
1 Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore:  John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
271. 
2 The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Operations, Army Transformation Office, 2004 
Army Transformation Roadmap (Washington D.C.:  Department of Defense, July 2004), x, 
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/ document_386_ATR_2004_Final.pdf.   
3 The Army Transformation Office, Transformation Roadmap, 3-2. 
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becoming a more “expeditionary force,” able to deploy without additional resources.  
Divisions and brigades are intended to be tailored to their specific environment with 
augments from support brigades.  Supporters of transformation applaud the flexible and 
strategic mobility the new concept provides.  Some critics note the loss of traditional 
combat power in the new design compared with its predecessor due to a reduction in the 
number of maneuver battalions and firepower-based platforms.  Others see the brigade 
modularity plan as a necessary and evolutionary step; but advocate far more reaching 
organizational changes if the Army is to be properly prepared for twenty-first century 
threats.  These diverse philosophical camps are largely derived from varied opinions of 
technology’s potential and different assumptions regarding the future threat environment.  
In the wake of the Cold War and the rising tide of destabilizing influences in 
societies worldwide, U.S. Army ground forces can expect to continue performing a 
myriad of tasks. These include conventional maneuver combat operations, providing 
military support to security, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction operations 
(SSTRO), assisting foreign nations counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, and rapid response 
humanitarian operations.  The threat of regional aggressor states, states that sponsor 
international terrorism, inter-state rivalries, and intra-state violence impact the United 
States’ concern for its own, and other states’ national security, economic stability, and 
human rights.     
Unwilling to combat U.S. military forces or its allies directly, future adversaries 
will continue to embrace asymmetric means. They will focus their operations in cities 
where close terrain provides cover and the populace provides them information and 
concealment.4   Guerrilla tactics and information campaigns will be used to counter-
balance U.S. technological and resource advantages.  U.S. ground forces must remain 
postured to complete national security initiatives through flexible and oftentimes 
simultaneous efforts to provide security, promote economic vitality, and support good 
                                                 
4 Regarding the challenges and increased potential for urban operations, see U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, Joint Urban Operations Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1.0 (Washington D.C.:  Department 
of Defense, July 23, 2007), http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/juo_jic_v1.pdf.  See also, 
Williamson Murray, War and Urban Terrain in the Twenty-First Century (Alexandria:  Institute for 
Defense Analyses, 2001).    
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governance at all levels.  Known historically and generally as small-wars, military 
operations other than war, low-intensity conflict, and more recently as irregular warfare 
(IW); these operations may follow military invasions, be used to prevent weak states 
from collapsing, or to oppose insurgencies and terrorists in partner states.   
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has been conducting foreign 
interventions approximately once every two years with the duration of each mission 
rising, and the scale of objectives increasingly expanding.5  The current U.S. war in Iraq 
is the most ambitious of five preceding endeavors in the course of a decade to include 
military interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.  These 
missions have varied in their environments, purpose, duration, scale, and results; but all 
share common principles found in current stability operations and counterinsurgency 
literature.  U.S. difficulties in Vietnam6 and its ill-fated attempt at peace enforcement in 
Lebanon demonstrated the beginning of a continued poor record when enemies have 
adopted tactics poorly suited for the “American way” of war.7  Despite what appears to 
be an “unavoidable burden” to the United States in an ever increasingly connected world, 
                                                 
5 Irregular conflicts such as counterinsurgency and stability operations are typically protracted in 
nature.  Historically, military efforts have required at least a decade to achieve positive political outcomes 
from the conflict.  See, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse, The 
Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (Santa Monica:  RAND, 2007).  Also, Thomas X. Hammes, 
“Insurgency:  Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation,” Strategic Forum no. 214 (2005), 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF214/SF214.pdf. 
6 Numerous sources describe early difficulties and then significant positive changes to U.S. ground 
strategies in the latter half of the U.S. ground involvement.  Large-scale conventional search-and-destroy 
missions eventually lost emphasis as programs such as the Civil Operations and Revolutionary 
Development Support (CORDS) program, Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, and the Marine 
Corps’ Combined Action Platoons demonstrated tangible, albeit late results.  For a more detailed analysis 
see, Larry Cable, Conflict of Myth (New York:  New York University Press, 1986); Krepinevich, The Army 
and Vietnam; Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN 
Performance in Vietnam (Santa Monica:  RAND, 1972); and Bing West, The Village (New York:  Pocket 
Books, 2003).  Despite these studies, U.S. ground-force tactics are only one factor in understanding the 
eventual collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 after a Congressionally-demanded end to U.S. support of the 
ARVN.     
7 This term was popularized by Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: 
Macmillan, 1973).  It refers to a national predisposition for technology-centric, large-scale, conventional 
combat operations and an aversion to irregular warfare.  See also, Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace 
(New York:  Basic Books, 2002); Robert Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror 
(Westport:  Praeger Security International, 2006); Jeffrey Record, “The American Way of War, Cultural 
Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency,” Cato Institute paper, no. 577, September 1, 2006,  
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa577.pdf;  and Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Counterinsurgency Comeback,” 
Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2007, 17.     
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these endeavors have consistently been looked upon by the U.S. military as missions to 
be avoided at all costs.8  Even though the U.S. has spent four times the money and 
incurred four times the casualties during stability operations compared to major 
conventional operations since Vietnam,9 little effort has been made to reflect this change 
in the Army’s force structuring.  Acknowledging the difficulty of stabilization missions, 
today’s threat environment demands that the U.S. military, particularly the Army, better 
prepare for irregular warfare.    
Recently, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 tasked the Army to rebalance 
its training and readiness focus between stability operations and conventional combat.  
This emphasis should force the majority of Army ground forces to question their 
responsibilities to perform this critical task.  Yet, the Army claims the current BCT 
modular construct is “more than adequate to address the demands of stability operations” 
and is as aptly prepared for counterinsurgency as it is traditional combat operations.10 
Furthermore, the initial purpose and assumptions that drove today’s force design are far 
different from the defense capabilities advocated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review11 and it’s supporting joint operating concepts (JOCs). 
These recent policy documents prod the conventional Army to accept a greater 
role in counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense.  While some argue it’s already 
                                                 
8 Dobbins, Guide to Nation-Building, xvii.  This term refers to a belief among some strategists that the 
U.S. does not have an option to sit out irregular warfare conflicts in the 21st Century due to economic 
interdependence and the rise of transnational terrorism.  The debate of whether or not the U.S. can avoid 
irregular warfare while sustaining its national interests is beyond the scope of this paper, however, the U.S. 
should prepare for it.  See also, Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York:  Penguin Group, 
2004); Frank Hoffman and Steven Metz, “Restructuring America’s Ground Forces: Better, Not Bigger,” 
The Stanley Foundation Policy Analyst Brief, September 2007, 
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/Metz_HoffmanPAB07.pdf.   
9 BG Keith Walker, Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy, HQ, Department of the Army, 
“Army Force Structure and Implementation of Directive 3000.05,” (PowerPoint presentation given at the 
National Defense University and CTNSP Short Course titled, “Force Structure for Stability Operations and 
Interagency Integration,” Fort McNair, Washington D.C., May 23, 2007).   
10 Andrew Feickert, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign:  Issue for Congress (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, May 2006), 6, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67816.pdf.   
11 The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington D.C.:  
Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf.   
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performing these tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan,12 its approach has been learn-as-you-go, 
and structural changes have been largely ad-hoc and inadequate.  The Irregular Warfare 
Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC)13 identifies a series of risks that concerns its authors.  
One of these is the possibility that the military (and more specifically, the Army) will fail 
to adequately “prepare and organize GPF (general purpose forces) for extended regional 
and global IW.”14  To mitigate this risk, the IW JOC recommends that the DoD:  
“Conduct assessments of GPF capabilities to execute IW in the envisioned future 
environment.  Based on these assessments, prepare a plan for Secretary of Defense 
approval with a timeline to address GPF capability gaps.”15  This paper identifies some of 
the Army’s existing capability gaps and offers a conceptual force design to increase its 
ability to prosecute irregular warfare operations and stabilize societies.       
B.  THESIS 
The Army’s modular-brigade design being implemented today is a necessary, but 
incremental step that fixed strategic-mobility problems and institutionalized operational 
successes from the 1991 Gulf War.  Today’s “transformation” does not properly prepare 
the Army for twenty-first century conflict.16  This paper argues that infantry brigade 
combat teams should be better optimized for the challenges of irregular warfare through 
                                                 
12 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Irregular Warfare Special Study 
(Washington D.C.:  Department of Defense, August 4, 2006), 
http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/DigitalCollections/IrregWarfareSpecialStudy.pdf.  This study was intended to 
be an analysis of the 2006 QDR’s use of the term irregular warfare, its doctrinal implications, and larger 
implications for Joint Forces.  Citing the IW Roadmap’s call for “US GPF to train, equip, and advise large 
numbers of foreign security forces,” it references Multi-National Security Transition Command (MNSTC) 
as evidence the concept is already being implemented.  Similarly, the IW Special Study notes CENTCOM’s 
participation in Iraq as evidence of GPF performing COIN.  These simplistic observations seem to state, 
“we’re already doing it,” without explicitly acknowledging the Quadrennial Defense Review’s intent of 
better training, organizing, and preparing GPF for these tasks in the future.   
13 U.S. Special Operations Command and Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Irregular 
Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0 (Washington D.C.:  Department of Defense, September 
2007), http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/iw-joc.pdf. 
14 “General purpose forces,” is a term used to indicate non-Special Operations Forces within the 
Army.  They are also commonly referred to as “conventional forces.”  This term is misleading as it 
suggests the Army is a monolithic force.  Many “conventional” units have the potential to perform irregular 
operations.     
15 DoD, IW JOC, 37. 
16 The Army’s current restructuring plan is commonly termed “transformation.”   
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structural changes that decentralize resources, flatten the command structure, and 
increase the capacity and integration of intelligence personnel, mobility assets, and 
population-focused capabilities (such as civil affairs, information operations specialists, 
military police, and civil engineers) at the battalion and company level.  Organizational 
theory, historical insights, Army doctrine, contemporary articles, presentations, and 
interviews are used to suggest further modifications to the force structure.  Combined-
arms concepts must progress beyond traditional maneuver and firepower assessments.  
These modified units—named within this paper as security and development brigades to 
distinguish them from their predecessors—would be focused on defeating guerrilla 
fighters, controlling (and protecting) populations, and conducting initial indigenous 
governance and economic capacity development.   
Numerous benefits accrue by creating more autonomous, multifunctional units 
with the current infantry brigade combat teams as their foundation.  They will have an 
enhanced ability to participate in steady-state multi-national partnerships and bilateral 
foreign internal defense (FID) operations.  They will still be full-spectrum capable (in 
fact, establishing and maintaining a secure environment through offensive and defensive 
operations is still the most critical requirement), but the units would be designed with 
stability operations as a core mission.  These units would be no more “specialized,” than 
a heavy brigade is for conventional warfare.  This would provide a more balanced, but 
still tailorable force structure.     
Intelligence, civil-affairs, and information operations specialists should be 
integrated elements of battalion and company headquarters.  Military police capabilities 
should be expanded and also integrated into infantry battalions, but differentiated from 
infantry in their functions.  Civil engineers and construction units should be created and 
integrated into security and development brigades.  Having non-combat related 
specialists organic to the units will promote greater unit effectiveness than the current 
adhocracy established by the brigade-modular design.   
Selected Stryker brigade combat teams, Airborne, and Air Assault brigade combat 
teams tailored for strategic missions such as rapid deployment and forced-entry 
requirements would remain in their current design.  The heavy brigade combat teams 
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would continue to be America’s dominant force in major conventional operations, 
conflict in open terrain, and as necessary, resourced to conduct urban and population-
focused operations.  Limited numbers of support and functional brigades would maintain 
stand-alone capabilities, providing theater support and capable of detaching subordinates 
units to heavy brigade combat teams as necessary.  Others would be absorbed into the 
security and development brigades.  This proposal could be an incremental step.  Should 
experimentation data and testimonies attest to the new design, similar capability designs 
could be implemented within heavy and Stryker brigade combat teams.       
The proposed force structure would still allow security and development brigades 
to conduct conventional offensive and defensive operations where its small unit 
proficiency would be necessary to defeating an adversary in a close fight, or utilizing 
standoff joint air, man-portable, and indirect weapons against distant enemies.  These 
capabilities are essential to traditional and irregular conflict, but they are not sufficient to 
insuring victory in today’s operational environment.  
C.   OUTLINE 
This paper will progress as follows.  Chapter II describes changes to the United 
States’ threat environment and the evolving national security policies that are attempting 
to address those changes.  Threat assessments should drive defense policies and 
capability assessments.  Capability requirements should drive the military’s force 
structure.  This process is often overlooked during political and organizational resource 
competitions.  Chapter III seeks to discern what assumptions and intentions led to the 
Army’s current force design, and examines the obvious gap between the capabilities 
inherent to the Army’s current force design (based on outdated assumptions) and those 
directed by more recent policy documents.  Chapter IV explores a wide array of policy 
and structural alternatives from a variety of military analysts.  Their proposals contribute 
to ongoing defense discussions, but have critical shortcomings, or simply do not offer 
enough detail from which to make meaningful policy recommendations.  In many cases 
this paper does not refute their ideas, but builds on them.  Chapter V uses organizational 
theory to demonstrate that recent changes in the United States’ strategic environment 
 8
suggest a need to create further specialization within the force structure, and those 
specialists should be integrated into lower-level tactical units.  Those theoretical 
underpinnings are then complemented with historical insights, Army doctrine, 
contemporary articles, presentations, and interviews to evaluate the capability and 
capacity of tactical units conducting irregular warfare to conduct intelligence operations, 
security operations, and civil-military operations.  While Chapters II and III discuss 
strategic-level policies, this chapter analyzes tactical-level capabilities.  Lastly, Chapter 
VI outlines a design proposal as a consideration for defense planners to modify the 
current modular-brigade design.      
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this thesis is limited to non-permissive environments where enemy 
forces employ asymmetric techniques, amongst civilian populations, in an effort to 
counter the technological and resource superiority of U.S. forces and their allies.  In such 
an environment, the BCT force structure becomes a significant determinant of the 
capabilities of the Army to conduct numerous irregular warfare tasks.  After describing 
an overall capability gap in U.S. defense posture, this paper pays specific attention to 
intelligence, security, and civil-military dimensions at the brigade and below levels of 
organization.   
Modifications in these areas are critical to the Army’s performance in irregular 
conflicts.  Adjusting the Army’s tactical force design to account for these changes would 
have operational-level implications, the extent of which is not fully explored within this 
paper.  However, this analysis is based on an assumption that the Army’s ground force 
structure should be built from the bottom up, congruent with strategic threat assessments 
and national security policies.  This paper is limited to irregular environments, but its 
recommendations could be adapted with minimal impact to the Army’s ability to conduct 
major conventional operations.   
This paper does not represent an all-inclusive study of the Army’s role in national 
security.  Nor does this study account for inter-agency applications of national power and 
influence.  Economic incentives and diplomatic initiatives should obviously precede any 
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foreign intervention by the United States.  When military force is necessary, there is a 
growing awareness that military actions must be complemented with increased civilian 
agency capacities.  Numerous conferences and studies are already exploring ways of 
better integrating those capabilities throughout all stages of military operations.  
Similarly, there is a necessary and well accepted movement to identify education and 
training deficiencies within the Army’s workforce.  For example, foreign-language 
training is being encouraged and the Army is promoting increased academic 
opportunities in economics, political science, public policy, and international relations.  
All of these initiatives are to be complimented.  Yet, while necessary, they may not be 
sufficient to properly transform the Army.      
Understandably, this paper will have its critics.  Extensive financial and political 
capital has already been expended on the current design and its personnel, materiel, 
doctrine, and base realignment implications.  Although the Army has launched numerous 
studies to analyze the effectiveness of its current design for irregular warfare, an over-
emphasis on traditional combat operations, external influences, and internal resistance 
still hinders honest assessments of future force capabilities.17  There is much to defend in 
current arrangements.  As Lieutenant Colonel James Boozell, an officer in the Army’s 
plans, policy, and experimentation department (Army G-3/5/7) acknowledged:  the Army 
is “holding the party line for now” with regard to force structure change.18  Force 
planners recognize the Army is in a pivotal period and are conducting continued tests and 
analysis, but are very unsure of what capabilities will be required beyond conflicts in Iraq  
 
                                                 
17 This paper attempts to view tactical-level force structure through a rational perspective.  However, 
there are numerous issues that account for force design decisions, many of which may carry more decision 
criteria weight then battlefield effectiveness.  Senior-leader backgrounds, organizational pre-dispositions, 
and budgetary disputes effect force design decisions.  Human resource concerns such as recruitment, 
retention, legacy promotion policies, and personnel allocations serve as decision limitations (sometimes 
with good reason, in other cases, falsely self-imposed).  The effect of domestic political concerns such as 
research and development allocations, industrial investments, equipment acquisitions, basing allocations, 
and National Guard force structures also effect force structuring decisions.  Lastly, the fact that 
organizations are largely resistant to change is well known.  For further discussion of organizational change 
and the national security decision making process, see James Wilson, Bureaucracy (U.S.:  Basic Books, 
1989) and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1999).   
18 LTC James H. Boozell, Strategy, Policy & Integration Branch Chief, Stability Operations and 
Irregular Warfare Division (interview with author, October 17, 2007). 
 10
and Afghanistan.  A potential (if not inevitable) foreign policy change and related defense 
budget allocations with a new presidential election further paralyze any bold initiatives 
for change.   
Boozell stated that there is “no analytical data that says the ‘full-spectrum BCT’ 
can’t do it all.”  This lack of empirical data allows senior military decision-makers to 
stave off criticism of the current design.  However, he also admited that irregular 
environments do not “lend themselves to zeros and ones” acknowledging the difficulty of 
establishing the kind of quantitative, predictive analysis Cold War planners were 
accustomed to, and the military’s modeling software is programmed for.  He asked, 
“How do you plug in cultural differences, and social ties?  How do you measure voting 
processes and political reconciliation?  What military capabilities are needed?  None of 
that computes.”  Rather than dismiss this study for its lack of quantitative evidence, it is 
my hope that it can be used as a model for further simulation and field testing.19  The 
Army’s future depends on its ability to further refine the BCT at the tactical level.     
For example, manning requirements as proposed in this paper, should be derived 
from rational capability assessments rather than permitting current limitations and 
personnel policies to constrain capability analysis and force structure alternatives.  A 
purely rational threat-based assessment is rarely used for policy and resource allocation 
decisions.  Branch parochialism, a rigid promotion system, cultural resistance, and 
defense procurement initiatives contribute to create a divisive system where force 
structure decisions are made as a result of extensive bargaining and compromise.  An 
Army colonel working force modernization issues for infantry brigade combat teams 
underscored this point when asked about the potential for increasing the number of 
battalions per brigade, given an anticipated increase in overall Army force size.  He 
                                                 
19 One source of empirical data and concept testing can be derived from OIF and OEF requirement  
requests from CENTCOM through Joint Forces Command to Army Forces Command.  Currently, 39% of 
the forces in Iraq and 75% of those in Afghanistan are designer units, different from the off-the-shelf 
capabilities existing in the current brigade modular design.  See Michelle Tan, “Deciding Who Goes, 
Where and When,” Army Times, October 14, 2007.  Another influential source for future force structure 
decisions should be each Geographical Combatant Commander’s Theatre Security Cooperation Plans, 
currently framed for 2015 resource requirements.  The Security Cooperation Plans should be the “analytical 
mark on the wall,” for force structure analysis according to Leslie Hunter, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, SOLIC (interview with author, October 17, 2007).   
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quickly stated, “it’s not going to happen, that wouldn’t increase the number of Flag 
(referring to General officer) positions.”20  Instead, the Army has attempted to transform 
its force design within an antiquated promotion system and hierarchy.  The challenge is 
to replace the rigid promotion timelines and criteria with more flexible performance-
based models needed for an updated BCT structure.         
Lastly, some readers may criticize this study as a model for “fighting previous 
wars,” as it is weighed heavily with supporting evidence from Iraq, and to a lesser degree, 
Afghanistan.  Iraq and Afghanistan may not provide a perfect blueprint for future 
operations; however, they are likely to be far more representative of future conflict than 
past conventional war assumptions and experiments used to validate the current force 
structure design.  The Army cannot afford to ignore the operational lessons of recent 
history.  Successes from the Gulf War resonated throughout the 1990s while military 
difficulties elsewhere were largely ignored.  Continued transformation and change are 
needed to keep Army ground forces relevant in the future.        
E. TERMINOLOGY 
There exists a dizzying array of terms to describe today’s military operations.  For 
example, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are often described by a variety of names 
such as post-conflict stabilization operations, counter-insurgency operations, and stability 
operations, highlighting the difficulty of clear naming conventions.  This paper draws 
from sources that use many terms interchangeably to include:  irregular warfare (IW), 
low intensity conflict (LIC), small wars, peace-keeping, counterinsurgency (COIN), 
stabilization and reconstruction (S&R), post-conflict stabilization, military operations 
other than war (MOOTW), nation-building, stability and support operations (SASO), and 
military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.  
While the military attempts to articulate doctrinal differences between these terms, they 
are used interchangeably by academia, policy makers, civil government agencies, and 
non-government organizations.  Although they carry recognized connotations, there is no 
                                                 
20 Anonymous Colonel serving as a member of the TRADOC Capabilities Manager (question and 
answer session following a “Breakout Session” during the Infantry Warfighting Conference, September 19, 
2007, Ft. Benning, GA). 
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overarching agreement on the details of their meaning.  Confusion and disagreements 
over the use of these terms complicates an already contentious debate.   
Even within the military community’s regulated vernacular, multiple terms and 
conflicting meanings abound.  A central tenet within the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (2006 QDR), approved by the Secretary of Defense and supported by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was improving Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
and general purpose force capabilities to conduct irregular warfare.  Irregular Warfare 
itself is still an emerging, and debated theme within the DoD.21  The 2006 QDR uses this 
term as an all-encompassing theme referring to military “activities” other than 
conventional combat operations against regular forces.   Irregular warfare is typically 
protracted, conducted in an indirect manner, and focuses its operations on “a relevant 
population” instead of simply defeating an adversary militarily.22  The Irregular Warfare 
Joint Operating Concept defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and 
non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.”23  IW is a 
broader term that encompasses COIN, stability operations, and FID.24   
Since the SSTR JOC refers to counterinsurgency as stability operations in a hostile 
environment, this paper tends to interchange these terms.  Since COIN is assumed to be 
practiced abroad by the United States in support of a foreign government, it carries a 
similar meaning to FID.  All of these missions fall under the broader term of IW.  The 
                                                 
21 Five months after the QDR was published, the Joint Staff requested a study on the doctrinal 
implications of irregular warfare (Joint Forces Command, Irregular Warfare Special Study) resulting in a 
recommendation not to include the term in joint doctrine. This recommendation was rebuffed by 
SOCOM’s, IW JOC which suggested that Joint Publication 1-02 “will need to be reviewed to incorporate 
IW terms.”  Numerous additions and changes were proposed in the IW JOC’s glossary.  The term “Irregular 
Warfare” is still under doctrinal dispute.        
22 DoD, IW JOC, 7.  
23 DoD, IW JOC, 4.   
24 According to the IW JOC, “insurgency and counterinsurgency are at the core of IW,” while “FID is 
thus the external support component of counterinsurgency,” and “SSTRO are an essential component of 
counterinsurgency campaigns (8).”  It is currently not defined in the Joint Publication or Army terms 
references but encompasses a broad spectrum of operations other than major combat against a 
conventional, state enemy.  Many of these operations have an operational focus that is inherently political, 
not military, while tactical operations focus on the population.  For further discussion regarding the current 
doctrinal debate over Irregular War see, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey L. Hasler, “Defining War:  New 
doctrinal definitions of irregular, conventional and unconventional warfare,” Special Warfare Journal, 
March-April (2007):  19-25. 
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capabilities that this paper attempts to identify with this study are similarly applicable to 
all three missions within the larger term of irregular warfare. 
This paper may interchange some terms due their associations from varying 
sources, but will attempt to keep doctrinal terms in line with Joint Publication 1-02, 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,25 Field Manual 1-
02, Operational Terms and Graphics,26 and recommendations proposed in the Irregular 
Warfare Joint Operating Concept.    Broadly defined, this paper is concerned with the 
ability of the Army’s general purpose forces to conduct irregular warfare.  More narrowly 
defined, this paper will focus on infantry and Stryker brigade combat teams conducting 
operations at the nexus of counterinsurgency, stability operations, SSTR, and foreign 
internal defense.  With the stage set, the attention can now be turned to the United States’ 
threat environment and its evolving national security strategy.  
                                                 
25 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, Washington D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 2001. 
26 Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, Washington D.C.:  
Government Printing Office, 2004.  
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II.  AN EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
The United States cannot force its opponents to fight the short, high-
technology wars it easily dominates.27  
This chapter describes post-Soviet changes to the United States’ threat 
environment as well as the emerging national security policies, directives, and military 
operating concepts developed to address these changes.  Looking forward, the United 
States envisions a world of irregular conflict, and the U.S. Army has been asked to 
execute missions crossing a large spectrum of operations.  Senior defense leaders have set 
new courses for national defense in the 2005 National Defense Strategy and the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review, directing the military to better prepare for irregular 
conflicts such as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and foreign 
internal defense.  The Joint Staff’s recent operating concepts establish conceptual 
frameworks for the future operating environment between 2015 and 2027.  These policies 
and concepts should become the Army’s analytical foundation for force structure 
decisions.  In subsequent chapters, this paper will assess whether the Army is responding 
with appropriate organizational adaptations.   
A.  CHANGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
We imagine the brewing threats of ‘Perfect Storms’ of failed governments, 
ethnic stratification, religious violence, humanitarian disasters, catalytic 
regional crises, and the proliferation of dangerous weapons.  We see 
lagging economies, unintegrated and disenfranchised populations, 
transnational crime, illicit sub-national power structures, and destabilizing 
bulges of uneducated and unemployed youth.28 
Disagreements about the force structure of the military, particularly the Army, lie 
first and foremost in debates over future strategic threats.  Recently, there has been a 
growing bifurcation within the defense community between those that see U.S. 
                                                 
27 Hammes, “Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation.”      
28 Remarks at the Joint Worldwide Planning Conference, Edelweiss Conference Center Garmisch, 
Germany, November 30, 2005, as quoted in the IW JOC, 9. 
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involvement in irregular war as something to avoid at all costs and therefore not taken 
seriously; and those that acknowledge the difficulty, but necessity to properly prepare for 
these conflicts.    The paramount issue facing defense planners is not what sort of 
missions the United States military would like to conduct or avoid.  But, discerning what 
missions it will have to perform, and performing those missions well.   
Future adversaries from non-state actors to regional threats will likely utilize 
irregular strategies to oppose U.S. military strengths.  Even if the United States’ Army 
continues to weigh its resources against the potential rise of a conventional competitor, 
the Army must not only prepare for major combat operations, but the post-conflict 
stabilization requirements that would follow.  Unlike the relatively stable environments 
of post-conflict Italy, Germany, and Japan, the likelihood of post-conflict instability will 
continue to exist in the foreseeable future.29  The Army must develop doctrine and 
organizations that cover transitions from invasion, major combat, and protracted irregular 
warfare.      
1. Visions of the Future 
In the 1990s while the U.S. military continued to train against Soviet-based 
doctrine, a quiet but growing audience began to question the nature of future threats.30  
Martin Van Creveld’s, The Transformation of War31 described recent changes in the 
nature of military conflict and the future of warfare.  Van Creveld argued that 
conventional warfare between states was being replaced with the tactics of guerrilla war 
                                                 
29 Increased weapons proliferation and communications have increased the destructive capabilities of 
guerrillas.   Additionally, some analysts suggest that increased operational fidelity and precision targeting 
can leave much of an invaded country in tact, allowing resources for guerrilla warfare.  Whereas, strategic 
bombing campaigns and massed conflict between large armies increased the suffering of indigenous 
populations making them less susceptible to conduct armed resistance against occupying powers.    
30 See also, Max G. Manwaring ed., Uncomfortable Wars, Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity 
Conflict (Boulder:  Westwiew Press, 1991).   
31 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed 
Conflict Since Clausewitz (New York:  The Free Press, 1991). 
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and terrorism employed by non-state actors.  He warned “strong” states to be wary of 
“weak” ones and to recognize the asymmetric nature of low intensity conflict.32   
Thomas Hammes built on Van Creveld’s work when he popularized the term 
“fourth generation warfare” (4GW).33  4GW represents an emergence of unconventional 
opponents who fight across the spectrum of “political, social, economic, and military 
networks.”   To combat worldwide networks of 4GW opponents, Hammes argued for 
“major changes in the way we educate, employ, structure, and train forces.”  In 2004 he 
expanded on his earlier work, providing a critical analysis of the military’s bureaucracy 
and its failure to adjust its organizations, tactics, and training to appropriately defeat 
today’s threats.34  While he notes the obvious benefits of technological development, he 
believes current research priorities are misplaced with an emphasis on technological 
networks (net-centric warfare) instead of human ones.   Hammes notes sunk costs, staffs, 
promotion and procurement systems that have contributed to “an entire culture and 
industry built around second- and third-generation warfare (conventional, combined arms 
maneuver).”35  Both Hammes and Van Creveld forewarned a future threat environment 
where stability operations, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism would become 
predominant.        
Published almost concurrently with Hammes’ earlier work, Robert Kaplan’s 
“Coming of Anarchy,”36 foreshadowed a similar future.  Today, his assessment deserves 
                                                 
32 Numerous authors have explored this subject.  Most recently, Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak 
Win Wars (England:  Cambridge University Press, 2005), uses extensive historical empirical evidence to 
suggest a simple model for conflict titled, “Strategic Interaction Theory.”  The essence of the argument is 
that strong and weak opponents can pursue regular or irregular warfare strategies.  When opponents adopt 
the same strategy (symmetric warfare), the strong win.  In cases where they adopt different strategies 
(asymmetry), the weak win.    
33 “4th Generation Warfare” was coined by Thomas X. Hammes, “The Evolution of War:  The Fourth 
Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette, September, 1994, http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm.    
34 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century (Minnesota:  Zenith 
Press, 2004).  Hammes outlines an “evolved form of insurgency,” where adversaries utilize “all available 
networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers 
that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit (208).”  Hammes’ 
critics note that his self-described 4GW is not a new phenomenon, but an asymmetric form of conflict that 
has reappeared throughout history.  Despite questions of semantics, his ideas are extremely insightful.   
35 Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 201.   
36 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/199402/anarchy.  
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more attention then it was once given.  To understand conflict over the next fifty years, 
he stated, “one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, 
geographic destiny, and the transformation of war.”  He cites a world population 
booming from 5.5 billion to more than 9 billion, the depletion and/or degradation of 
natural resources, and population movements that will breed crime and fuel existing 
hatreds such as those described by Samuel Huntington.37  Kaplan warns of a growing 
militant tract of Islamic extremism that “makes it attractive to the downtrodden,” and he 
declares, “it is the one religion that is prepared to fight.”  As the influence of Islam 
spreads, the governing legitimacy of many African, Middle East, and Southeast Asian 
states declines.  Kaplan envisioned our multi-colored globes of clearly defined nation-
states being “replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and 
anarchic regionalisms.”   
Amongst this chaos, there is a host of areas where the U.S. could find itself 
intervening (multilaterally, or unilaterally if necessary) and in need of capabilities more 
indicative of irregular than conventional combat.38  The collapse of a large state such as 
Indonesia or Pakistan (with the latter possessing nuclear weapons), providing assistance 
to an ally against an aggressor state in Africa, or conducting a future proxy war with 
Russia or China in central Asia will unlikely display symptoms of the linear, high-tech, 
platform-based combat that shaped current resource and organizational imperatives. 
As the economic gap grows between information-age states and many pre-
industrial societies, citizens of the latter will become more inclined to rebel against weak 
or corrupt states and other sources of injustice.39  Increasingly, the divide between 
                                                 
37 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 
http://www.alamut.com/subj/economics/misc/clash.html.   
38 Examples derived from Andrew Krepinevich, Nadia Schadlow, and Marin J. Strmecki, “Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations:  Meeting the Challenge” (PowerPoint presentation 
dated  March 7, 2007, emailed to the author).  Similar examples can be read in Metz and Hoffman, 
“Restructuring America’s Ground Forces:  Better, Not Bigger.” 
39 Known as “relative deprivation,” it is in part, due to “rapidly rising expectations, nourished by 
images of affluence and democratic lifestyles spread by the international mass media, have fueled feelings 
of deprivation among vast populations.”  See, Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism, A 
Psychological Exploration,” American Psychologist, vol. 60, no. 2 (February-March 2005), 161-169.  See 
also, Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks  (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004).   
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political insurgents and criminal opportunists is becoming harder to discern as both cite 
religious ideology or government neglect as their cause de jure.  The proliferation and 
size reduction of explosives, weapons, and the potential for biological contaminants 
makes suicide zealots particularly dangerous.  On a global level, disparate groups are 
becoming increasingly networked through information technologies, rallying around 
similar grievances or shared enemies.  At the local level, many of these groups maintain 
closely-guarded relationships in traditional social networks that can not be easily 
penetrated.40  These struggles may be less technological, but have the potential to be as 
devastating as the high-tech conventional wars the U.S. Army has prepared itself for in 
the past.   
In 1994, Congress directed a review of the “current allocations of roles, missions, 
and functions among the Armed Forces.”41  Their commission’s report indicated the 
possibility of peace operations increasing in frequency and intensity, and as such, the 
need for appropriate U.S. capabilities.42  It made numerous recommendations to include 
the following:  1) “assign proper priority to peace operations” through changes in DoD 
directives and planning guidance; 2) review related training programs and equipment 
stocks; 3) “integrate other agency resources”; 4) and “determine how best to organize 
DoD and non-DoD assets to conduct these operations.”43  Furthermore, the report 
recommended that the Secretary of Defense propose to the National Security Council a 
Presidential Directive that integrates inter-agency, contractors, and non-governmental 
organizations into peace operations.44  This suggestion finally took root with the release 
of National Security Presidential Directive 44 and DoD Directive 3000.05 in 2005, ten 
                                                 
40 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks.  Sageman emphasizes the role of societal networks over 
top-down organizational strategies for explaining terrorist recruitment initiatives. 
41 “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994,” PL 103-160, 30 November 1993 (as 
amended), as stated in, The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, John P. White, 
Chairman, Directions for Defense, The Department of Defense Report (Washington D.C.:  Brassey’s, 
1995).   
42 Peace operations as defined in the 1995 Directions for Defense Report are those missions to 
“prevent, halt, or contain conflict” other than major, regional combat operations.  Despite its name, the 
terminology is not meant to indicate a permissive threat environment and can be considered synonymous 
with today’s stability or counterinsurgency operations.    
43 Commission on Roles and Missions, Directions for Defense Report, 2-16, 2-17.     
44 Commission on Roles and Missions, Directions for Defense Report, 2-19.     
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years and four conflicts later.45   As such, there is no indication that the report’s 
suggestions were heeded when the Army designed its current force structure.     
However, the visions of Van Creveld, Kaplan, Hammes, and others have finally 
become established policy.  Today, one of the most commonly used diagrams found 
throughout current DoD policy documents and presentations is the following quadrant 
chart (see Figure 1).46  Unveiled in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, it establishes 
a conceptual visualization of the challenges the United States is expected to face in the 
twenty-first century:47   
• Traditional challenges posed by states employing conventional armies, 
navies, and air forces in well-established forms of military competition.   
• Irregular challenges from state and non-state actors employing methods 
such as terrorism and insurgency to counter our traditional military 
advantages, or engaging in criminal activity such as piracy and drug 
trafficking that threaten regional security. 
• Catastrophic challenges involving the acquisition, possession, and use of 
WMD by state and non-state actors; and deadly pandemics48 and other 
natural disasters that produce WMD-like effects.  
• Disruptive challenges from state and non-state actors who employ 
technologies and capabilities (such as biotechnology, cyber49 and space 
operations, or directed-energy weapons) in new ways to counter military 
advantages the United States currently enjoys.   
                                                 
45 See, George Bush, National Security Presidential Directive/NPSD 44, December 7, 2005, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html.  This memorandum was issued to improve 
“coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign 
states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”  It is largely viewed as a 
catalyst for developing an interagency approach to stabilization operations.  The document assigns lead to 
the State Department for stabilization and reconstruction activities, creating the office of the Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).     
46 See, DoD, QDR 2006; BG Andrew B. Twomey, “Cost of Modern War,” (PowerPoint presentation 
dated January 5, 2006); and DoD, IW JOC, 11.  
47 Paraphrased from, Office of the President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (Washington D.C.:  March, 2006), 44;  and The Office of the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, v 2.0 (Washington D.C.:  Department of 
Defense, August, 2005), 6, http://http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf.  
48 See, Thomas X. Hammes, “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges,” Military Review, 
May-June (2007), 14-23.  




Figure 1.   The Changing Threat Environment 
2. Weighing Risk 
Most of the national security policy documents today call for the military, namely 
the Army, to be better capable of combating irregular opponents.  However, a frequent 
caveat within defense policy documents is that the military cannot sacrifice its ability to 
deter, and if necessary conduct major conventional combat operations.  Though  
necessary, this has led to peripheral changes to the Army’s force design, providing 
marginal enhancements to better its performance at stability operations without giving up 
its ability to do what it does best—large scale conventional combat operations.  While 
procurement budgets may be finite, force structure options are not necessarily a zero-sum 
game.  The potential need exists to make the Army, or major elements of it, optimal for 
irregular conflict, while remaining capable of conducting conventional operations 
overseas.     
Critics of the Army’s present-day philosophical emphasis on counterinsurgency 
and stability operations point towards Iran, China, North Korea, and Russia as potential 
conventional threats to be wary of in the future.  Numerous strategists and military 
leaders see irregular warfare as a passing fancy.  They believe difficulties in Iraq are the 
ghosts of poor planning and idealized foreign policy—mistakes never to be made again.  
One senior defense planner called counterinsurgency “passe,” saying it would be a once-
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again forgotten concept once the military can free itself of Iraq and Afghanistan.50  In a 
recent speech to the National Press Club, the Army’s Chief of Staff General George 
Casey described the Army as “unbalanced.”  “Right now we’re focused on 
counterinsurgency training.  We need to get back to full-spectrum training as soon as we 
can,” he said, a statement many of his listeners assumed to mean placing a greater 
emphasis back on conventional combat.51  While trainers at the Army’s Joint Readiness 
Training Center say many leaders and staffs on the eve of their combat deployments still 
lack anything but a rudimentary understanding of counterinsurgency and the staff 
processes to help fight it,52 the Army’s senior officer is advocating a pendulum shift back 
towards traditional combat training—a change, even if it is irrelevant and counter-
productive to the conflicts at hand and those in the foreseeable future.   
Army documents consistently describe traditional warfare as the least likely, but 
most dangerous threat to American interests abroad.  The 2005 Capstone Concept for 
Joint Operations, version 2.0 acknowledges that the U.S. lead in traditional military 
power “nullifies the incentive of a potential opponent to compete with us.”  Most analysts 
agree that the U.S. should maintain its dominance in this regard, however the U.S. can 
not continue to suffer painful loses in what are often perceived as “lesser wars.”   
Should the U.S. Army have to engage a rival state such as Iran, China, North 
Korean, or Russia in future warfare, there is little reason to believe the ground battlefield 
would look like those of the 1940s and 50s.  Provided the U.S. maintains its dominance 
of the air and naval lanes, there is little likelihood rival states would desire to engage in 
traditional maneuver warfare.  Recognizing U.S. political fickleness and military 
vulnerabilities displayed in Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, future 
enemies may be more likely to execute a deliberate guerrilla campaign.  Countries such 
as Iran will be more likely to hug their cities and populations, using a combination of 
conventional platforms and irregular fighters if attacked, while attempting to employ 
                                                 
50 Lieutenant Colonel from Joint Forces Command who wished to remain anonymous (conversation 
with the author at a counterinsurgency seminar, March 14, 2007, Westpoint, N.Y).   
51 Gina Cavallaro, “Casey Urges More Conventional Training,” Military Times, August 17, 2007, 
http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2007/08/army_casey_070814w/?fromrss=1. 
52 Major (P) Andy Ulrich, IN, U.S. Army (phone interview, August 22, 2007).   
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terrorist tactics against the U.S. and its allies’ interests abroad.53  Strategist Thomas 
Hammes is adamant about this last point: 
Every potential opponent has observed the Gulf War, Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, and operations in Afghanistan.  They understand that if the 
United States is provided clear targets, no matter how well fortified, those 
targets will be destroyed.  Just as certainly, they have seen the success of 
the Somalis and the Sandinistas.  They have also seen and are absorbing 
the continuing lessons of Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  They 
will not fight with conventional means.54   
Let there be no mistake, a conventional hedge must be maintained against 
potential regional conflict with countries such as China as long as it continues to expand 
its military capabilities in a non-transparent way and seek to “lock up” energy markets 
around the world.55  When referencing China’s future military strategy, most defense 
planners discuss “unrestricted warfare,” based on a popular paper written by Qiao Liang 
and Wang Xiangsui of the People’s Republic of China.  Liang and Xiangsui describe a 
multi-pronged military strategy “with nothing forbidden” to include cyper-warfare, 
attacking the networks of financial institutions, terrorism, and urban guerrilla warfare.56  
Force planners fearful of China point to the Chinese missile test against one of their low-
flying weather satellites on January 11, 2007, and a Chinese submarine that allegedly 
“stalked” a U.S. Navy fleet on October 26, 2006.57   
                                                 
53 Iran’s use of proxies in Iraq is well documented and reported.  For example, see Simon Tisdall, 
“Iran’s Secret Plan for Summer Offensive to Force U.S. Out of Iraq,” The Guardian, May 22, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,2085195,00.html#article_continue.  Also, Associated Press, 
“U.S.: Iran Smuggling Missiles and Other Advanced Weapons into Iraq,” FoxNews.Com, September 24, 
2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,297777,00.html. 
54 Hammes, “Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation.”  
55 The Office of the President, The National Security Strategy, 41.  
56 Qia Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing 
House, February 1999), 2.  As referenced by Hasler, “Defining War.”  See also, Hammes, The Sling and 
the Stone.   
57 The intentions, meanings, and policy implications of these two events are largely debated.  For 
initial unclassified reporting, see Marc Kaufman and Dafna Linzer, “China Criticized for Anti-Satellite 
Missile Test,” Washington Post, January 18, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/AR2007011801029.html; and Bill Gertz, “China sub secretly stalked U.S. 
fleet,” The Washington Times, November 13, 2006,  
http://extendedremarks.blogspot.com/2006_11_13_archive.html.  
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Despite these ongoing tensions with the communist country, it is hard to imagine 
decisive tank on tank warfare in eastern Asia.  Instead, “the strategies of our adversaries 
will be to subvert, attrite, and exhaust us rather than defeat us militarily.”58  Conflict with 
China will likely take place in the financial markets or cyper-space.  Yet, it will be 
necessary to maintain significant capital-intensive expenditures to protect the U.S. lead in 
maritime, air, space, and digital domains, if only as a deterrence strategy.59  
 Additionally, should the U.S. face Iran, China, North Korea, or Russia in future 
conventional warfare, the challenges of post-conflict stabilization60 will likely still exist.  
As demonstrated in Iraq, war does not end when the last enemy tank is destroyed.  The 
U.S. cannot hope for future armistice treaties.  The Army must truly institutionalize 
tactics, doctrine, and organizational lessons being learned in Afghanistan and Iraq today.   
B. POLICY FORMULATION  
The 9/11 attacks and post-invasion difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
awakened the U.S. government to the realities of twenty-first century threats.  This has 
resulted in numerous policy changes and national security directives that encourage 
further changes within the Army beyond “transformations” initial blueprint.     
1. The Quadrennial Defense Review 
The 2005 National Defense Strategy encouraged defense planners to redefine past 
conceptions of general purpose forces, noting:  “our [U.S.] experiences in the war on 
terrorism points to the need to reorient our military forces to contend with such irregular 
challenges more effectively.”61  The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) took this 
guidance and sought ways for DoD capabilities to shift their emphasis to better prepare 
                                                 
58 DoD, IW JOC, 15. 
59 Hammes, The Sling and the Stone.     
60 Refers to the initial necessity to provide order, reconstitute essential services, reestablish 
governance and law, and provide the essential foundations for economic development.  U.S. involvement 
within a large-scale contingency could be as a supporting effort in a multilateral coalition, but will likely 
take a leading role when the situation demands it.   
61 The Office of the Secretary of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America (Washington D.C.:  Department of Defense, March 2005), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005.htm.  
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for a host of emerging threats.  The QDR notes that “U.S. forces are primarily organized, 
trained, educated, and equipped for traditional warfighting,” acknowledging the need to 
maintain such functions in the event of major conventional warfare.  However, the QDR 
also recognizes that military forces are not as capable of conducting protracted IW in the 
current or envisioned threat environments and recommends “rebalancing general purpose 
forces” to improve their capability to operate against adversaries who are attempting to, 
or already have mobilized their populations against us.62  Specifically, the QDR 
recognizes the need for “multipurpose forces to train, equip, and advise indigenous 
forces; deploy and engage with partner nations; conduct irregular warfare; and support 
security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.”63  
The 2006 QDR makes a stark contrast to its 2001 predecessor.  The 2001 QDR 
directed the DoD to design its force structure to “swiftly defeat” enemies in two military 
campaigns, winning one of them “decisively.”  It also acknowledged the need to conduct 
a “limited number of lesser military and humanitarian contingencies.”64  That same year, 
President Bush came to office proclaiming the U.S. would not get involved in nation-
building.65  However, the attacks of 9/11 reshaped U.S. foreign-policy, and led to a 
realization that the U.S. military was ill-prepared for the potential future.   
The 2006 QDR addresses this gap.  In the 2006 edition, the “lesser” types of 
contingencies became the focal point and “decisive” campaigns were replaced with an 
emphasis on “distributed, long-duration operations.”  The ability to compete in 
conventional campaigns became overshadowed by a desperate need to develop 
                                                 
62 DoD, IW JOC, 11; DoD, QDR 2006.   
63 DoD, QDR 2006, 23. 
64 The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington D.C.:  
Department of Defense, September 30, 2001), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf.  
(emphasis added)      
65 During a Bush-Gore presidential debate in Winston-Salem, North Carolina on October 11, 2000, 
Bush criticized President Bill Clinton’s foreign policy in Somalia and Haiti, stating, “I don’t think our 
troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building,” distinguishing peace-enforcement missions from 
what he believed the central purpose of the military should be, to “fight and win war.”  Bush then 
elaborated, “I think our troops ought to be used to help overthrow a dictator that’s in our and its in our best 
interests.” (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/10/11/politics/main240442.shtml)  President Bush’s 
administration has been frequently criticized for underestimating the scale and duration of nation-building 
requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan (particularly Iraq), after their governments were overthrown.          
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capabilities for unconventional warfare, FID, counterinsurgency, and stabilization 
operations.66  With the new guidance in place the Department of Defense should have 
refined its force planning construct.  But curiously, the QDR compliments the Army’s 
ongoing force structure change which was designed in accordance with the 2001 QDR’s 
emphasis on decisive conventional campaigns—a subject the next chapter will explore in 
greater detail.  The modular brigade’s force design has been relatively unscathed despite 
ongoing discussions to make general purpose ground forces more tailored to irregular 
environments.  
2. DoD Directive 3000.05 
DoD Directive 3000.05 was signed on November 28, 2006 to establish “DoD 
policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, 
training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations...”67  The directive 
defines military support to SSTR as those DoD activities “that support U.S. Government 
plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to 
sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.”68  Stability operations are broadly 
defined as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to 
conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”69  Paragraph 4.1 states:  
[Stability operations] shall be given priority comparable to combat 
operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD 
activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, 
material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.70 
The directive correctly places heavy emphasis on civil-military partnerships and 
inter-agency organizations, foreign government and security force integration, 
cooperation with U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.  
                                                 
66 DoD, 2006 QDR, 36. 
67 Gordon England, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
Operations,” Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (November 28, 2005), 1.2,  
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf. 
68 DoD Directive 3000.05, 3.2. 
69 DoD Directive 3000.05, 3.1. 
70 DoD Directive 3000.05, 4.1 (emphasis added).   
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However, the directive assigns the U.S. military responsibility to perform “all tasks 
necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”71  This tasking 
results from the realization that civil assistance is limited while hostilities continue.  The 
presence of non-state terrorists, intra-state insurgents, violent militias, and criminal 
elements will continue to present the major impediment to U.S. stability efforts.  Those 
efforts may follow major combat operations, U.S. interdictions against inter-state and 
intra-state violence that threatens regional stability, disastrous humanitarian crisis, and 
other U.S. interests abroad.  Paragraph 1.3 claims that DoD Directive 3000.05 
“supersedes any conflicting portions of existing DoD issuance.”  This should include the 
current modular brigade design.   
3. Joint Operating Concepts 
While the 2006 QDR establishes a defense strategy, and DoDD 3000.05 
establishes a mandate, the Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and 
Reconstruction Operations (SSTR JOC), Joint Operating Concept and the Irregular 
Warfare Joint Operating Concept establish a guide for future strategy design, doctrine, 
and force structure.  While these operations share many commonalities, certain ones are 
more indicative of one environment over another.  This paper is identifying capabilities 
that are required in the ambiguous nexus of irregular warfare, major combat operations 
(MCO), and SSTR operations.  The area is conceptually displayed in Figure 2.72 
                                                 
71 DoD Directive 3000.05, 4.3. 
72 Modified from the IW JOC, “JOC Relationships,”13.     
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Figure 2.   Conceptual Linkages  
 
Written in December 2006, the SSTR JOC “posits an operational level solution for 
a very challenging future military problem—how the Joint Force can more effectively 
prepare for and conduct SSTR operations to assist governments or regions under serious 
stress.”  The document seeks to identify capabilities for future SSTR operations, and 
establishes a recognized framework for further Defense Department experiments and 
simulations.   Within a conceptual timeframe of 2014-2026, the SSTR JOC claims to 
represent a launch point for future doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader 
development and education, personnel, and facility (DOTMLPF) changes associated with 
military support to SSTR operations.  The SSTR JOC establishes six major missions of a 
SSTR Operation at the operational level as depicted in Figure 3 below.73     
                                                 
73 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0 (Washington D.C.:  Department of 
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Figure 3.   Operational Lines of SSTR  
The SSTR JOC claims to establish operational concepts within the broader 
guidelines of DoDD 3000.05 and NSPD 44.  Relevant to this study, the SSTR JOC cites 
“high end” SSTR as those “operations associated with a U.S. imposed regime change, 
assisting a faltering government or responding to the collapse of a government caused by 
internal failure or military defeat.”  When this situation includes the presence of 
threatening armed forces opposing the host government, this type of SSTR is a 
counterinsurgency operation.74   
The finer details of the SSTR JOC showcase a continuous source of friction within 
the military community.  Some members of the armed forces are still resistant to adopt 
certain “civilian responsibilities” in a conflict environment.  The SSTR JOC consistently 
states civilian agencies and organizations “will” take the lead in stabilization missions 
instead of “should” and calls on the creation of an operational civilian core.  But the 
document provides an early disclaimer about the lack of civilian capabilities and twice 
writes a “high risk” warning about civilian capabilities not arriving in the quantity or for 
the longevity needed in an SSTR environment abroad.  The military must improve its 
                                                 
74 DoD, SSTR JOC, iv. 
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ability to coordinate efforts with civilian agencies abroad, oftentimes in a supporting 
capacity. However, until significant reforms are made throughout the inter-agency, the 
least bit of which is a legal mandate to serve in hostile assignments when directed 
(similar to the Uniformed Code of Military Justice), service members will have to expect 
to carry the propensity of effort in a hostile or semi-permissive environment.  The 
question is whether they are prepared to do so?   
The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept identifies a common framework 
for tasks the military must perform that are radically different from conventional combat 
operations.  It lists fourteen activities belonging to the concept of irregular warfare:  
insurgency; counterinsurgency; unconventional warfare; terrorism; counterterrorism; 
foreign internal defense; stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations; 
strategic communications; psychological operations; civil-military operations; 
information operations; intelligence and counterintelligence activities; transnational 
criminal activities; and law-enforcement activities countering irregular adversaries.75 
While some of these operations have historically been the hallmarks of Special 
Operations units, the 2006 QDR is calling on general purpose forces (GPF) to assume a 
larger role in some of these tasks to include, COIN, FID, and SSTR.  Without a doubt 
many of these activities are inter-related.  Specifically the IW JOC expands GPF 
capability requirements as follows:     
• Provide a greater number of small units operating in a distributed manner 
throughout a potentially large operational, working unilaterally, or with 
partners.  (This concept is similar to that of joint net-centric warfare, only 
IW is the type of warfare, not conventional operations).  
• Prepare to conduct COIN, operating “amongst the people.” 
• Train and advise indigenous forces in IW operations. 
• Establish interim military government or perform civil administration 
functions in occupied or liberated territory when indigenous, international, 
or US civilian agencies cannot do so.    
                                                 
75 This list includes both U.S. and our adversary’s “activities.”  Terrorism and criminal activities are 
explicitly listed as being “used by our adversaries.”  (See Figure 2). 
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In the 1990s, Martin van Creveld’s Transformation of War, was a must read 
within the Pentagon.  His concepts were reinforced in 2003 with Thomas Hammes’ Sling 
and the Stone, almost a mandatory read on most military professional reading lists.  After 
9/11 and years of difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq, their visions of the future threat 
environment have been embodied by recent policy documents and directives.  What 
remains to be seen is how suited the Army’s current force structure is to these changes.  
In subsequent chapters, this paper will determine if the Army is responding fast enough 
to today’s environment with appropriate organizational adaptations.  The evidence 
suggests not.     
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III.  THE ARMY’S RESPONSE—“TRANSFORMATION” 
The previous chapter discussed traditional and irregular threat concepts under 
consideration by military planners.  It outlined strategy and policy changes that should be 
the impetus for the Army’s force structure decisions.  This chapter describes the Army’s 
current force structure and shows how it came to be.  First, an overview of the revolution 
in military affairs (RMA) discussions and their theoretical underpinnings establish a 
foundation on which to better understand the assumptions that led to the Army’s current 
modularity design.  Second, an overview of the more current transformation planning and 
policy documents will articulate the intent behind the Army’s latest organizational 
design, the brigade combat Team (BCT).  A description of the BCT design will identify 
capability gaps when the BCTs are tasked to conduct irregular operations such as 
counterinsurgency and stability operations.   
A. THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
Post-Cold War changes in international relations, a changing threat environment, 
and an explosion of technological innovations in the 1980s led to frequent debates since 
the 1990s about the use of technology in the military.  Actual and potential improvements 
in information technologies, precision weapons, armor, and robotic capabilities have 
launched a theoretical movement known as the revolution in military affairs.  Not only 
did the defense community respond with ideas of warfare altered by technological 
dominance, but it looked to exploit technology to keep U.S. power projection relevant in 
a post-Soviet era.     
The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the mobility and lethality of an increasingly 
digitized battlefield in the vast desert of Kuwait and southern Iraq.  Advanced 
communications, global positioning systems, and precision weapons demonstrated the 
formidable power of air-ground coordination in an increasingly joint, combined-arms 
fight.  However, the lack of available pre-positioned forces in the region resulted in an 
extensive and time-consuming build-up prior to the initiation of ground combat.  
Meanwhile, light infantry soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division were temporarily 
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holding a defensive line, exposed to the threat of Iraq’s heavier and larger ground forces.  
Preparations for the Gulf War revealed a weakness in United States’ ability to project 
military force abroad. 
For decades, the U.S. military remained postured for potential ground combat in 
Europe and eastern Asia against the U.S.S.R.  When the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S. 
government responded with a “peace dividend” by way of a reduction in military size and 
spending.  Worldwide base realignments and closures throughout the 1990s reduced the 
size of pre-positioned military forces abroad.  Additionally, battle plans designed for 
mobile conventional ground combat in the Fulda Gap or the Korean peninsula gave way 
to a new host of potential contingencies.    
The U.S. became increasingly involved in third-world conflicts where pre-
positioned equipment was unavailable and countries of interest lacked the infrastructure 
to support heavy vehicle movement.76  Not knowing where U.S. forces would be called 
to in the future, defense planners sought ways to increase U.S. strategic mobility and 
reduce logistics requirements for rapid deployment forces.  Transformation initiatives 
explored lighter platforms and improvements for ground and sea mobility.  Besides 
mobility platforms, futurists foresaw information technologies as a combat multiplier that 
could revolutionize Army tactics.   
Of the numerous scholars calling for major changes in military strategy and force 
structure throughout the 1990s, perhaps none were as influential as Douglas Macgregor 
and Arthur Cebrowski.  Macgregor’s Breaking the Phalanx argued for changes to the 
Army’s legacy structure of corps and division-level fighting formations.77  His thesis 
called for the reorganization of the Army into mobile combat groups pre-positioned 
throughout the world, postured to conduct “rapid and decisive” operations relying on 
“superior knowledge” and “information dominance.”  Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski 
                                                 
76 H.R. McMaster, “A Crack in the Foundation:  Defense Transformation and the Underlying 
Assumption of Dominant Knowledge in Future War” (Student issue paper, CSL, U.S. Army War College, 
vol. S03-03, November 2003).  McMaster references mobility problems during the initial phase of 
Operation Desert Shield (lack thereof), in Somalia (lack of armored vehicles), and Kosovo (lack of 
appropriate type). 
77 Douglas A. McGregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century 
(Westport, CT:  Praeger, 1997). 
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echoed similar concepts of speed, precision, and information superiority in his 1998 
Proceedings article that popularized the term “network-centric warfare” (NCW).78  Both 
authors were invaluable catalysts of change within the defense community and their ideas 
carry significant merit; however, neither author gave much attention to the possible 
difficulties of post-conflict stability operations, counterinsurgency, and elements of 
irregular warfare that affect U.S. Army ground forces today.  Macgregor, Cebrowski, and 
other theorists were proposing revolutionary ways of fighting traditional military 
adversaries.    
B. ARMY TRANSFORMATION 
1.  A Three-Pronged Strategy 
On October 12, 1999, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki announced 
the formal initiation of the Army’s transformation plan.   
To adjust the condition of the Army to better meet the requirements of the 
next century, we articulate this vision:  ‘Soldiers on point for the nation 
transforming this, the most respected army in the world, into a 
strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of 
operations.’  With that overarching goal to frame us, the Army will 
undergo a major transformation…79   
The transformation plan had three elements:  the legacy force, objective force, and 
interim force (see Figure 4).80  The division of the Army’s force structure and 
                                                 
78 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare:  Its Origin and 
Future,” Proceedings, January (1998), http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/overview.html.  Their article 
focused on Naval Operations but the concepts and terminology have become hallmarks of each Service’s 
transformation initiatives within the Department of Defense.  It is not my intention to criticize Cebrowski’s 
vision of defense transformation; instead, the perverse application of his vision to the realm of irregular 
conflict.  Cebrowski, who passed on November 12, 2005, should appropriately be remembered as an 
important visionary who helped launch insightful discussions about the future of warfare.  
Cebrowski credited the term “network-centric warfare” to a speech given by the Chief of Naval 
Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, (U.S. Naval Institute Annapolis Seminar and 123d Annual Meeting, April 
23, 1997).              
79 Dennis Steele, “The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Army Transformation,” Army Magazine, 
2001, http://www.ausa.org/PDFdocs/Hooah_Guide_web.pdf.  “Full-Spectrum” at this point referred to a 
spectrum of conflict, from low intensity threats to high intensity ones.  This was later changed to refer to a 
spectrum of operations, including stability, offensive, and defensive actions.   
80 Steele, “Guide to Army Transformation.”  
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procurement was seen as a way of balancing the risks of an uncertain future strategic 
environment and the possibility that future technologies would fail to meet planners’ 
expectations.  Early planners envisioned two decades of development that would result in 
a futuristic objective force around 2020.    
 
 
Figure 4.   Army Transformation  
 
The legacy force consisted of the Army’s traditional heavy and mechanized 
infantry forces that would be sustained and continually modernized with new technology.  
Maintaining this force was seen as a hedge against the rise of potential near-peer 
competitors and would continue to be the nation’s muscle in major combat operations 
requiring the mobility, survivability, and firepower of heavy armor.  The legacy 
platforms could also serve as platforms for new vehicle mounted technologies.81   
                                                 
81 To this day, FCS experiments have mostly been conducted on the M1 and M2 variant vehicles 
because of significant power and weight requirements.  Already, discussions of a revolutionary 
homogeneous future force in 2020 are being replaced with an acknowledgement that legacy platforms will 
be part of the force structure for much longer.  Furthermore, the creation of the Maneuver Warfare Center 
of Excellence at Fort Benning, GA, between 2006-2016 will combine the Army’s infantry and armor 
training programs.  While this provides for greater training synergies focused on traditional combined-arms 
maneuver battlefield, it may encourage education programs tailored to vehicular platforms, and lessen the 
infantry’s needed focus on irregular threats and population-focused operations.   
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The interim force was the short-term focus of transformation, designed to consist 
of interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs)82 that would fill the gap between light and 
heavy forces.  They offered greater mobility, survivability, and firepower than light units, 
and could self-sustain for longer periods of time; but were designed to be light enough to 
be rapidly transported by aircraft.  This force was advertised as being “full spectrum 
capable.”83  While IBCT conversions were first initiated to fill strategic mobility and 
initial entry gaps identified during Operation Desert Shield, it also stood out as being 
particularly suited for small-scale contingencies, especially those in urban terrain.   
The objective force was designed to be the gateway to the future.  “The Objective 
Force will combine the deployability of light forces with the lethality, tactical mobility, 
and survivability of heavy forces.”84  Replacing Force XXI,85 the Future Combat System 
(FCS) family of vehicles, weapons, and sensors, was its focus.  This system was 
advertised as being a fully networked Army of soldiers with enhanced capabilities, armed 
platforms that are lighter but stronger than today’s vehicles, unmanned ground and air 
vehicles, and a network of manned and unmanned sensors.      
2.  The Irregular Gap 
The Army’s transformation was accelerated by the Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld, following the attacks of September 11th.  He issued the Department of 
Defense’s Transformation Planning Guidance in April 2003 stating: 
                                                 
82 Name later changed to Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) after the wheeled vehicle used as 
the units’ primary mobility platform.   
83 “Full spectrum capable” previously referred to the spectrum of conflict from low intensity to high 
intensity.  The term has since been redefined to indicate a spectrum of operations that transitions between 
offense, defense, and stability operations capabilities.  The term has been sufficiently watered down and all 
units are now considered “full spectrum capable.”    
84 Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, Seth Jones, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 
Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options (Santa Monica:  RAND, 2002).  
85 Force XXI was the namesake for the Army’s software-based, information-age experimental force 
redesign.  It was introduced as a concept in 1995 with the publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force 
XXI Operations.  Ongoing tests throughout the late 1990s revealed both limitations and the potential for 
future technological applications to warfare.  The program resulted in some equipment designs and 
software programs.  Today, it has largely been replaced by the Future Combat Systems program.  For a 
more detailed description, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/force-xxi.htm.   
 38
Some believe that with the United States in the midst of a dangerous war 
on terrorism, now is not the time to transform our armed forces.  I believe 
that the opposite is true.  Now is precisely the time to make changes.  The 
war on terrorism is a transformational event that cries out for us to rethink 
our activities, and to put that new thinking into action.86   
The Army adjusted its short-term transformation plan to accelerate the conversion 
of divisions with their assorted brigade support units to modular brigades.87  Joint 
interdependence between the military’s services and expeditionary capabilities became 
the hallmarks of transformation.  These concepts were implemented through a redesign of 
the division-centric mass Army to a brigade-centric maneuver force that was rapidly 
deployable, self-contained, and capable of achieving “decisive results.”  President Bush’s 
2003 statement provides an even greater summation of the new transformation concept: 
…a future force that is defined less by size and more by mobility and 
swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies more 
heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and information technologies.88 
While the United States was initiating a protracted war against guerrillas and terrorists, 
the Army was implementing a force structure designed and tested for the rapid defeat of 
conventional military forces.       
Largely influenced by Cebrowski’s popularized notions of warfare, Rumsfeld’s 
guidance for the military’s transformation was depicted as “fundamentally joint, network-
centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across 
the battlespace.”89  It is ironic that Rumsfeld’s written guidance was published 
immediately following the invasion of Iraq.  While proclaiming the needs of the Global 
War on Terror, the guidance specifies, “We cannot afford to react to threats slowly or 
have large forces tied down for lengthy periods.  Our strategy requires transformed forces 
                                                 
86 Donald H. Rumsfeld’s foreword to Transformation Planning Guidance (Washington D.C.:  
Department of Defense, April 2003), 
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library_files/document_129_Transformation_Planning_Guidance_April_2003_1.pd
f.    
87 From October 29, 2001 until January 31, 2005, the Department of Defense Office of Force 
Transformation was headed by (then retired), Arthur K. Cebrowski.   
88 George Bush as quoted by, DoD, Transformation Planning Guidance, 3. 
89 Donald Rumsfeld’s foreword to, DoD, Transformation Planning Guidance, 1.    
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that can take action from a forward position and, rapidly reinforced from other areas, 
defeat adversaries swiftly and decisively…”90  Irregular opponents and stabilization 
strategies were not part of the design criteria.      
The roots of this proclamation, and its obvious shortcomings, can be seen in 
Breaking the Phalanx.  Macgregor recognized the need for adaptable war fighting 
structures that must conduct a wide array of missions and discounted the “creation of new 
OOTW-specific [Operations Other Than War] military structures and training.”91  
Macgregor believed “recent trends of civil disturbance” to be of “peripheral strategic 
importance in order to secure the ideals and habits of democracy.”  He recognized the  
lack of attention he gave “low-intensity conflict,” but stated that it would be unwise to 
shape the military to perform these actions.  And while Macgregor claimed, “Army 
ground forces must be prepared to administer and control large populated areas of enemy 
territory until legitimate indigenous administration can be restored,” his chapter-long Iraq 
conflict scenario culminated with the “installation of a friendly government” one day 
after the arrival of U.S. forces in Baghdad.92  To be fair, Macgregor acknowledged the 
troop-intensive nature of occupations, but the overall theme of Breaking the Phalanx is 
one of rapid combined arms maneuver against future conventional threats, using modern 
technological innovations.   
Throughout the RMA and transformation discussions, an implicit assumption was 
that soldiers trained and units specifically organized for close conventional combat could 
                                                 
90  DoD, Transformation Planning Guidance, 4.   
91 Macgregor, 169.  McGregor suggests that the challenges posed by unconventional warfare and 
peacekeeping can be better managed through graduate level officer training instead of force design 
changes.  Acknowledging improvements in education programs as paramount, in Chapter five this paper 
will argue that training time is finite.  Greater specialization in the workforce will result in greater unit 
effectiveness during irregular warfare.  This requires improvements to the Army’s education system and 
organizational change.      
92 Published in 1997, Macgregor demonstrated eerie foreshadowing using a fictitious conflict with Iraq 
in the future-year 2003.  He described the future scenario to demonstrate notional capabilities of his force 
design proposal and technology-based strategy.  While acknowledging irregular threats, Macgregor’s 
scenario entails large aerial dogfights, cruise missile strikes, MLRS bombardments, and a rapid invasion by 
a ground force that is closely mirrored six years later.  During the imaginative scenario, Macgregor 
describes a ground force that can “deploy quickly and advance rapidly in great strength into the depths of 
the enemy’s territory…neutralizes enemy’s military capability…ensures a rapid collapse of his command 
system, and terminates the conflict.”  Macgregor, 145. 
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easily conduct an array of other missions.  Therefore, tests used to validate the new force 
designs were primarily focused on traditional combat and largely ignored “the other 
missions.”  McMaster provided his perspective on one of the simulation scenarios as 
follows: 
In constructive computer simulation exercises designed to “validate” the 
new design, near perfect intelligence permitted centralized targeting of 
large conventional forces such that long-range rocket artillery, Apache 
helicopters, and other fires compensated for the division’s reduction in 
combat power.  The new division was “smaller” yet “more lethal” because 
the assumption of dominant knowledge gave the unit “situational 
understanding.93 
The scenarios were a throwback to the Gulf War.  Irregular threats and the effects of 
urban terrain were primarly ignored while the merits of information technologies were 
largely inflated. 
In addition to testing scenarios and strategists’ assumptions, a lack of emphasis on 
stability operations should not be surprising given its portrayal in the Army’s previous 
doctrinal literature.  FM 3-0, Operations, is the Army’s flagship how-to-fight manual.94  
In its 2001 version, it embodied the lexicon of classic combined arms doctrine, the “close 
with and destroy” concept, that is insufficient and often times counter-productive to the 
intricacies of irregular conflict.   
In stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means 
Army forces use to influence adversary actions.  In all cases, the ability of 
Army forces to engage in close combat, combined with their willingness 
to do so, is the decisive factor in defeating an enemy or controlling a 
situation.95 
This statement is incredibly misleading.  While the capacity for violent, small-
unit, close combat is as necessary in irregular warfare as it is conventional combat 
                                                 
93 McMaster, Crack in the Foundation, 30.   
94 Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations (Washington D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 
June 2001).  This manual is currently under revision.  The updated version, Full-Spectrum Operations, 
places greater emphasis on stability operations than its predecessor.   
95 Task Force Modularity, Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Volume 1, Version 1.0 (Fort 
Monroe, VA:  U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, October, 2004), 6-3, 
http://www.forscom.army.mil/weathr/Army_Transformation/Mod_OO_v._1.0.pdf.          
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operations, the Army has painfully realized that it is rarely sufficient to achieve 
sustainable battlefield success.  In response to the problems facing troops in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the Army published a manual on counterinsurgency in December of 2006.96  
Instead of “defeating the enemy,” protecting the populace becomes decisive.  Fostering 
effective indigenous governance, creating political solutions, low-level intelligence 
gathering, law enforcement, and facilitating economic growth becomes just as important 
as “close combat dominance.”  Former brigade commander, Colonel Mike Shields notes, 
“without some kind of economic development or reconstruction, security alone won’t fit 
the bill.”97   
The Army’s initial handbook on transformation’s structural changes was The 
Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, (Guide to Modularity).98  It is filled with 
diametrically opposing concepts of threat, strategy, and force structure as it defends the 
notion that the BCT provides an all-purpose structural and capabilities framework for the 
Army.  Appropriately, the Army’s close combat threat is portrayed as being increasingly 
unconventional in nature, often operating in restrictive terrain (such as urban areas), and 
frequently adopting guerrilla and terrorist tactics.  An insurgent threat will “depend upon 
the acquiescence, if not active support, of the indigenous population.”  Yet, within the 
next few pages of the guide, air power, attrition of the enemy, and exploiting maneuver 
are but a few of the descriptions of the BCT’s close combat capabilities.  These 
contradictions support Hammes’ argument that DoD initiatives such as those posed in the 
Transformation Planning Guidance and Joint Vision 2020 are focused primarily on high-
technology conventional war—seemingly new tools for the same job, yet marketed under 
                                                 
96 Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C.:  Government Printing 
Office, December 2006).   
97 Colonel Mike Shields, former commander, 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (presentation at the 
Infantry Warfighting Conference, September 19, 2007, Ft. Benning, GA).   
98 Army, Guide to Modularity.  This manual contains descriptions and illustrative depictions of the 
revised tables of organization and equipment from division-level to the company and platoon.  Filled with 
wire diagrams and block charts, this document is intended to both clarify and justify the Army’s 
organizational changes in accordance with current transformational initiatives.  It has since been replaced 
by Department of the Army, FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office,  August 4, 2006).   
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the “rubric of transformation.”99  While the DoD has made adjustments to its post-9/11 
training strategies and doctrine, its basic organizational structure at the tactical level 
remains wed to antiquated defense strategies.  Today’s transformation is not wrong; it’s 
just not enough.      
3.  A New Direction?    
While Shinseki used the 1999 AUSA conference to initiate the Army’s 
transformation to a more expeditionary force, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates used 
the same venue on October 10, 2007 to budge the U.S. Army in a different direction than 
his predecessor.100  Gates noted the military’s aversion to irregular conflicts following 
the Vietnam War, leaving the Army “unprepared to deal with the operations that followed 
in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans and more recently, Afghanistan and Iraq—the 
consequences and costs of which we are still struggling with today.”  He expects 
asymmetric warfare to “remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some 
time,” and although he didn’t advocate any specific plans, Gates challenged the Army not 
to treat Iraq and Afghanistan as anomalies.  Instead, he emphasized that the Army must 
develop greater advising capabilities, language proficiencies, and hone its ability “to fight 
smaller forces of insurgents.”  Additionally, he revived a term purposely abandoned by 
his predecessor—nation-building. 
Army soldiers can expect to be tasked with reviving public services, 
rebuilding infrastructure and promoting good governance…all these so-
called ‘nontraditional’ capabilities have moved into the mainstream of 
military thinking, planning and strategy, where they must stay.        
 A recent Army Times article further highlights the disconnect between the current 
operating environment and the force-mix available to meet its demands.101  
                                                 
99 Hammes, Sling and the Stone, 225. 
100 For quotes and commentary from his presentation, see Julian E. Barnes and Peter Spiegel, 
“Rethinking the U.S. Army,” Los Angeles Times, October 10, 2007;  Barnes, “Gates Urges Funds for a 
Smarter Army,” Los Angeles Times, October 11, 2007;  Lolita C. Baldor, “Gates Envisions an Army 
Remade to Fight Future Wars,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, October 11, 2007;  and David S. Cloud, “Gates 
Says Military Faces More Unconventional Wars,” New York Times, October 11, 2007. 
101 Michelle Tan, “Deciding Who Goes, Where and When,” Army Times, October 14, 2007.  
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Commander’s in Iraq and Afghanistan are increasingly requesting “designer units,” force 
requests tailored to their current environments.  According to Colonel Edge Gibbons, 
Chief of FORCOM’s plans division: 
As [the] theater has matured, the additional capabilities required often 
don’t match existing Army inventory for certain niche capabilities that are 
required based on the operating environment…It decreases readiness of 
the Army because it’s breaking units.  For every designer unit we make, 
that’s one or more units that we break to meet that requirement.   
While the Army touts the flexibility of the current modular design, it is ill-suited 
to meet the demands of its current theaters.  Instead of adjusting the Army’s force 
structure to embrace mission tailoring and modularity as advertised, FORSCOM is 
discouraging the use of “designer units.”  Instead of changing the force mixtures 
available, the Army seems to be telling commanders in the field, “make do with what you 
have.”  Regardless of the scale of today’s conflict, the Army should better tailor its force 
design to the current operating environment, assuming (as Secretary Gates does) that this 
will be more indicative of future conflict then previous assumptions foretold.   
Thus far, early planning assumptions and operational imperatives of the Army’s 
“transformation” have been examined.  The next section will be a descriptive overview of 
the Army’s modular brigade concept.             
C.  BRIGADE MODULARITY  
The basic premise of the Army’s recent force structure change was to disassemble 
certain corps and division support brigade structures to create autonomous and rapidly 
deployable brigade-centric ground forces.  Previously a combined arms brigade combat 
team was not structured with organic support capabilities, relying instead on attachments 
from divisional units.    Instead of the division, the brigade has become the basic building 
block of the Army.  This allows faster deployment, more rotational depth, and better task 
force tailoring, while supposedly reducing the number of redundant support commands 
who have no war-time responsibilities.102  As part of the ongoing restructuring plan and 
                                                 
102 Walker, “Army Force Structure and Implementation of Directive 3000.05.”    
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pending an active component/reserve component initiative, the Army intends to convert 
over 100,000 individual specialty positions from “low demand” skill sets to “high 
demand” professions.103   
In May of 2007, the National Defense University (located at Fort McNair, 
Washington D.C). held a conference on “Force Structure for Stability Operations and 
Interagency Integration.”  The Army’s Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, 
gave a presentation titled, “Army Force Structure and Implementation of Directive 
3000.05.”104  According to the presentation, the modularity plan centered on the brigade 
combat team design, augmented by functional or multi-functional modular brigades 
“allows units to be designed and adapted in ‘real time’ to execute stability operations in 
any environment under any condition.”  The presentation notes it as the “most significant 
Army restructuring in the last 50 years.”  In particular, the current modularity plan was 
advertised as follows:105     
• Modular brigades can “plug and play” with different corps and division 
HQs.   
• Units are decentralized, leader-enabled command and control.   
• The brigade combat team (BCT) is organized to include stability 
operations capabilities.  
                                                 
103 Walker, “Army Force Structure and Implementation of Directive 3000.05,” slide 26.  This long-
term plan has soldiers being “retrained and reallocated” from field artillery, air defense, engineers, armor, 
and certain logistics units to military police, transportation, civil affairs, special operations, biological 
detection, and military intelligence units.  According to Boozell, (interview, October 17, 2007) most of 
these conversions are occurring through attrition in over-strength specialties and placing new recruits into 
under-strength specialties.  Most of these specialists are grouped together in functional and multi-functional 
brigades, separate from the brigade combat teams.         
104 Restructuring was not the only intent of the Walker, “Army Force Structure and Implementation of 
Directive 3000.05.”  The speaker discussed a number of issues relevant to the military’s DOTMLPF 
system’s approach.  Other messages included:  Doctrine- A host of new doctrine has emerged since 9/11 to 
address changes in threat environment (conventional and unconventional), an operating environment that is 
increasingly joint, interagency, and multinational, and emerging tactics centered on “full-spectrum” 
operations.  Training- Improvements have been made to the Army’s combat training centers that exercise 
“continuous, complex counterinsurgency operations,” stress the importance of civil affairs, and utilize 
ethnic role players.  The speaker stressed the importance of cultural awareness, language capabilities, and 
highlighted recent initiatives to improve those dimensions of soldier training.  Material- Numerous 
procurement initiatives related to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were highlighted.  Leadership- 
Leadership and education programs have been revitalized with increased instruction in COIN, stability 
operations and cultural studies.  Additionally, the Army has expanded the availability of fellowships and 
graduate programs.  
105 Walker, “Army Force Structure and Implementation of Directive 3000.05,” slide 12.    
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• Either a functional or multi-functional modular brigade will augment the 
BCT to enhance capabilities.   
The brigade combat teams are the principal tactical units of the modular Army.  
They are designed specifically for major combat operations:  “Their core mission is to 
close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture enemy forces, 
or to repel their attacks by fire, close combat, and counterattack.”106  While optimized for 
major, conventional combat, they are reportedly “capable” of conducting stability 
operations, and with augmentation can be tailored for a wide variety of missions.   
Although the BCTs are generally designed to “operate in any OE [operational 
environment] and against any threats, each BCT has unique characteristics.”107  They are 
divided into the heavy (HBCTs), Stryker (SBCTs), and infantry (IBCTs) brigade combat 
teams.108  Additionally, a mix of support brigades can be added to Army divisions or 
used to augment BCTs.  The modular support brigades available to most division-level 
task forces are the following:  aviation, reconnaissance, surveillance and target 
acquisition (RSTA), maneuver enhancement (ME), fires, and sustainment.109  The active-
duty modular force as currently planned includes 48 brigade combat teams, 39 multi-
functional support brigades, and 41 functional support brigades (see Figure 5).110   
                                                 
106 Army, FM 3-90.6, 2-1.  The manual explicitly states, “BCTs are optimized for MCO (major 
combat [read conventional] operations).” 
107 Army, FM 3-90.6, A-1.  
108 Army, FM 3-90.6, viii.  The interim naming conventions were designed to prevent force designers 
from leaning on past references as the Army was trying to reduce top-level layers of command (see DoD, 
Transformation Roadmap, 3-5).  Since publication of the Transformation Roadmap, the Army has replaced 
its abstract naming conventions of Unit of Action (UA), Unit of Employment (UEx), and Unit of 
Employment (UEy) with the legacy naming conventions of Brigade Combat Team and Division.  All levels 
of command from Company to Corps present in the prior system are maintained in the new one.  Also, 
Stryker Brigades, named after the vehicular platform for which it was designed, have gone through a series 
of naming conventions to include “interim,” “initial,” and “medium” brigades.   
109 Army, Guide to Modularity, Chapter 1.  
110 The exact number and allocation of Brigade Combat Teams, Functional, and Support Brigades are 
frequently being adjusted based on resource allocations, policy guidance, and threat scenarios.  The 2006 
QDR, BG Twomey’s “Cost of Modern War” presentation, Walker’s NDU Brief, and General Campbell’s 
Infantry Warfighting Conference presentation had varying numbers.  The numbers used here are based on 













Figure 5.   Active Component Brigade Allocation 
1.   Heavy Brigade Combat Teams 
The HBCT is tank-centric.  As such, it is considered the Army’s premier fighting 
unit to conduct major combat operations.  It places a premium on mobile protected 
firepower balanced with dismounted infantry.  The HBCT is particularly suited for the 
following operational environments:111   
• open or mixed terrain that can support the size and weight of armored 
vehicles 
• offensive and defensive operations against enemy conventional ground 
forces 
Some of the disadvantages of the HBCT include the following: 
• restricted mobility in mountainous, forested, and dense or poorly 
developed urban terrain 
• a large geographical footprint required for logistics basing and vehicle 
positioning 
• vulnerability to mines and advanced antitank weapons 
• high usage rate of consumable supplies such as fuel, ammunition, and 
maintenance repair parts112 
• high costs associated with transporting, operating, and maintaining tanks 
and Bradley fighting vehicles 
                                                 
111 This is a compilation from, Army, Guide to Modularity and Army, FM 3-90.6, A-7, A-9.   
112 Army, FM 3-90.6, A-4 provides emphasis—“do not underestimate its (logistics) requirements.” 
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Figure 6.   Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT)  
The HBCT is composed of approximately 3,800 soldiers organized into two 
combined maneuver battalions, a reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion, a brigade 
special troops battalion (BSTB), and a brigade support battalion (BSB).  Each combined 
maneuver battalion is organized with combined arms (infantry, armor, engineer, artillery 
support etc). at the battalion level.  The BSTB includes an assortment of headquarters 
staff, a military police platoon, a signal company, and a 118-man military intelligence 
company. 113  
The heavy brigades are explicitly designated as a hedge for major combat 
operations until FCS/Objective Force technology has matured.  While there are critical 
applications for tanks in certain aspects of IW, armor is generally not the ideal force 
choice for population-focused operations.  Although there are specific applications for 
heavy forces that will be explored later, the HBCT will not be the focus of this analysis.  
Instead, the Stryker and Infantry BCTs will provide the comparative baseline for further 
structural changes necessary to serve the Army’s irregular warfare requirements.       
2.  Stryker Brigade Combat Teams  
The Stryker brigades were designed to fill the strategic gap that existed between 
light and heavy forces.  This gap was described earlier when the 82nd Airborne drew a 
line in the sands of Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Shield.  Light forces offered 
rapid, strategic mobility but didn’t have tactical mobility or reliable staying power once 
deployed.  Heavy forces had the protection and firepower to combat conventional 
enemies, but took too long to deploy.  On October 12, 1999, General Eric Shinseki 
                                                 
113 Army, Guide to Modularity, Chapter 8.  These numbers are according to the published 2004 
MTOE.  Although subtle changes are ongoing, they provide an overview.   
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initiated the transformation process to field medium-weight brigades that could deploy 
worldwide within four days.114  The Stryker vehicle is the identifying mobility platform 
for this motorized unit.  The Stryker is a wheeled, medium-weight, armored vehicle that 
can be configured as a troop transport or to a more specialized function.  Beyond rapid 
strategic deployment, the SBCT’s advertise themselves as the optimal full-spectrum 
combat force possessing robust intelligence, combined arms battalions, and a unique 
balance between lethality, mobility, and survivability.  The SBCT is also the transitional 
force design that is supposed to provide the experimental foundation of the Army’s 
objective force as legacy forces are dissolved and FCS is brought (quite literally) online.  
 
Figure 7.   Styker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)  
The SBCT has approximately 4,000 soldiers in its “ready to fight” configured 
package.  It contains three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 
acquisition (RSTA) squadron, a field artillery battalion, an anti-tank company, engineer 
company, signal company, military intelligence company, a brigade support battalion, a 
brigade headquarters, and the headquarters company.  The Army designed the SBCT for 
early entry operations and “small scale contingencies.”115  Some of the SBCT’s 
operational advantages include the following:116   
                                                 
114 General Shinseki’s keynote speech entitled, “Army Vision,” at the 1999 Association of the United 
States Army (AUSA) Conference is largely heralded at the starting point for the Army’s transformation.  
New “medium weight” brigades were only one aspect of transformation.  Brigade modularity, unit-
manning systems, and the objective force (now FCS) development are also major aspects of the concept.  
Concerning deployment timelines, see Vick, The SBCT, Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing 
Deployment Options.  This report negated the Army’s 4-day deployment window,   determining the 
deployment time actually ranged from 9-21 days based on predicted resources and capabilities.  Deploying 
from forward bases and using combination of air and sea lift could reach most regions 5-9 days.   
115 Army, FM 3-90.6, A-9.  As opposed to major combat operations against a conventional enemy, 
“small scale contingencies” are more synonymous with today’s vernacular—irregular warfare.  However, 
small indicates a limited scale of conflict.  As discussed before, irregular warfare is not limited to “small” 
conflicts, or those “low” in intensity.    
116 This is a compilation from the Guide to Modularity and FM 3-90.6, A-7, A-9. 
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• operations in or near urban terrain 
• combating conventional or unconventional enemies 
• premium on infantry strength and motorized transport 
• balanced between strategic, operational, and tactical mobility 
• four maneuver battalions instead of the three in the HBCT and IBCT 
• armor capabilities in the Mobile Gun System (MGS) platoons, organic to 
infantry battalions 
• less logistics overhead than HBCT 
The SBCT limitations are relative to the HBCT and IBCT include the following: 
• It doesn’t have the protection or firepower of the HBCT, but more so than 
the IBCT. 
• It is easier to deploy than the HBCT, but requires more aircraft than an 
IBCT. 
3.  Infantry Brigade Combat Teams 
The infantry brigade combat teams are the manpower-intensive units within the 
Army’s force structure.  Limited in organic mobility, their primary method of movement 
is by foot, making the infantry ideally suited for population-focused interactions.  Their 
small signature allows them to reside in close proximity to indigenous populations 
without undue burdens.  Furthermore, they are the least technologically-dependent units, 
making them ready-made for advising and training technology-limited foreign Army and 
police units.   The infantry BCTs operational capabilities include: 
• dismounted infantry operations in restrictive terrain such as mountains, 
jungles,  forests, and dense urban areas 
• premium on strategic mobility, and conducting air assault, air mobile, and 
airborne operations 
• small-unit operations 
Their limitations include: 
• a severe lack of motorized armored protection and heavy firepower 
• limited ground mobility provided by supporting transportation units 
• only two maneuver battalions, limiting the IBCT’s options “for retaining 





Figure 8.   Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) 
The IBCT is composed of approximately 3,400 soldiers organized into two 
infantry battalions, a reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion, a brigade special troops 
battalion (BSTB), and a brigade support battalion (BSB).  The BSTB and BSB are 
slightly smaller, but organized similarly to their respective battalions as described in the 
HBCT.   
4.  Multi-Functional Support Brigades 
According to the Army, functional and multi-functional support brigades can 
augment division and corps headquarters, or integrate necessary specialists into combat 
brigades so the brigades may be specifically tailored to a given mission.  The multi-
funtional brigades were designed to support various levels of command.  They are 
organized according to specific capabilities such as providing aviation support, indirect 
fires, or additional logistics support.  The planned allocation of multi-functional support 
brigades and types are listed in Figure 9.117  One of the primary advantages of the 
functional brigades is to maintain technical proficiency within a cohesive unit capable of 
training, supporting, and operating systems that require a high-level of specialization.  
The combat aviation brigades and fires brigades offer functional capabilities that are 
reliant on a high degree of technical training.  The capabilities are designed to offer the 
division and higher headquarters operational flexibility, and when necessary, provide 
assets in direct support to the BCTs.  The battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB)118 is 
                                                 
117 As stated earlier, the numbers used are from Walker, “Army Force Structure and Implementation 
of Directive 3000.05.”    
118 Also known as the Reconnaissance Surveillance Target Acquistion (RSTA) Brigade. 
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designed to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition and intelligence 
operations at the operational level to help the Joint Task Force commander position his 
combat power. 
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Figure 9.   Multi-Functional Support Brigades Allocation 
5.  Functional Support Brigades 
Similar to the aviation and artillery multi-functional support brigades, the 
functional support brigades are grouped by branch-specific single function capabilities.  
They are similar in design to the previous force structure’s division support brigades.  
The planned type and numbers of functional support brigades are listed in Figure 10.  
According to a recent briefing, “As a general rule, functional support brigades are 
assigned, attached, or OPCON to a theatre-level command or Army HQ and support 
theater-wide operational requirements.”119  However, as a secondary purpose, these 
brigades are available to “provide reinforcing tactical capabilities to the brigade combat 
teams and the modular support brigades.”120   
                                                 
119 Walker, (NDU take-home CD), slide 81. 















Figure 10.   Functional Support Brigade Allocation 
The functional support brigades provide single-function homogeneous units that 
are able to train, assess, and develop doctrine for their specialty areas that often require 
high degrees of professional training.  Multi-tiered command chains allow leader 
development within functional units.  In some cases, they may be employed as a cohesive 
unit when a theatre commander wants to maintain functional, not geographical task 
differentiation within a campaign.  Otherwise, subordinate functional units (battalions or 
companies) may be resourced to brigade combat teams or a maneuver enhancement 
brigade where functional capabilities can be integrated below the theatre level.  The 
engineer, military police, explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), and medical specialties 
have been in particularly high demand and limited availability during ongoing conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.   
D.  BELOW THE BRIGADE 
So far this description has provided an operational overview of the modular 
brigade concept.  To understand capabilities below the brigade level, this chapter will 
now turn to three functional areas especially relevant to irregular warfare:  intelligence; 
security; and civil-military operations such as information operations (to include public 
affairs and psychological operations), civil affairs, and civil engineering.  These three 
areas provide the guiding framework for the remainder of this study’s analysis and 
recommendations.   
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 1.  Intelligence 
a.  Brigade Intelligence 
Brigades are now staffed with a sizeable intelligence staff and an 
intelligence company within the brigade troops battalion (BTB).  As part of the current 
force design, most divisional military intelligence (MI) battalions were inactivated.  The 
direct support MI companyies that had a habitual relationship with each brigade, simply 
became permanently assigned to the BCT.  The analysis and control element (ACE) 
within the division MI battalion was absorbed by the division’s G2 staff.  New to the 
brigade-level MI company was enhanced top-secret communications capabilities,121 
UAVs, HUMINT specialists, and signals intelligence systems.  Army-wide MI assets are 
planned to increase by almost 9,000 more soldiers and collection systems to include 
positions earmarked for over 3,000 HUMINT, 2,000 all-source, 1600 UAV, and 800 
SIGINT specialists,122 although the implementation details are vague.       
 
Figure 11.   SBCT Military Intelligence Company 
                                                 
121 Capabilities allow brigade-level intelligence staffs to access national intelligence databases from 
DIA, CIA, and other agencies.  Previously this capability was reserved for the division level.   
122 Stephen K. Iwicki, “CSA’s Focus Area 16:  Actionable Intelligence…one year later,” Military 
Intelligence Professional Bulletin, October-December (2004), 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBS/is_4_30/ai_n13822278/print.    
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The newly designed MI company consists of approximately 120 
personnel.123  The IBCT MI company consists of a small headquarters section, a tactical 
UAV platoon, an analysis and integration platoon, and a tactical HUMINT platoon.  
Typically, it has three dedicated two-man HUMINT teams (out of a brigade of 
approximately 3,500 soldiers), and two prophet SIGINT collection systems organic to its 
task organization.  The SBCT brigade’s MI company is similar to others already 
described except its number of HUMINT teams is more robust and the UAV platoon is 
embedded with the RSTA squadron (see Figure 11 above).124  It maintains an ISR 
integration platoon, ISR analysis platoon, and a tactical HUMINT platoon.  HUMINT 
and signal intelligence (SIGINT) teams are sometimes assigned under tactical control to 
subordinate battalions, usually for a limited time and purpose.     
b.  Reconnaissance Squadrons 
As part of the Army’s modular design, the infantry brigades lost a 
maneuver battalion, gaining a reconnaissance squadron with half the manpower in its 
place.  On a traditional battlefield, the reconnaissance squadrons are designed to be the 
“eyes and ears” of the brigade commander, collecting intelligence so he can conduct 
effective maneuver by his infantry or armor battalions.  The IBCT reconnaissance 
squadron consists of 304 soldiers organized into a headquarters troop and three recon 
troops of approximately 70 soldiers (as compared to a 600 to 700 soldier maneuver 
battalion).  Two of the troops are motorized using armored HMMWVs, while one is a 
dismounted recon troop.  The reconnaissance squadrons are mostly manned by enlisted 
scout specialists (19D) in lieu of infantrymen (11B) and their officers are predominantly 
armor officers  (see Figure 12).125   
                                                 
123 Army, Guide to Modularity, 7-8, 7-9.  
124 Army, FM 3-21.31, 18. 
125 Army, Guide to Modularity, D-7.  
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Figure 12.   Infantry BCT Reconnaissance Squadron 
The SBCT’s RSTA squadron126 is slightly larger then its lighter 
counterpart.  It consists of three Stryker-mounted reconnaissance troops,127 a 
headquarters company, and a surveillance troop consisting of a headquarters sections, a 
UAV platoon, a multi-sensor platoon, an MI integration platoon, and a 
chemical/decontamination platoon (see Figure 13).128   
 
Figure 13.   Stryker BCT Reconnaissance Squadron 
                                                 
126 A squadron is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel and represents the same command level as a 
battalion.  Its naming difference is largely tied to historical lineage. 
127 A troop is commanded by a Captain and represents the same command level as a company.   
128 Department of the Army, 3-21.31, Stryker Brigade Combat Team (Washington D.C.:  Government 
Printing Office, 2003), figure 1-6.   
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c.  Battalion-level Intelligence 
A battalion of approximately 600 to 700 soldiers only has seven to eight 
dedicated intelligence personnel assigned (see Figure 14).  This section is responsible for 
gathering the information collected by the companies, analyzing it, and reporting it to the 
brigade.  Tracking current operations, preparing intelligence reports, directing 
subordinate collection efforts, conducting pattern analysis, developing and updating 
extensive social network diagrams, screening detainee, questioning informants, and 
conducting counter-intelligence operations provide the section more work than it can 
typically accomplish.  There are no trained intelligence specialists below the battalion 
level although most units operating today have assembled out-of-hide, informal 
information processing and analysis teams.     
 
Figure 14.   Battalion Intelligence Section 
2.  Security and Mobility  
Security is the cornerstone for all other aspects of stabilization operations and 
counterinsurgency.  Therefore, the ability of military units to secure terrain, capture and 
kill enemies, and guard populations is still the dominate activity for military units 
operating in hostile environments.  The Army’s ability to distribute firepower and move 
to a position of advantage over conventional enemies is called maneuver.  Tanks, Stryker 
vehicles, and foot soldiers are all designed to dominate in certain environmental and 
threat conditions as described earlier.  Irregular warfare is no different.  The type of 
soldiers and vehicles used to accomplish this purpose must be carefully analyzed.   
a.  Light Infantry 
The legacy infantry brigade and the new infantry brigade combat team 
design changed from three infantry battalions to two infantry battalions and a 
reconnaissance squadron.  The infantry battalions are relatively unchanged from their 
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previous design.  Most infantry battalions consist of approximately 660 soldiers divided 
into three 141-man infantry companies of three rifle platoons each, and a 71-man 
motorized weapons company (see Figure 15).  They are a legacy design, using 
HMMWVs equipped with anti-tank guided missle systems.  The brigade support 
battalion’s forward support companies consist of transportation platoons with wheeled 
transport vehicles able to truck two rifle companies of infantryman as needed.129     
 
Figure 15.   Infantry Rifle Company130 
Some of the infantry brigade combat teams have modified task 
organizations, specifically designed for forced-entry operations.  For example, the four 
brigade combat teams of the 82nd Airborne Division (and others) are designated for 
parachute operations.  The four brigades of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) are trained 
and organized for helicopter operations.         
                                                 
129 Known as Light Medium Tactical Vehicles (LMTVs) or their earlier models, the “5-ton” and “2½-
ton” trucks.  They were designed for rear area troop and supply transport.  Recent operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have displayed the vulnerability of these vehicles.  In combat zones, they have been largely 
replaced with variants that have cab and side armor, but the troop carrying compartment is still uncovered.  
Soldiers are extremely vulnerable during transport.  For example, seven soldiers from the 82nd Airborne 
were killed on September 10, 2007 when their LMTV overturned after a wheel blew.  New vehicles are 
being tested and the MRAP (to be explained later) is finally being fielded in increased numbers.   
130 Army, Guide to Modularity, D-x.  
 58
b.  Stryker 
The Stryker infantry battalions consist of three rifle companies with three 
rifle platoons each.  Each company also has a mobile gun system platoon (MGS),131 a 
section of 60mm and 120mm mortars, and a sniper team.  Within the rifle platoons, each 
squad has a wheeled, medium-armored infantry carrier available with mounted crew-
served weapon.  Additionally, the battalion has a mobile gun system platoon with 
firepower similar to tanks, but it is wheeled and less protected.     
The Stryker RSTA squadron is larger than the light version with three 
troops of vehicle-mounted recon companies, an organic surveillance and sensor troop, 
and three chemical reconnaissance vehicles.  The SBCT also has an anti-tank company 
that provides stand-off against enemy armor with three platoons of three Stryker anti-tank 
guided missile (ATGM) vehicles.   
c.  Military Police 
The new BCTs were designed with a military police (MP) platoon of 
approximately 25 soldiers (out of the brigade’s approximate 3,500).  This platoon serves 
many roles, but as chapter five will show, its exact function has been a source of frequent 
disagreement.  The MPs perform numerous duties to include:  
• maneuver and mobility support consisting of checkpoints and traffic 
control for large-scale troop movements 
• area security for the brigade headquarters 
• law enforcement operations internal to the brigade 
• internment resettlement and detainee operations 
• police intelligence operations 
Additionally, the brigade has a provost marshal (PM) assigned for planning and 
coordinating military police operations.   
                                                 
131 An 8-wheeled armored fighting vehicle with a 105mm tank gun.  It is not intended to conduct tank 
on tank warfare, but easily provides the firepower of a tank, without the infrastructure damage in an urban 
environment if needed.    
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3.  Civil-Military Operations  
Brigade headquarters are designed to allow flexible staff organizations tailored to 
the BCT commander’s leadership style and the unit’s mission.  Typically, the BCT staff 
organizes into six functional and integrating cells.  They are as follows:  operations; 
sustainment; command, control, communications, and computers (C4); intelligence; 
information operations; and civil-military operations (see Figure 16).132  The latter two 
functional areas are specific to irregular environments.  Battalion and company-level 
maneuver units do not have any dedicated special planners who specialize in civil-
military operations.    
 
 
Figure 16.   Brigade Staff 
a.  Information Operations 
The S-7 is the brigade’s coordinating staff officer to ensure information 
operations are integrated into the planning process.  He works with other principal staff 
members to plan deception, psychological operations, and disseminate information to the 
local populace.  Most brigades rely on ad hoc cells to fuse information operations themes 
and plans, or utilize the field artillery commanders as “effects coordinators,” who are 
tasked with this duty.   
                                                 
132 Army, FM 3-90.6, 2-10, 2-11.  
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b.  Civil Affairs 
The S-9 is the only civil affairs officer organic to the brigade.  He is 
responsible for advising the brigade commander and operations officer on the 
relationship between the brigade and the civilian population.  Additionally, the S-9 
integrates attached civil affairs units into the brigade and assists them in the 
establishment of civil-military operations center(s).     
Currently, the only active duty civil affairs units reside in Special 
Operations Command.  The civil affairs community has proposed to increase its size by 
adding a fourth company to each battalion, creating the manning positions for a standing 
civil military operations center (CMOC) in each company, and increasing the overall 
force by over 188 teams.133  Each civil affairs (CA) company would be designed to 
support a maneuver brigade, with each CA team supporting a maneuver battalion (see 
Figure 17).134  The standing CMOC would provide a “store-front” for community 
dialogue, interagency coordinations, and NGO collaboration.  The CA teams would serve 
as staff proponents to the battalions assisting with civil population mapping, governance, 






Figure 17.   Proposed Expansion of CA Capacity to Support a BCT 
                                                 
133 LTC Ritchie Moore and LTC Michael Warmack, “Civil Affairs Transformation,” (PowerPoint 
presentation dated March 24, 2005, email from Major Cameron Sellars, U.S. Army Civil Affairs).   
134 Moore and Warmack, (PowerPoint, March 24, 2005), slide 26.    
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Similarly, a CA battalion would support the division-level commander.  It 
would provide the equivalent of provincial level stabilization and reconstruction support.  
Functional specialists would plan and coordinate specific areas of stabilization.  Also, a 
conceptual civil information management cell would collate information regarding 
population demographics and infrastructure to establish an operational-level common 
operating picture.   
c.  Engineers 
The engineer company assigned to the light and Stryker BCTs provide 
mobility support; they ensure the brigade’s maneuver units are able to freely move 
throughout the battlefield.  They are skilled at demolitions and obstacle reduction, 
performing “combat engineering tasks in support of close combat.”135  The brigade does 
not have dedicated assets capable of conducting construction or civil engineering 
assistance.  Depending on the brigade’s mission and availability of units, other types of 
elements could be attached to the brigade special troops battalion or individual maneuver 
battalions.  The organic company consists of two combat engineer platoons and an 
equipment section.  Each platoon is usually tasked to support one of the two infantry 
battalions.  On some occasions the engineer platoon remains a cohesive unit within the 
battalion.  Otherwise, the platoon headquarters is integrated into the battalion staff while 
the squads are tasked to provide direct support to the rifle companies.  The engineer 
company in the Stryker BCT is composed of three mobility platoons and a mobility 
support platoon to account for its third infantry battalion.136    
E.  ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION? 
This chapter was an ambitious attempt to present the pivotal moments of the 
RMA discussion, and more specifically, the Army’s recent “transformation” concepts.  
Even a cursory review highlights the obvious incongruence between “transformation’s” 
initial assumptions and its current rhetoric.  Difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
                                                 
135 Army, FM 3-90.6, A-6.  
136 Army, FM 3-90.6, A-8. 
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shaken transformation discussions from their technologically-centric roots.137  There is a 
growing realization within the Defense Department that “modernizing” our Army for 
irregular warfare in the twenty-first century must also include profound changes in the 
human work force.  Still, an “irregular gap” persists.  Optimized for strategic mobility 
and fluid, decisive, conventional combat, the organizational transformation launched in 
2003 has remained unscathed despite changes in threat perceptions, profound changes in 
national security imperatives, and updated military doctrine.  This chapter concluded with 
a descriptive overview of the Army’s current brigade-modularity force structure.  This 
was an important, yet incremental step.  Chapters V and VI will explain why further 
changes are necessary and offer recommendations for further designs.  Secretary Gates 
recently encouraged Army planners to be innovative in exploring “how the Army should 
be organized.”138  For now, the attention will be turned to alternative concepts from 
analysts who have done just that.       
 
 
                                                 
137 General Campbell, FORSCOM Commander, recently lamented that, “modernization was 
inappropriately tied to FCS.”  Comments, Infantry Warfighting Conference, September 18, 2007, Fort 
Benning, GA.     
138 Julian E. Barnes, “Gates Urges Funds For A Smarter Army,” Los Angeles Times, October 11, 
2007.   
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IV.  ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR GROUND FORCE 
STRUCTURE 
Over the past decade, the United States has made major investments in the 
combat efficiency of its forces.  The return on investment has been evident 
in the dramatic improvement in war-fighting demonstrated from Desert 
Storm to the Kosovo air campaign to Operation Iraqi Freedom.  There has 
been no comparable increase in the capacity of U.S. armed forces or of 
U.S. civilian agencies to conduct post-combat stabilization and 
reconstruction operations.139   
When General Shinseki’s transformation vision was initiated, an initial 
bifurcation emerged between those advocating for heavy investments in technology 
enhancements and those cautioning against it.  In 2003, H.R. McMaster questioned 
ongoing defense transformation initiatives.  He believed the underlying assumption of 
information dominance in future warfare created numerous vulnerabilities in the current 
force, stating:  “The enthusiastic embrace, the assumption of near-certainty in future war 
is a dangerous fallacy.”140  He was primarily concerned with assumptions that traded 
information for combat power and sustainability, stressing that network-centric warfare 
should be pursued as a capability, not a strategy unto itself.141  While McMaster 
cautioned defense planners against prioritizing information technologies over protection 
and firepower given the uncertainty and ambiguity of future conventional war,142 other 
authors have begun nudging discussions about Army transformation in an entirely 
different direction.    
                                                 
139 James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, 
Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, America’s Role  In Nation-Building, From Germany to Iraq (Santa 
Monica:  RAND, 2003), xxvii.   
140 McMaster, Crack in the Foundation, 2.   
141 McMaster, Crack in the Foundation, 98. 
142 McMaster, Crack in the Foundation, 1.  
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A.  POST-2003 CRITICISM AND ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS 
While the Army was beginning to implement its brigade modularity conversions, 
post-invasion difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq were becoming all too apparent.  As a 
result of September 11, 2001 and the military excursions that followed, a flurry of books, 
articles, and studies on grand strategy, counterinsurgency, stability operations, advising, 
and post-conflict stabilization have surfaced.  Max Boot143 made comments last year to 
the Council on Foreign Relations regarding his research on recent defense initiatives: 
What I’ve seen over the course of the four years that I’ve been writing 
[this] book is sort of a transformation of the idea of defense 
transformation…when I started writing this book in 2002, defense 
transformation was a very techno-centric concept…using capital instead of 
labor…right now we’ve seen the limitations of those technologies…you 
still need people, and you need not only a lot of people, but you need the 
right kinds of people.144   
Similarly, British counterinsurgency expert, Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Fosters145 
finds Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,146 “uncompromisingly and 
ironically oriented towards warfighting in tone and content,” referring to a concentration 
towards high technology conventional capabilities.  He recommends the military follow 
through on claims of “enhancing strategic and operational agility and responsiveness,” by 
investing more in the “human workforce.”  While the Army contends that its current  
 
 
                                                 
143 Max Boot is a Senior Fellow, National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations and the 
author of Savage Wars of Peace (New York:  Basic Books, 2002), and War Made New: Technology, 
Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today (New York:  Gotham Books, 2006).  
144 Max Boot’s comments, “Military Strategies for Unconventional Warfare,” (Council on Foreign 
Relations, October 27, 2006), 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11834/military_strategies_for_unconventional_warfare_rush_transcript_fed
eral_news_service.html.  
145 Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Fosters (U.K)., “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” 
Military Review November-December (2005): 2-15.  
146 Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Transformation, A 




general purpose, “full-spectrum” force accounts for the demands of stability operations, 
other analysts disagree and provide a wide array of policy and structural alternatives to 
consider.   
B.  A NEW BLUEPRINT? 
Thomas Barnett’s books seek to explain the growing interdependence of 
globalization, financial markets, and the military.   In order to expand economic 
opportunities and social development to the underdeveloped areas of the world, Barnett 
advocates for the U.S. to adopt a preemptive dual-strategy of applying military pressure 
and development incentives in states along the Core-Gap divide.147  Barnett recommends 
transforming the current military into two functions—“one to fight wars and one to wage 
peace.”148  The “Leviathan” military would be focused on classic, conventional war 
fighting.149  The “System Administrator” (SysAdmin) military would be the “rule-set 
enforcer for globalization’s advance” trained in the delicate tasks of post-conflict 
reconstruction, building indigenous security forces, bolstering weak governments, and 
setting the conditions for long-term infrastructure building, education, and local 
governance.150  He identifies the SysAdmin force as a separate cabinet-level position on 
par with the State Department and Department of Defense.    
                                                 
147 Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York:  Penguin Group, 2004).  Barnett divides 
the world’s nations into two definitive categories.  The “Functioning Core” (Core) nations are modernized, 
have effective communications networks, and are connected through economic interdependence.  The 
world’s “Non-Integrating Gap” (Gap) is not integrated into the rest of the world and as such is unable to 
reap the benefits of globalization.  Barnett surmises that countries in the Gap will continue to be defined by 
poverty, inter-state and intra-state violence, and human rights calamities until they are connected to the 
Core countries.  Connectedness will allow the free exchange of “mass media, ideas, capital, goods, 
technology, and people”. 
148 Barnett, New Map, 299.   
149 This military service would be poised to combat hostile militaries, remove governments that 
threaten world stability, and defend other Core countries.  It would encompass most of the Air Force, Navy, 
heavy armor and artillery from the Army, and missile defense as described in Barnett’s follow on book, 
Blueprint for Action (New York:  Berkley Publishing Group, 2005).     
150 Barnett, New Map, 299.  
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James Ellsworth supports the need for SSTR capabilities in the Department of 
Defense, but differs from Barnett’s call for a separate cabinet-level agency.151  Ellsworth 
notes that Barnett’s arguments “overlook the fact that motion along the spectrum of 
conflict is neither unidirectional nor predictable,” arguing that the ability to command 
and conduct SSTR operations in uncertain environments exists only with the DoD.   
Ellsworth, like many critics of the State Department believe civilian agency cultures are 
too far removed from contributing significant effort to operational duties in austere and 
oftentimes dangerous environments.  Narrowing his focus to the DoD, Ellsworth outlines 
numerous problems that have frequently plagued the Army while conducting stability 
operations.  After Ellsworth advances multiple force-structure options, he finally 
recommends a standing Joint Task Force or new joint command for stability operations, 
“USPEACECOM,” that is heavy on “linguistic and cultural fluency,” and built with an 
active-duty core but able to draw heavily from the reserves for desired “surge capacity.”  
While Barnett calls for a separate agency and Ellsworth argues for a separate joint 
command, other military theorists have recommended changes internal to the Army.    
C.  A STABILIZATION FORCE?      
Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson152 provide assertions shared by many 
analysts that U.S. technological changes have led to a transformation of forces focused on 
“rapid decisive operations,” requiring a subsequent transformation to be able to properly 
conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations.  Binnendijk and Johnson see a 
transition of warfare from slow buildups and long wars with large numbers of troops and 
hence, large numbers of troops available for occupation during civilian led nation-
building; to short wars with fast buildups, smaller numbers of troops and a gap with few 
forces available to conduct stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) after major conflict.  
                                                 
151 James B. Ellsworth, “SysAdmin:  Toward Barnett’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Force,” The 
Land Warfare Papers vol. 57 (2006), http//:www.ausa.org/PDFdocs/LWPapers/LWP_57.pdf.  He claims 
that the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is little 
more than an ambitious ideal, too far removed from its current culture of diplomacy and embassy duties to 
be effective.  
152 Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Operations (Washington D.C.:  National Defense University Press, 2004).  
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The authors propose modest force structure changes and the creation of two division-
sized S&R forces drawn from active and reserve components and designed to be 
“flexible, modular, and scalable force multipliers.”  The authors do not think the S&R 
forces should be embedded in combat units; however, “light combat units could be 
attached to the S&R force to provide it the capability to operate autonomously in a hostile 
environment.”   
Binnendijk and Johnson make a compelling argument for military reform.  Their 
ideas are well founded, yet the arbitrary number of two S&R divisions would offer 
marginal assistance to large-scale, sustained contingencies.  In the absence of large 
contingencies, these forces would likely maintain an operational tempo exceptionally 
high as compared to conventional forces reserved for major combat.  Binnendijk and 
Johnson are correct in identifying some of the skill sets that are required during stability 
operations such as civil affairs, military police, medics, and construction engineers.  
While these skills are essential to sustained irregular operations, they are predominately 
found in the reserves where mobilization may be constrained by political infighting and 
collective training might prove difficult.  Furthermore, the DoD’s propensity to place 
these capabilities predominately in the reserves has not changed with the new force 
design.   
Charles Barry advocates for a similar theatre-level stability operations Joint Task 
Force composed of military police, civil affairs, engineer, and medical battalions 
integrated into joint stability operations brigade-level task forces.153  The theatre 
command would also be assisted by an array of combat brigades, and sustainment 
brigades (see Figure 18). 
                                                 
153 Dr. Charles Barry, “Organizing Land Forces for Stability Operations,” (PowerPoint presentation, 
National Defense University, May 2007), slide 7, “Task Organized Model for Land Forces in Stability 
Operations:  Theater SO JTF based on Combat Division.”   
 68
 
Figure 18.   Stability Operations Joint Task Force 
While he recognizes many of the capabilities integral to stability operations, units 
must be integrated to maintain security and conduct an assortment of operations such as 
intelligence analysis, civil affairs, and information operations at each level of command.  
Pooling these specialists together as suggested by Barry and others, creates a stove-piped 
command environment requiring top-level coordination and staffing.  In the ambiguous 
environment of irregular warfare, senior-level decision making and coordination is 
extremely difficult, unresponsive, generalized, and time consuming. 
 Furthermore, battalions and brigade-level functional units create duplicate 
logistics and training structures that are costly, redundant, and oftentimes unnecessary 
during deployments.  For example, civil affairs specialists should not have a primary task 
of driving a vehicle or operating its crew-served weapon.  Civil affairs specialists should 
be educated on governance and economic models.  They can be embedded with forces 
responsible for security in a given area.  The civil affairs specialists should understand 
basic soldier-skills, but to focus collective training on independent patrols and convoy 
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D.  MORE MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADES? 
Colonel Brian Watson builds on Binnendijk and Johnson’s S&R “gap theory.”154  
Watson describes two significant transitions in post-conflict environments.  The first is an 
initial turnover from “forward” brigade combat teams to stabilization forces in order to 
facilitate the former’s “freedom of action and ability to maintain a relentless tempo of 
offensive action during decisive operations.”155  The second transition is to indigenous 
security forces and governance, State Department representatives, and civilian non-
governmental organizations.  As combat progresses, he envisions combat forces being 
relieved by stabilization-specific forces, assembled within the maneuver enhancement 
brigades.156  According to Watson:   
[The Army] must have a robust force pool comprised of modular and 
scalable combat support and service support units that can be tailored 
rapidly under multifunctional battalion and brigade headquarters and 
integrated into operations as coherent force packages.  Modularity ensures 
the correct combinations can be achieved; scalability ensures the force can 
be right-sized for the specific mission.”157   
Watson recommends creating additional maneuver enhancement brigades that can 
provide command over stabilization efforts.  Watson’s assessment that greater 
stabilization skill capabilities are necessary is sound, but he incorrectly describes a linear 
battle-space where combat units can easily transition responsibilities to stabilization-
                                                 
154 Brian G. Watson, Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater 
Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force, (Carlisle:  Strategic Studies Institute, 2005).     
155 Watson, 15. 
156 Feickert, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign:  Issues for Congress.  The report outlines numerous 
areas of concern related to the Army’s modularity program such as the proposed number of BCTs, the 
number of maneuver battalions contained within, lessons learned by the BCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan that 
could have implications on the design, related personnel and equipment shortfalls, and particular to this 
study, “Does the Army’s current modular force design adequately address counterinsurgency and 
stabilization operations?”  Towards the last question, the CRS Report provides an overview of DoDD 
3000.05 and uses the Strategic Studies Institute paper authored by Colonel Brian Watson in August 2005 as 
its mainstay evidence to question the Army’s design.  After summarizing COL Watson’s arguments, the 
CRS report states, “the Army contends that the current modular forces construct [that BCTs are full 
spectrum forces, equally capable of performing traditional combat, counterinsurgency, and stability 
operations] is more than adequate to address the demands of stability operations, asserting that the modular 
force, as designed, has vastly improved communications infrastructure. (5-6)”  
157 Watson, 11. 
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specific forces.  Guerrilla threats and insurgent movements will threaten the civil 
initiatives of stabilization if not properly met with adequate security forces.  These 
capabilities must remain integrated throughout the extent of stabilization operations and 
the creation of separate stabilization command authorities convolutes necessary unity of 
effort.  
The Army’s force structure presentation at National Defense University cited the 
maneuver enhancement brigade as being capable of providing the following specialists to 
a stability environment:158   
• up to 1250 Engineers 
• up to 1200 MPs 
• 550 Chemical personnel 
• 1,400 Protection and Security personnel 
• 32 Civil Affairs specialists  
This is misleading.  The MEB does not have a standing operational capacity.  The 
numbers above are an example of what could be provided under a singular brigade 
command as an independent stability operations headquarters or in support of larger 
operations.  It is a skeleton headquarters—a reserve—ready to receive attachments during 
a time of need.  This unit was designed to be an adhoc organization from the onset.  It is 
one of many redundant commands inherently built into the current brigade-modular 
design.     
E.  MAAGS, FLAGS, STEGS, AND CORDS 
One of the most recent, and specific proposals to altering the Army’s force 
structure has been presented by Andrew F. Krepinevich, Nadia Schadlow, and Marin J. 
Strmecki.159  Their proposal is meant to be a “rough cut” at addressing the implications 
of DoD Directive 3000.05 on Army doctrine, force structure, and capabilities, noting that 
“SSTR operations will dominate U.S. security challenges over the foreseeable future.”  
                                                 
158 Walker, “Army Force Structure and Implementation of Directive 3000.05,” slide 12.   
159 Krepinevich, “SSTRO:  Meeting the Challenge.”     
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The proposal recommends the creation of Military Assistance and Advisory Groups 
(MAAGs) to be established as field commands for SSTR operations.  Serving under the 
MAAGs would be Forward Liaison and Assistance Groups (FLAGs); Security Training 
and Equipping Groups (STEGs); and Civilian Operations, Reconstruction, and 
Development Support (CORDS) Groups.  The FLAGs would be brigade-sized elements 
optimized for conducting SSTR operations.  The study cites the following capabilities as 
essential for these operations:  robust intelligence units, infantry, military police, special 
operations forces, construction engineers, civil affairs specialists, PSYOPs, quick 
reaction force elements, advisory teams, and transportation, communication, and logistics 
elements.  The STEGs would be standing advisory groups.  The CORDs would be robust 
organizations of civilian and military personnel.  Like their Vietnam-era namesake, 
CORDS Groups would develop and implement reconstruction and development plans 
with “flexible funds and procurement rules.”   
The Army Action Plan for Stability Operations includes a recommendation to 
assess Krepinevich’s ideas.160  However, two months earlier, the Army’s Joint Staff had 
(unofficially) already dismissed his proposal as subjective, with no verifiable analysis.  
According to the Army G-3/5/7, “the roles of the MAAG are being largely subsumed by 
the JTF…the mission of the FLAGs has been addressed through modularity in the BCT 
and CSB structure and full spectrum operations doctrine…[and] those programs outlined 
for execution by the CORDs have been subsumed by the CA, USACE, and the 
interagency.”161  This may be a simplistic initial response.  In particular, the Army’s 
claim that capabilities called for by Krepinevich’s FLAG concept are already found in the 
modular brigade system is misleading.  A closer look will reveal extensive shortcomings 
of critical specialties that must be sustained throughout steady-state operations.   
                                                 
160 Department of the Army, G-3/5/7, Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate, Stability Operations 
Division (DAMO-SSO), Army Action Plan for Stability Operations, Army Campaign Plan Decision Point 
105 (Washington D.C.:  Department of the Army,  August 2, 2007), 13.  The document states:  “follow-on 
analyses should address the issue of specialized versus full spectrum BCTs for select SO tasks, to include 
concepts of Military Assistance and Advisory Groups, Forward Liaison and Assistance Groups, Security 
Training and Equipping Groups, and Civil Operations, Reconstruction, and Development Support Groups.” 
161 Walker (NDU take-home CD), slide 87.  
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Yet, for all its ingenuity, Krepinevich’s concept yields questions about 
coordination.  Similar to Barry’s proposal, each of these organizations would have people 
working in the same geographical areas.  Ad hoc working groups, fusion cells, liaison 
officers, and committees would have a difficult time coordinating operations in a given 
area.  Stove-piped, compartmentalized units would likely discourage effective 
information sharing, collaboration, and unity of effort.      
F.  IDEALIZED MEDIUM-WEIGHT FORCES? 
Thomas Hammes not only articulates an acute assessment of the future threat 
environment, his book emphasizes the need for a force structure that embraces future 
unpredictability and is organized with greater built-in flexibility.162  Hammes states, “we 
have too many heavy ground forces and way too many heavy reserve forces for any 
foreseeable fight.  Yet the military is short of the flexible, multi-mission, medium-weight 
forces we need for forward presence, quick response, nation building, and peacekeeping 
or peace enforcement missions.  In fact, it faces a critical shortage of such forces today in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.”163  Though he concedes further details are necessary, Hammes 
outlines general characteristics for an idealized medium-weight unit that provides a sound 
basis for further development.  At first glance, one may think of the Stryker units.  While 
they offer a starting point, they too have limitations (and in the case of vehicles—
excesses) that will be explored in the next chapter.  They still require substantial 
attachments to account for non-combat specialties and their limited number will unlikely 
be increased to prevent funds devoted to the future combat system (FCS) program from 
being reallocated.  Hammes’ recommendations include:164   
• Creating lean headquarters capable of integrating interagency liaisons and 
operations, limit inefficiencies, and focusing on supporting a networked, 
mission-oriented force by reducing excess staff overheads.   
• Maintaining force structure balances to excel against guerrilla street 
fighters and mechanized conventional enemies.  
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• Easily deployable and prepositioned expeditionary forces.   
• Large infantry and military police units to “secure and pacify both heavily 
populated areas and remote areas” after the conventional fight is over.    
Hammes further notes that the infantry units must be “capable of operating 
as small units to patrol, outpost, and finally to live with and advise 
counterpart units of an indigenous force.”   
• Robust intelligence sections with an “emphasis on HUMINT and cultural 
intelligence rather than technical intelligence.” 
• Increased numbers of civil affairs capable of operating joint, interagency, 
and in hostile environments.  They must be able to handle critical 
governmental service functions and transition these functions to other 
agencies and indigenous offices.     
• Forces must be networked, flexible, and able to operate on commander’s 
guidance without direct command and control.  
G.  TRENDS 
While the idea of transformation is evolving, the Army’s organizational structure 
below the brigade level is not.  Many theories have been proposed to enable the United 
States to conduct more effective stability and counterinsurgency operations.  These 
authors make sound arguments for change and provide generic theoretical models.  
However, they propose a radically-bifurcated force structure that could lessen the Army’s 
strategic flexibility and create unnecessary (and costly) force redundancy; they do not 
offer enough detail from which to make acute recommendations for the Army’s 
restructuring at the tactical level; or their concepts promote highly-compartmentalized 
functional groupings that would require tedious and centralized collaboration to properly 
integrate diverse capability effects.  Because these analysts are providing conceptual 
designs for strategic or operational levels, the subtleties of ground combat are ignored.  
Most of the proposals for bifurcations in force structure that establish specific cabinets, 
joint commands, or divisions designed exclusively for stability operations, ignore (or at 
least marginalize) the hostile threats involved in these fragile environments.  Some of the 
studies mistakenly suggest a sequential approach to military operations with clear 
transitions between combat forces and stabilization forces within specific time and spatial 
divides.  The divide between combat operations and stability operations is not as clear as 
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in the days of uniformed symmetric battles between conventional forces, often ending in 
symbolic and internationally recognized surrender agreements.  Even with “security 
augmentation,” many of these proposals do not place enough emphasis on proper security 
and population control, a critical condition to further political, economic, and civil 
development.165   
Forces must be tailored to maintain security and conduct stability operations such 
as providing essential services, building partner security and host nation governing 
capacities, and promoting economic growth.  These operations must support high-level 
goals and plans, yet be tailored to the nuances of a local area and society.  Concepts that 
integrate population-focused capabilities with security elements throughout all levels of 
command should be explored.           
Secretary Gates’ military assistant, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli and the 
current Secretary of the Army, General Casey, reportedly reject any proposals for plans 
that discuss optimizing any portions of the Army for irregular warfare.166  They continue 
to emphasize full spectrum capabilities, frequently perceived as a euphemism for the 
current Army design.  This study supports the notion that all forces must be full-spectrum 
“capable” as described in the forthcoming FM 3-0, able to conduct offensive, defensive, 
and stability operations.  However not all units should, or can, be structured to do all 
things equally well.  The previous chapter demonstrated stark discrepancies between 
heavy, Stryker, and infantry BCT proficiencies.  As such, there is a vast opportunity for 
components of the overall force structure to be better optimized for irregular warfare.  
The next chapter will begin to explore these opportunities.  
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V.  ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT DESIGN FOR IRREGULAR 
WARFARE 
There’s much more of a recognition within the Department of Defense 
that transformation has to be cultural transformation, organizational 
transformation, transforming the kind of skill sets that we have.  But…I’m 
not sure that I see it actually being carried out to the extent that it ought to 
be.167 
The Army has maintained its position that the current brigade-modular design is 
appropriately suited for stability operations, counter-insurgency, and other forms of 
irregular warfare.   There are explicit references in the Transformation Roadmap and 
Guide to Modularity that the BCT is aptly suited for stability operations, although these 
claims have been widely disputed within DoD and from outside critics.  According to a  
recent Congressional Research Service report,  the Army “asserts that Army modular 
forces deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in comparison to non-modular brigades, have 
proven to be equally as effective in conducting combat missions, more capable in 
conducting stability operations, and far better at interacting with other Services’ 
forces.”168   
While the new BCT design may be performing better than its division-centric 
predecessor, organizational theory, historical insights, and recent experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan suggest the potential exists for further structural changes to better optimize 
the Army (or a portion thereof) for irregular warfare.  In August 2007, the Army Action 
Plan for Stability Operations was issued to serve “as the plan for improving Army 
capabilities and capacities to execute stability operations, as well as for implementing 
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DoD Directive 3000.05.”169  One of the plan’s purposes is to ensure the “Army force 
structure is organized and equipped to execute stability operations as part of full spectrum 
operations across the spectrum of conflict.”  The plan calls for a “review of division, 
corps, and theater army design for sufficiency of staff elements’ capability to plan for and 
conduct SO throughout all phases of an operation,” but does little to encourage explicit 
discussions about staff capacities or operational capabilities at the company, battalion, or 
brigade level.170 
Maneuver battalions and their subordinate units have had little or no change in 
their organizational design.  The Army claims modularity provides increased flexibility 
by attaching specialized units to the BCTs, but numerous problems still exist.  One 
problem is the lack of capacity in critical specialties.  Badly needed capabilities are not 
being fielded at tactical levels in sufficient numbers.  Many of these units reside in the 
reserves where they are difficult to mobilize,171 or in compartmentalized support 
brigades, isolated from the BCTs they often support.  Both cases lend potential problems 
for the BCTs and their attached functional specialists.  A lack of integration makes 
cohesion problematic, and the inability to conduct combined collective training reduces 
performance.  Lastly, many functional communities have not made significant enough 
changes in their selection, education, or training curriculums to provide real technological 
expertise in critical areas.  For example—power and water infrastructure repair.  To 
maintain modern-day relevancy, more changes are necessary.   
This chapter identifies broad problems with the Army’s current force design.  It 
begins with an analysis of the relationship between organizations and their environment.  
Then, two broad conceptual issues of organizational design are applied to the Brigade 
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Combat team: specialization (also known as task differentiation) and integration of 
capabilities.  Related closely to integration are discussions regarding degrees of 
centralization within an organization.  Lastly, these concepts will be applied to the three 
critical areas of analysis identified earlier in the paper:  intelligence operations, security 
and mobility, and civil-military operations.        
A.   THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ORGANIZATION 
To fight effectively under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, 
organizations must be flexible and agile.  Flatter, or less hierarchical 
organizations are, in general, more capable of operating in uncertain 
environments than hierarchical organizations.  Diverse capabilities at 
lower levels of command, to include all-service and all-arms, will increase 
the effectiveness, albeit not the efficiency of the force.172 
Although stable organizations can operate in simple organizational forms, they 
must establish structures that cope with greater degrees of uncertainty if exposed to 
rapidly changing technologies or environments.  Unstable environments require a greater 
degree of flexibility and adaptability.  As organizations take on more tasks, increased 
specialization and diversified structures require new methods for vertical and lateral 
coordination.  Instead of the traditional top-down pyramid, chains of command should 
become flatter (less layers of authority or a lower ratio of senior to subordinate units) and 
coordination should occur through a “network of horizontal relationships.”173  The 
Army’s structure has remained fixed to its historical hierarchy and the ratio of 
subordinate maneuver units to each command headquarters is relatively unchanged.    
In his seminal book, The Structuring of Organizations, Henry Mintzberg 
described numerous frameworks for organizations dependent on the amount of 
standardized work or skills necessary, levels of formalization, and the amount of training 
required for its operational employees.174  These organizations are each suited for 
particular environments.  The Army’s operational environment can be viewed along two 
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axes as depicted in Figure 19.175  One axis measures environmental change.  If 
environmental factors influencing an organization remain fairly unchanged over time, the 
environment is stable; the more they change, the more dynamic it is.  Mintzberg suggests 
the more turbulent an environment, the more “organic” the organization must be—less 
standardized, allowing greater adaptation and innovation.  Conversely, mechanistic 
organizations (common to stable environments) are more bureaucratic in nature.  They 
rely heavily on standardized procedures, rules, and job descriptions.  While less flexible, 
greater standardization generally allows greater efficiency and accountability.   
Additionally, the environment can be viewed along an axis measuring the work an 
organization performs on a scale between simple and complex, corresponding to the 
diversity and difficulty of tasks being performed.  Greater complexity usually drives 
organizations to decentralize authority and resources while encouraging greater skill 
specialization.  When the environment is stable and tasks are simple and predictable, 
vertical coordination allows greater predictability and resource efficiency through 
standardized work processes.  When the environment is dynamic and an organization’s 
work becomes more complex, its employees must be able to communicate laterally, 
mutually adjusting off each other’s successes and setbacks.  Top-down directives work 
poorly in this environment.176   
Leaders cope with ambiguous environments differently.  Some try to make their 
environments simpler using technology and processes to centralize information 
management and decision authority.  Others break complex problems into manageable 
pieces, assigning each piece to specialized units or individuals allowing increased 
decentralization.177  While the Army is tacitly pursuing the former solution, it should 
consider a larger emphasis on the latter in an irregular environment. 
                                                                                                                                                 
174 Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations (New Jersey:  Prentice Hall, 1979).   
175 Diagram modified from its original source:  Eric Jansen, “Mintzberg Model,” (PowerPoint 
presentation, organizational theory course, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
October 14, 2006).   
176 Bolman and Deal, 56. 
177 Bolman and Deal, 30. 
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Figure 19.   Mintzberg Structures 
Mintzberg would describe the Army’s current design as a “machine bureaucracy.”  
It is centered on standardized work processes trained and evaluated through doctrine, 
Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs), checklists, battle-drills, and 
rehearsed set-piece maneuvers.  The Army maintains a high-level of centralization 
through a strict chain of command that is designed to expeditiously communicate 
information vertically through a host of managerial methods.     This structure is ideal to 
produce management efficiencies and predictability, allowing numerous units and 
functional specialists to operate at relatively similar standards of performance and tasks.   
As outlined in Chapter II, the external environment has changed.  Over the last 
century, the United States Army has explicitly prepared itself for state-versus-state 
warfare on linear battlefields.178  While conventional warfare will always have elements 
of uncertainty, the Army’s force structure, strategies, and tactical battle-drills were 
designed to combat fairly standardized enemy formations and tactics.  Today, guerrilla 
and terrorist tactics by clandestine foes, the proliferation of communications technology 
and weapons materiel, and continued world urbanization, all work to create a future 
threat environment that promises to be increasingly turbulent.  Compared to traditional 
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conventional warfare, irregular environments present more external and unprecedented 
factors with which military units must contend.  This shift means the Army must become 
increasingly more flexible and innovative then its current structure allows.  The 
traditional military hierarchy and an over-reliance on standardized work processes should 
give way to increased specialization, education, and a more adaptable, professional force.    
Resources and authorities should become more decentralized.   
B.   SPECIALIZATION 
Irregular warfare requires an extensive list of new tasks to individual soldiers and 
leaders as well as collective proficiencies of the units.  Not only are tactical units 
expected to maintain their traditional warfighting capabilities, they must learn a number 
of new skills.  While commanders should have knowledge in all aspects of 
counterinsurgency, they can not be expected to possess in-depth doctrinal knowledge of 
every facet of operations.  Training time is a finite resource—one that was already in 
short order when tactical units only trained conventional combined arms maneuver.  The 
problem of skewed training priorities is magnified with irregular conflicts as the number 
of critical tasks leaders, staffs, and units must understand has rapidly expanded.   
Irregular warfare may be intellectually more difficult then traditional warfare, yet 
competent specialists are rarely dedicated beyond the brigade level to assist commanders 
with planning and conducting these operations.  While population specialists such as CA, 
PSYOP, and HUMINT teams may be temporarily attached to battalion or lower levels, 
many tactical officers must deal with a revolving door of assets as “the brigade moves 
them to priority areas.”179  This may demonstrate an attempt at acute tailoring of limited 
personnel to tasks, but counterinsurgency depends on personal relationships with the 
local populace and protracted relationship building.  When the focus is on the population, 
continuity becomes sacrosanct.  During a recent conference, former brigade commander 
Colonel John Nicholson stressed decentralized execution and “collective genius,” noting 
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that “situational understanding was best at the lowest levels.”180  Recognizing that 
counterinsurgency was a combined arms fight performed “at the squad through company 
level,” Nicholson advocated that those units be properly resourced.  He further noted that 
“brigade, battalion, and company commanders work all lines of operations.  They have to 
know governance, economics, and information domains.”   
In an online article, Captain Jeremy Gwinn states “in today’s military, the 
requirement to conduct tasks far outside traditional specialties is an accepted reality.”181  
As a former company commander, he recommends “companies and platoons develop 
specialized capabilities organically.  This is the primary level of activity in 
counterinsurgency and the level where tactical wins or losses contribute to the strategic 
outcome.”  Gwinn recognizes the significant role CA, HUMINT, PSYOP, and other 
specialized units can play:  “men and women in these units are specifically trained and 
absolutely critical to success.”  However, he cautions that specialized teams are not 
always available and his soldiers “probably know the area and the people better than 
anyone else.”  He offers numerous techniques for tasking selected soldiers to perform 
specialized duties such as serving as a “political and cultural advisor.”  His suggestions 
exemplify the creative and adaptive spirit of the Army’s small-unit ground forces; but 
they should be given the resource support to do their jobs more effectively.   
Greater individual technical abilities and cognitive aptitudes are required as tasks 
become more complex.  This demands greater task specialization with individuals 
requiring increased education and training in their respective areas of expertise.  As 
militaries have modernized, specialization has consistently been integrated at lower 
echelons of command.  An infantry company commander should have a firm 
understanding of fire support and mobility and counter-mobility operations, yet he has a 
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designated fire support officer and a combat engineer squad leader that advise him on 
their respective capabilities.  Company and battalion units require similar combined-arms 
integration with population-focused specialists.   
Historical case studies, contemporary military doctrine, and a host of academic 
studies, continue to associate certain capabilities with counterinsurgency, stability 
operations, and other types of irregular warfare.  The demand for these capabilities 
depends on the scope of U.S. intentions, the scale of operations, the threat environment, 
foreign infrastructure capacities, and a host of other factors.  The Irregular Warfare Joint 
Operating Concept identifies necessary U.S. capabilities as follows:   
…information operations to include deception and PSYOP; HUMINT 
network operations, collect and exploit information, produce and/or 
disseminate intelligence; provide security assistance, training, and 
advisory assistance to foreign security forces; continue to conduct lethal 
strikes; and be able to conduct joint net-centric operations that link 
globally distributed forces conducting IW.182 
The Joint Urban Operations Joint Integrating Concept outlines the necessity for 
military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs, and civil 
engineers.183  Additionally, immediate assistance to the local population may require 
enhanced logistics and medical capacities.  Military analyst Andrew Krepinevich cites a 
need for robust intelligence units, infantry, military police, special operations forces, 
construction engineers, civil affairs specialists, PSYOPs, quick-reaction force elements, 
advisory teams, and transportation, communication, and logistics elements.184   
The Army believes these capabilities are well represented in the functional and 
multi-functional brigades.  Yet articles from ground-level practitioners and interviews 
with a range of Army officers, suggest many of these skill sets are still in short supply 
and functional compartmentalization requires high-level capabilities integration.  Colonel 
Brian Watson recognizes one of the current design’s shortfalls: 
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The modular BCT does feature some organic military police, intelligence 
collection, signal, and combat engineer assets that were not previously 
organic to combat brigades.  However, the current design of these units 
represents a minimalist approach, barely capable of accomplishing the 
tasks necessary to support combat operations—let alone the additional 
tasks required for stabilization.185   
While there is a general agreement to increase the capacity and capabilities of 
certain population-focused specialists in irregular environments, there is continued 
disagreement over how to integrate those capabilities with traditional combat specialties 
such as the infantry. 
C.  DECENTRALIZATION AND INTEGRATION 
Tightly controlled, top-down forms may work well in simple, stable 
situations but fail badly in more fluid and ambiguous ones.186 
A vast array of literature analyzes the need for effective organizations when 
conducting irregular warfare.  Historians and analysts stress the critical importance of 
close coordination between foreign and indigenous militaries, police, and civil 
administrations from the senior levels of government down to the tactical level.  
Furthermore, years of counterinsurgency study demonstrate the importance of small unit 
operations and intelligence work over large-scale conventional operations during 
irregular conflict.187  The resulting organization should promote decentralized decision-
making while retaining lateral unity of effort in all operating areas to include security, 
economic development, intelligence, and political authority.  Austin Long’s compilation 
of RAND counterinsurgency studies notes the recent change of Army units from division 
units to separate brigades as “encouraging…but insufficient.”  He states: 
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COIN is fought at the neighborhood and village level, and is ultimately 
won or lost by sergeants, lieutenants, and captains, not by colonels and 
generals.  The current focus on force protection combined with a 
propensity for thinking in terms of high-intensity combat has meant that 
there is often less autonomy for these squad, platoon, and company leaders 
than successful COIN requires.188 
United States Army and Marine Corps’ doctrine also stresses small-unit capabilities: 
Battalion-sized and smaller unit operations are often most effective for 
countering insurgent activities.  Counterinsurgents need to get as close as 
possible to the people to secure them and glean the maximum amount of 
quality information…Brigades are usually synchronizing 
headquarters…The sooner counterinsurgents can execute small-unit 
operations effectively, the better.189  
The Joint Urban Operations JIC recognizes that “ground forces should be trained 
to operate in a distributed manner at the small-unit level,” noting the highly 
compartmentalized nature of urban operations.  Each local area is very nuanced requiring 
small-unit actions tailored to that area.  Furthermore, the authors see the need for “robust, 
decentralized command and control of ground forces,” and the integration of diverse 
capabilities at “increasingly lower levels of application.”190    
Despite all the discussion of small-unit operations and lower-level capability 
integration, the question remains as to whether the Army is actually enabling lower units 
to do their jobs.  In Full Spectrum Operations, Major General Peter Chiarelli and Major 
Patrick Michaelis, recognize the importance of small-unit operations with innovative 
leaders, empowered by resources such as money and intelligence.191  However, the 
authors cautioned against the Army’s insistence on modularity believing the smaller 
division headquarters would lose “force multipliers, traditionally located at the division” 
causing increased friction and slowing the campaign’s operational tempo.  This 
observation may have had relevance in Baghdad in 2004, but it is contrary to the 
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historical evidence presented by Martin Van Creveld.  Noting “twenty-five centuries of 
historical experience,” he describes a trend of successful warfare being waged through 
decentralized command structures.192  Van Creveld asserts, “greater certainty at the top 
(more reserves, superior control) is only bought at the expense of less certainty at the 
bottom.”193  Chiarelli saw his headquarters’ role as “providing the tip of the spear with 
the information and actionable knowledge needed to determine the best course of action.”  
But many officers from the “tip of the spear” frequently complain of cumbersome 
headquarters unable to process and analyze information they send up, and unable (or 
unwilling) to provide the resources that would enable them to do their job better at the 
lower tactical levels.   
The Army’s force structure relies on customized mission tailoring—the “plug-
and-play” of modular units to a given environment.  According to Van Creveld, an 
organization’s desire for “overall flexibility” (currently maintained by harboring 
specialized capabilities and equipment in functional brigades and higher echelon 
commands) actually contributes to greater centralization, higher decision thresholds, and 
increased requirements for information processing.194  However, he further cautions that 
greater autonomy of decision authority is not sufficient to determine success.  Units must 
be properly trained and resourced.  This results in cohesive, self-contained organizations 
that reduce the requirements for top-level information processing.   
Martin Van Creveld describes, “two basic ways of coping with uncertainty, 
centralization and decentralization.”195  He outlines numerous implications for the 
organization of successful combat units.  One refers to command authorities.  It is “the 
need for decision thresholds to be fixed as far down the hierarchy as possible, and for 
freedom of action at the bottom of the military structure.”  Another is for decentralized 
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resources:  “the need for an organization that will make such low-decision thresholds 
possible by providing self-contained units at a fairly low level.”196   
The current Army design is brigade-centric.  Brigade combat teams have 
considerably larger staffs and organic assets then their predecessors.  Some of the officers 
interviewed for this study felt the brigade staff is an essential lynch-pin to tactical 
operations.  They believe the many resource-intensive lines of operations pursued in a 
counterinsurgency operation require extensive coordination between specialized units and 
individuals, grouped functionally, who operate at the brigade and higher levels.  One 
officer said most of the current operating deficiencies he’s observed at the Joint 
Readiness Training Center are due to ineffective brigade staffs and poor management, not 
a lack of specialized capabilities. 197  He sees operational ineffectiveness as a training 
issue.  He believes proper training and better knowledge of COIN doctrine will allow the 
brigades to provide “good products to the company-level.”  However, he cautioned that 
“brigade staffs’ products are limited by the quality of information they’re receiving from 
the companies.”  To this officer, the largest limiting factor of an effective brigade staff is 
the managerial abilities of its senior officers and the quality of information its receiving 
through the formal information channels.  Better training and managerial capabilities are 
necessary to optimize the brigade staff’s potential.   
While this observation has merit and is shared by many, it seems there could also 
be an organizational issue.  If brigade staffs are overwhelmed by shear volumes of 
information they’re attempting to process and analyze, the staffs may need to be 
increased, placing an even larger demand on managerial skills.  One military intelligence 
officer said his brigade integration and analysis cell had to sort over 700 pages of 
information “coming in from every direction” in a 12-hour period.198  While some see 
technology and connectivity as a means to decentralize, it can also empower greater top-
level control through increased information demands that burden subordinate 
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organizations and micromanagement.  Summarizing his observations of U.S. military 
staffs at work, a senior British officer wrote:  
…if there was a common trend it was for micro-management, with many 
hours devoted to daily briefings and updates.  Planning tended to be staff 
driven and focused on processes rather than end effect.  The net effect was 
highly centralized decision-making…it tended to discourage lower level 
initiative and adaptability, even when commanders consciously 
encouraged both. 199  
These staffs are expected to process and analyze large amounts of information, 
synchronizing complex operations across a large geographic area.  While senior-level 
effectiveness is critical, an alternative may be to decentralize greater responsibilities to 
lower commands.   
If exercising central control over limited resources is one way of 
maximizing cost-effectiveness, distributing those resources among 
subordinate units may, by virtue of eliminating much of the need for 
planning, coordination, and internal communications, be 
another…distributing the resources may often be the more effective way 
to maximize cost-effectiveness.200    
Supporters of the current design believe brigade-level synchronization is 
important to prevent lower commands from becoming overly myopic.  Limited resources 
require brigade and higher staffs to establish priorities for specialized units, equipment, 
and operational funds, oftentimes resulting in high-demand assets being frequently 
moved to different areas as the situation dictates.  These are relevant concerns, but they 
must be balanced with the longevity of personal relationships (both internal and external 
to the organization) necessary in population-focused operations.  The Army must take a 
critical look at its available capacity for high-demand specialists, units, and the 
integration of those capabilities into tactical maneuver units.        
So far, this chapter has used organizational theory to infer areas of further analysis 
within the Army’s force structure.  The most important points are as follows: 
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• A turbulent environment requires greater decentralization of authority and 
resources. 
• Increased complexity within the operating environment requires an 
increase in the number and diversity of tasks required of units and 
individuals.   
• While increased education and training curriculums can broaden leader 
skill sets (and should be aggressively pursued), training time is finite.  The 
operating environment demands an increase in specialization.   
• These diverse capabilities should be integrated at lower levels of authority, 
allowing localized tailoring, while maintaining the means to coordinate 
across lateral and functional divides.      
The remainder of this chapter will examine three functions essential to Army 
combat units conducting irregular warfare activities—intelligence operations, security 
and mobility, and civil-military operations.  Each functional area will be examined to 
discern what degree of specialization is required and how those functions should be 
integrated to make the Army’s tactical units more effective at conducting operations in 
irregular environments.      
C.  INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 
Because all echelons collect and use intelligence, all staffs are heavily 
involved in analysis.  Units are simultaneously intelligence producers and 
consumers…battalion staffs often do not have the personnel to collect 
patrol debriefs, analyze incoming information from multiple sources, 
produce finished intelligence products, and disseminate products to 
appropriate consumers.  In many cases brigade intelligence sections may 
also be inadequate for a COIN environment…There are also instances 
when analysts can be beneficial at the company level.201 
Historical literature and contemporary doctrine stresses the critical importance of 
intelligence in population-focused operations such as counterinsurgency.202  Intelligence 
drives tactical operations and successful operations result in a greater quality and quantity  
 
                                                 
201 Army, FM 3-24, 3-162, 3-163. 
202 See David Galula, Counterinsurgency Wafare Theory and Practice (Westport:  Praeger Security 
International, 2006); Komer, Krepinevich, Nagl, Krepinevich, Crane, Hammes, Sepp, Aylwin-Foster, 
Gibson, Ollivant and Chewing, and FM 3-24.      
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of intelligence.  This dynamic is not unique to irregular warfare, but methods of 
collection, types of information, and how the information is processed, are vastly 
different from conventional operations.     
Army intelligence manning allocations and processes are indicative of its legacy 
design.  Information has traditionally been gathered through centrally controlled systems.  
It was disseminated through a series of briefings and reports where the enemy situation 
was boiled down to an overlay of red symbols and numbers.  Imagery and signals 
intelligence was critical to identifying the disposition, location and strength of enemy 
combat units and command nodes.  When fighting conventional foes on linear 
battlefields, human intelligence was often limited to detainee questioning and the rare 
occurrence where civilians could provide current information on enemy troop 
movements.  Population centers and their inhabitants were to be avoided.   
Enemy situational templates were developed through a top-down process of 
collection and analysis with limited bottom-up refinement.  Battalion intelligence 
specialists were often relegated to information conduits.  In addition to technological 
methods, specialists trained in reconnaissance and surveillance collected information on 
the enemy situation and reported it to a staff that consolidated the “common operating 
picture.”  The staffs then sent this information to the maneuver units tasked with 
destroying the enemy elements.  This process resulted in a present-day intelligence 
organizational structure that looks like an inverse pyramid.203  There are little, if any, 
dedicated intelligence assets at lower echelons, while higher commands maintain sizeable 
staffs and collection systems.   
While the Army has embraced the mantra of “every soldier as a sensor”, the 
current intelligence structure has only seen slight incremental changes from its Cold War 
predecessor.  The 2004 Transformation Roadmap recognizes numerous changes 
necessary to an intelligence framework originally designed to provide top-down 
                                                 
203 Division intelligence staffs are approximately 300-strong, brigades are 115, and battalions 8.  
Additionally, there are ten active-duty MI functional brigades, typically supporting division and corps-level 
operations.    
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information to maneuver units in linear battle; yet none of these solutions have been 
implemented below the brigade-level.  Some of these solutions include:204   
• “moving appropriate Army intelligence collection capabilities forward 
into the tactical maneuver forces”  
• “providing additional analytic capability within maneuver units to enhance 
situational awareness”  
• “increasing the number of intelligence personnel organic to the lowest 
level war-fighting units”  
As noted in Chapter III, there are no technologies or intelligence personnel 
organic to maneuver platoons or companies, while the battalion headquarters is 
unchanged and under-manned with a small intelligence staff of approximately six to eight 
personnel.205  Tactical Collection Teams (TCT)206 typically remain under brigade or 
higher control, often reporting through a classified and rigidly compartmentalized 
process.  Additionally, high demand technologies such as signal intercept capabilities are 
often maintained at the brigade and higher level, attached to battalion and lower levels 
intermittently.  These systems have proven to be extremely influential while integrated 
into smaller unit tactical operations.   
Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadrons boast 
intelligence and maneuver integration offering a possible exception to stove-piped 
intelligence structures.  Yet, these capabilities are confined to a separate battalion within 
a maneuver brigade.  This is indicative of an organization still defined by linear battle-
space.  The Guide to Modularity states, “the reconnaissance squadron should be used in a 
security role only when that cannot be avoided.”207  However, on the contemporary 
battlefield, this battalion is often given its piece of terrain identical to the other maneuver 
battalions, with each having similar tasks.      
                                                 
204 DoD, Transformation Roadmap, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16. 
205 In the current environment, adhoc groups of untrained individuals at the company-level pour over 
information and forward their data to an undermanned intelligence cell at the battalion level.  Increasingly 
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process.  Email from CPT Neil Hollenbeck.  His unit, 1-30 IN (Mech), deployed to Iraq in summer, 2007 
with an additional lieutenant per company to serve as an intelligence officer. 
206 Formally know as Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT). 
207 Army, Guide to Modularity, 7-9. 
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There are numerous problems with the availability and allocation of current 
intelligence personnel and resources.  (1) There are not enough specialists at lower 
command levels to process and properly analyze the extensive amounts of information 
being collected by the maneuver units.  This information is bottle-necked at the battalion-
level.  (2) Information that is processed at the brigade and higher echelons is often 
incomplete.  The individuals conducting analysis at that level are usually separated by 
layers of concrete, wire, and perimeter guards.  They lack the nuanced understanding of a 
given area’s terrain and population.  (3) Intelligence received by special collection units 
at brigade and higher levels may not be actionable, or even relevant without the 
contextual information a more localized maneuver commander or embedded analyst 
would have.   
In irregular conflict, vast amounts of information are gathered at the lowest levels 
by soldiers walking the streets, and platoon, company, and battalion-level leaders who 
have daily contact with the population.  Their observations and conversations—
conducted during patrols, chance encounters, and planned meetings—provide critical 
human intelligence.  Metz and Hoffman summarize this notion in their call for additional 
intelligence personnel at lower levels within the military’s hierarchy:208   
The nature of irregular warfare reverses traditional intelligence collection 
requirements, which come from tactical units at the lowest levels of the 
military chain of command.  The wealth of information gleaned from 
patrols and meetings with the local population must be fused with other 
surveillance means and law enforcement sources to produce meaningful 
insights. 
Counterinsurgencies are traditionally dispersed operations with units being 
responsible for given areas of terrain and population over an extended period of time.  
Information has localized and sometimes timely context.  Guerrillas may hide within the 
population, but not from it.  Enemy situations often vary from neighborhood to 
neighborhood and town to town.  Therefore, analysts must possess a detailed 
understanding of a given area’s terrain, demographics, and population.  For this reason, 
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information must be processed and analyzed (at least initially) close to the point of 
collection and then passed to adjacent units.      
In a recent survey of 109 combat-experienced company commanders, the 
“wartime experience” that ranked second-most challenging was developing their own 
“company-level intelligence cell or processes.”209  One of the company commanders 
surveyed stated: 
Our battalion has the best S-2 I have ever worked with, yet higher intel 
still fails us daily.  It’s the nature of the war.  In order to stay in touch with 
what is going on, I have always devoted hours daily to figuring out the 
terrain (people) in my sector.  It’s a challenge to develop my subordinates 
and my command post to appreciate the importance of company-level intel 
processes, but we have developed some good ideas on how to battle this 
monster.210   
Unable to handle the amount of information at their current skill capacity, 
companies sort information the best they can prior to forwarding it to battalion and higher 
levels.  Essential information (or its contextual relevance) is frequently lost before it’s 
processed at the brigade level.  Combined with a fluid environment that often requires a 
high operational tempo, information must be validated and processed into larger 
networks, much faster than current centralized structures allow.  Numerous officers 
interviewed for this paper described brigade and division-level intelligence staffs 
generating target folders laced with inconsistencies—the details of which would only be 
known by someone acutely familiar with the area and its people.211     
The Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine states, “enemy activities are more often 
reported by patrols, units conducting raids, or observation posts than they are by 
dedicated intelligence collectors.”212  Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Ollivant and Captain 
                                                 
209 Army Magazine, September 2007, 80.  In a survey conducted by the CompanyCommand team of 
109 combat-experienced company commanders, 58 stated “company level intelligence processes” as the  
area they needed the most assistance in.  This was the second highest response out of 39 choices.   
210 CompanyCommand Team, “Leadership Challenges in Iraq,” Army Magazine, September 2007, 77. 
211 Interviews with CPT Ray Mattox, MAJ Morgan Southern, CPT Bob Gregory, 1LT Kyle Phillips, 
and CPT Nick Clemente.    
212 Army, FM 3-24, 3-167. 
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Chewing’s account of operations in Iraq support this claim.213  Most of their intelligence 
came from company and battalion-level leaders meeting regularly with influential locals.   
Likewise, platoon leaders and senior NCOs interacted with community members.  
Ollivant and Chewing discouraged further “outsourcing” intelligence gathering to young 
NCOs who reported directly to senior staffs.214  Instead, they recommended increasing 
tactical HUMINT teams and attaching them directly to the battalion intelligence section 
to maintain a seamless relationship between intelligence and operations.  Ollivant and 
Chewing feel HUMINT specialists play a critical and integral role in the time-consuming 
process of detainee interrogation, post-raid tactical questioning, source development, and 
intelligence analysis.  However, they also argue for maneuver unit leaders (many of 
whom develop extensive relationships with local community leaders) to have formalized 
training, legal inclusions, and operational funds to properly conduct source operations 
themselves.   
Former brigade commander, Colonel Ralph Baker stresses the importance of 
HUMINT-centric operations and offers numerous techniques for informant development, 
document exploitation, analysis, and effective interrogations.215  However, he takes a 
very centralized approach to intelligence operations and offers little insight into his 
subordinates’ informal methods of gathering and analyzing intelligence.  To be fair, 
Baker claims he was eventually “able to back off and be less directive,” allowing 
battalions and companies to modify their intelligence operations to suit their particular 
areas of operations.  Yet the organization, reporting structures, and manning emphasis 
                                                 
213 See, Ollivant and Chewing, “Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN Operations,” Military 
Review, July-August (2006):  50-59.   
214 See, “Army Looks for NCOs to Serve as Human Intelligence Collectors,” Army News Service, 
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215 Baker, Ralph O, “HUMINT-CENTRIC OPERATIONS:  Developing Actionable Intelligence in 
the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment,” Military Review, March-April (2007).  
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presented in his article remain brigade-centric, designed to “ensure that the battalions’ 
intelligence and collection requirements were nested with the brigade’s.”216  Intelligence 
should place less emphasis on bottom-level actions supporting higher-level situational 
understanding, and increase analysis that supports bottom-level actions.   
At the 2007 Infantry Warfighting Conference, Brigadier General Yarborough 
stated that Iraq was a “company fight.”217  “I get over half of my intel from the company 
level,” he said, and recalled a story about a company commander in Baghdad who awoke 
one morning to sixty-three missed cell phone calls from local Iraqis.  In BG 
Yarborough’s opinion, company-level teams needed greatly enhanced intelligence 
gathering and analytical capabilities to include:  tactical HUMINT teams, including 
interrogation specialists, signals intelligence, and intelligence-surveillance-
reconnaissance capabilites (ISR).   
Former battalion commander Christopher Gibson states, “experience has shown 
that effective targeting should be, in the main, driven by intelligence garnered by troopers 
interacting respectfully and empathetically with the populace.”218  He advocates for 
numerous organizational reforms at lower levels.  He calls for an overdue necessity to 
redistribute intelligence assets stating, “companies and battalions plainly need more 
intelligence analysts.”  He specifically recommends that there should be tactical 
HUMINT teams and a dedicated interrogator at the battalion level, and intelligence 
analysts at the company level.   
                                                 
216 If a brigade-level commander is personally involved with each facet of intelligence operations, one 
must question the overall effectiveness of the subordinate units’ gathering techniques.  Baker’s insights are 
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217 Brigadier General Yarborough, Multi-National Corps Iraq (presentation at the Infantry Warfighting 
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While tactical units are developing information for their designated areas of 
operations, higher echelons must still fuse it into operational intelligence. 219  Although 
most modern insurgencies are fractured and localized, there are social networks, 
financing chains, and ideological catalysts that extend throughout larger regions.  
Populations and enemy insurgents are not constrained by U.S. unit boundaries.  
Collective databases and higher-level analysis should provide critical synthesis, and 
cross-reference intelligence from military units, host-nation security forces, other U.S. 
government agencies, and intelligence organizations.  Yet, the higher one goes, the less 
familiar staffs are with the subtle intricacies of a given area and population.     
A recent RAND study on counterinsurgency discussed the necessity for all-source 
intelligence coordination at every echelon of military command, recommending 
intelligence centers at each level of organization from the village and neighborhood, to 
the national level.220  It also warns that the intelligence community is fiercely resistant to 
decentralized initiatives.  Intelligence organizations declare source protections, collection 
method sensitivities, and other important but often exaggerated legalistic minutia.  
Ollivant and Chewing believe unnecessary legal restrictions prevent seasoned leaders 
from tasking willing cohorts into gathering sensitive information.221   
Critics of decentralized intelligence assets believe unfettered universal data access 
in the virtual realm will make geo-spacial concerns obsolete.  According to one MI 
officer: 
[Transformation] is enabling the tactical force with network connectivity 
so that [the] smartest people can collaboratively attack any problem from 
any location in the world.  Do we still need MI assets and analysts 
forward?  Absolutely!  Does the analyst need to be standing in your 
tactical operations center in order to provide critical input as part of your 
collaborative team?  Absolutely not!222   
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Without a doubt, reach-back capabilities are already improving intelligence 
sharing.  Yet, digital intelligence networks’ databases are only as good as the quality of 
the information entered into them.  The information must be continuously updated to 
remain relevant, and that has to be done by those who walk the streets.  However, 
specialists can help refine unfiltered information before it overwhelms the system, and 
quickly identify information gaps.   
In a 2004 article published in the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 
Lieutenant Colonel Iwicki states, the intelligence community “know(s) where the rubber 
meets the road and enabling tactical forces is the heart of what we are doing.”223  He 
claims recent transformation initiatives are dramatically changing MI operations to tailor 
collection and analysis capabilities, particularly suited to meet asymmetric threats.  
However, the tone of the article focuses largely on “embracing Information Age 
processes and distributed network-centric operations.”  Information technologies should 
be aggressively pursued, but the increased proliferation of technology should promote 
flatter command structures and lateral communications while still allowing top-level 
synthesis and coordination.   
Databases and information management is another often-cited area of concern for 
practitioners of counterinsurgency with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Gibson 
stresses the usefulness of census data and detailed population databases.224  Many units 
had social network and population reports with names numbering in the thousands.  
Attempting to update that information and continuously refine linkages between 
individuals is a full-time job.  An online OPED by a returning soldier fumed at the lack of 
available common intelligence databases that could enable tactical units to laterally share 
information.  “Multiple reporting chains, proprietary databases, and top-down solutions 
                                                 
223 Stephen K. Iwicki, “CSA’s Focus Area 16:  Actionable Intelligence…one year later,” Military 
Intelligence Professional Bulletin, October-December (2004), 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBS/is_4_30/ai_n13822278/print.  Iwicki describes recent 
improvements and tests of the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) that is intended to 
provide the future digital architecture for intelligence analysis breaking down previous “ownership” 
barriers between different collection systems and echelons. 
224 Gibson, “Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success.”      
 97
hinder our ability to understand our enemy,” wrote Eric England.225  Nearly five years 
into the war in Iraq, every maneuver unit leader interviewed for this study mentioned 
their own programs, databases, and templates for tracking information.226   
This section has identified numerous problems with today’s intelligence structure.  
The current design runs counter to Army doctrine, historical insights, and comments from 
the field.  The following chapter will provide a detailed recommendation for creating 
enhanced intelligence capacities within company and battalion units.  For now, the 
attention will turn to security operations—the necessary foundation for development and 
the establishment of an environment that allows accelerated transitions to civil and 
legitimate host-nation authorities.   
D.  SECURITY AND MOBILITY 
Whatever weapon dominates the battlefield, there will always be times 
and places where vehicles cannot travel, shells and missiles cannot reach, 
and electronic sensors cannot sense.  There will moreover, always be men 
who, for reasons of poverty or strategy, prefer to fight their battles at the 
retail rather than the wholesale level.  For this reason, there will always be 
a place for first-class infantry.227 
1.  Vehicles  
The population is the center of gravity in irregular warfare.228  Future ground 
conflict will likely continue to be conducted against guerrilla fighters hiding among 
sympathetic or coerced populations.  Population security usually requires soldiers to live 
amongst the population they protect (or if need be, control), but too large a signature (the 
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visible size of units and the amount of space they occupy) can accelerate resistance 
movements.  While most security work must be done on foot, protected mobility is still 
critical.  Soldiers will need to balance mobility, firepower, and survivability, while 
recognizing that “sometimes, the more force [that] is used, the less effective it is.”229  
Hammes’ believes heavy divisions are overly expensive, largely ill-suited for urban and 
restrictive terrain, and their firepower is irrelevant against guerrilla fighters.  Large fleets 
of heavy armor require massive logistics tails, represented by sizeable support units and 
overhead costs (personnel, materiel, financial).  In urban stabilization operations, soldiers 
must minimize their signature, while possessing the means for safe transport and 
increased firepower when necessary.  This is a delicate balance.     
The current Army structure is separated by a heavy, medium and light divide.  
Each type of BCT is distinguished primarily by its mobility platform (or lack thereof). 
According to the Army’s Guide to Modularity, “all BCTs can execute full spectrum 
operations”—able to operate in any threat situation, geographical region, and task 
environment.230  The BCTs are designed to complement each other in a diverse array of 
mission environments; yet each type of BCT was optimized for specific types of terrain 
and enemy threats as described in Chapter III. All BCTs are stated to have utility in 
stability operations although no particular design is optimized for it.231   
The Stryker BCT provides the closest balance of infantry and mobile protection 
necessary for an irregular, urban environment.  Unfortunately, Stryker units only account 
for eight percent of the active component’s brigade combat teams.232  Creating more 
Stryker BCTs may not be a fiscal reality or an operational necessity.  Having enough 
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vehicles to promise every soldier a seat, SBCTs maintain a large signature and logistics 
requirements as compared with the lighter IBCTs.  Forced-entry operations and major 
combat requires rapid mobility (both strategic and tactical) for the entire task force, but 
sustained operations permit smaller, modular pools of vehicles to support localized troop 
patrols.  Furthermore, the SBCTs still lack the capacity for proper low-level intelligence 
operations and the many non-combat aspects of irregular warfare.       
Heavy brigades make up forty percent of the active Army’s BCTs.233  The 
protracted and extensive use of heavily-armored, tracked vehicles can be detrimental to 
counter-insurgency operations.234  The vehicles cause excessive damage to a town’s 
surface and sub-surface infrastructure.  They do not allow for the use of “minimum 
necessary force” when in contact and they limit interactions between soldiers and the 
populace.  Lastly, armor can be psychologically menacing to local citizens, accelerating 
feelings of oppression and fueling resistance movements.  The extensive use of heavily-
armored vehicles increases budgetary requirements and support personnel reducing the 
number of combat troops on the ground.235  Given the amount of their logistics overhead, 
the vehicles offer a very low “tooth-to-tail” ratio in a usually manpower-intensive 
operating environment.    
While many armored units have adapted themselves to counterinsurgency, the old 
adage “if your only tool is a hammer…” may apply.  During the first six months of 
operations in Ramadi, the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division fired over five-hundred 
120mm main gun rounds.  Noting his unit was a “hammer,” and everything looked like a 
“nail” to his soldiers, Colonel MacFarland eventually mandated that a major or above had 
to approve the use of a main gun round.236  As for collateral damage, the colonel stated 
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that “tanks crush infrastructure” and his units’ outposts became “swamps” due to broken 
water and sewage lines.237  While almost all of the armor officers interviewed for this 
paper deployed with their full complement of Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting 
vehicles, many operated in HMMWVs.  Yet, due to smaller personnel manning,238 
training deficiencies, or organizational resistance, some armored units were hesitant to 
conduct extensive dismounted patrolling—a necessary method for conducting community 
policing, speaking with locals, and gathering intelligence.   
Conversely, most of the infantrymen interviewed wished they had more vehicles 
offering greater mobility and increased protection from mines, improvised explosives, 
and small arms.  While they believed dismounted operations were essential to interacting 
with the public, a lack of vehicles limited their flexibility to react to attacks and conduct 
protected rapid movements of troops for selected operations.  Alternative medium-weight 
vehicles are now under development to fit the immediate needs in Iraq.239  These vehicles 
and others will likely remain in deployment pools for some time.  An increase in 
medium-armored, wheeled vehicles should be expeditiously adapted into the standard 
organization of infantry units for training and wartime requirements.  U.S. enemies have 
seen the vulnerability of U.S. light units in urban areas and will continue to exploit them.       
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In the next chapter, this paper will offer a standard force design to balance the 
demand for mobility, survivability, and firepower necessary for security duties, with the 
need for U.S. units to maintain a small signature and logistics tail.  This lessens the 
population’s resentment towards foreign troops and allows greater flexibility and 
autonomy for units operating in persistent irregular conflicts.     
2.  Military Police  
“The primary frontline COIN force is often the police—not the military.”240  This 
statement recognizes the significance of developing local security organizations that are 
accountable to government institutions and woven into the fabric of the environment in 
which they serve.  However, many analysts equate “community policing,” or “police 
operations” in a counterinsurgency as analogous to a requirement for more military police 
(or contracted civilian law enforcement officers).  In a hostile environment, the role of 
military police and infantry is oftentimes blurred.  The Stability Operations Army Action 
Plan recommends the Joint Staff “assess the roles and missions of Military Police (MP) 
in order to determine what tasks may be executed by the GPF [used presumably to mean 
non-MP ground soldiers such as infantry or artillerymen] and what tasks require MPs.”  
Furthermore the action plan seeks to define a “clear distinction between criminal 
information/intelligence and police information/intelligence.”241  The IW JOC says 
irregular warfare, “may require additional capabilities for police-like intelligence and 
security functions in support of population security and rule of law.”242   
MPs have unique skill sets that can augment foreign police force training and 
support ongoing civil-military operations.  Army counterinsurgency doctrine offers a list 
of skills that military police are “especially suited to teach” such as stations management, 
prisoner and detainee handling, and riot control.243  However, other skills listed such as 
weapons handling, small-unit tactics, and raids are difficult (if not impossible) to 
                                                 
240 Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 6-19.  
241 DAMO-SSO, Army Action Plan for Stability Operations, xx. 
242 Army, IW JOC, 22. 
243 Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 6-20. 
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differentiate from common infantry capabilities.  Police take on more of a paramilitary 
role in a non-permissive environment.  While all maneuver units and intelligence 
personnel are involved in policing duties, MPs should be able to provide more detailed 
investigations support to intelligence gathering requirements in an irregular operating 
environment.  Lastly, women serving in military police units are a tremendous asset 
working with host-nation females from traditional societies.  Female MPs can search 
indigenous women, question them out of sight of other males and escorts, or simply 
befriend them,        
In a recent article, Colonel David Patton addresses the confusion that seems to 
exist over the current and future role of the military police.244  Historically, the MPs were 
primarily responsible for handling enemy POWs, guarding, and facilitating the ground 
movement of critical supplies in rear areas.  In garrison, they were charged with 
installation security, maintenance of law and order, and investigative duties.  During the 
1970s, the MPs dedicated themselves to rear battle tactics.  According to Patton, “hours 
of training formerly devoted to garrison patrols, criminal incident response, and police 
report writing were given over to more hours on the ranges and in the field, learning the 
basics of moving, shooting and communicating necessary to fight and survive on the 
battlefield of Western Europe.”  They focused on guarding rear-areas, protecting 
convoys, and directing military traffic.  Through the last two decades, MPs have 
gradually been relieved of numerous home-station law enforcement duties by civilian 
contractors, while they focus on more infantry-like training.  Meanwhile, non-linear 
conflict has altered the doctrine of rear-area duties.       
Patton argues that the MPs niche’ is law enforcement and detainee operations.  He 
cites Panama as a stability operation where “military forces were required to maintain 
law and order, sustain or restore basic services and nurture the development of new 
domestic civil institutions until they are prepared to take over these roles.”  Among his 
numerous recommendations, Patton believes each BCT should have a dedicated MP 
company with platoons available to support battalion commanders in investigation 
                                                 
244 Colonel David L. Patton (ret), “Put the ‘Police’ Back in Military Police,” ARMY Magazine, 
September 2007, 11-18. 
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procedures, law enforcement, and detainee operations.  This proposal will become the 
basis for recommendations further outlined in the next chapter.   
3.  Combat Engineers 
Recognizing current and future “full-spectrum” operations concepts, the Army 
Stability Operations Action Plan calls on the engineer community to “ensure the proper 
skill sets are developed and available to meet the Army’s and the Nation’s needs.”245  
The engineer community has largely weighed its warfighting emphasis within its combat 
engineer units, steeped in infantry operations.  They accompany tactical combined arms 
units, equipped and trained to reduce enemy obstacles while on the offense, and emplace 
their own while in the defense.   
Guerrilla fighters of today, and potentially conventional adversaries of the future, 
will be less likely to establish large-scale, low-tech obstacles such as classic wire and 
mine obstacles.  The increased proliferation of munitions and explosives technology and 
training is making concealed, highly-lethal, and very technical explosive devices more 
common.  These devices have proven deadly against soldiers trafficking roads and 
entering houses.  Engineers have knowledge on the construction of demolitions, but little 
training in explosive ordinance disposal (EOD).  These specialists are in extremely 
limited supply in Iraq and Afghanistan today.  The Army is exploring increased robotics 
technology that can detect enemies and explosive devices.  Although this technology is 
immature at the moment, it hopes to deliver revolutionary capabilities.  Combat engineers 
must revisit their capability mix, training emphasis and organizational structures to be 
more relevant in irregular warfare.   
4.  Advising Foreign Security Forces  
So far this chapter has focused solely on U.S. Army capabilities.  Yet, one of the 
most critical steps following a U.S. foreign intervention is building, or strengthening, 
already established indigenous security forces capacity.  More importantly, U.S. 
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partnerships and multi-lateral exercises can provide preventive training opportunities to 
strengthen foreign militaries and police units, precluding some situations that would 
demand direct U.S. military ground combat.  The necessity for building effective 
indigenous security force capacity during stability operations and counterinsurgency is 
rarely disputed; but, the method of organizing for this task is.  Operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have witnessed dedicated advisory teams, special operations teams, informal 
assistance, and formal partnerships between U.S. and indigenous security units.   
A thorough analysis of foreign unit training and leader advising is beyond the 
scope of this paper; however, one can not discuss irregular warfare without addressing 
this important component.  The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review states, “helping others 
to help themselves is critical to winning the long war.”246  Current operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have demonstrated the importance, and difficulty, of establishing effective 
indigenous security forces to reduce the requirements of U.S. combat soldiers and to 
increase the legitimacy of the host-nation government.    
While early efforts in Iraq usually relegated host-nation development to military 
transition teams (MiTT) teams at the battalion-level and higher, recent initiatives toward 
fully integrating conventional forces, the Iraqi army, and the Iraqi police at all levels of 
command have taken hold.  Supporters of Baghdad’s Joint Security Stations (JSS) note 
the increased confidence and training the constant presence of U.S. troops embedded with 
the Iraqis provides.  Small units of U.S. personnel integrated with the Iraqis merge U.S. 
advantages in close-air support and rapid reinforcements with Iraqi culture, linguistic, 
and intelligence collection benefits.  A formal partnership of this type operates in the 
historical shadow of Vietnam’s Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program and 
the Marine Corps’ Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program.  Austin Long’s RAND 
report explains how combining U.S. squads with indigenous platoons makes an otherwise 
ineffective indigenous unit effective.  Effective capabilities are essentially tripled.247  FM 
3-24 declares that “U.S. combat operations are secondary to enabling the host nation’s 
                                                 
246 DoD, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, as quoted in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 6-1.   
247 Long, 64. 
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ability to provide for its own security.”248  This statement, while unanimously accepted 
 in word, has had a mixed following in deeds.         
Critics of the MiTT program point to a lack of proper selection criteria for this 
essential job despite a doctrinal and senior leader adage that, “commanders must assign 
the best qualified Soldiers and Marines to training and advisory missions.”249  Selection 
for a MiTT assignment has normally relied on “dwell time,” a personnel policy that often 
ensured officers and soldiers with the least experience would be selected for this critical 
duty and offers little quality control over the selection process.250  A recent graduate from 
Fort Riley’s training program tasked to prepare MiTT teams for deployment, lamented 
that most of the program’s curriculum was spent refreshing basic soldier skills.251   
Special Forces teams are inherently organized for advising indigenous forces at 
the tactical level.252 However, 11-man ODA teams are not designed nor experienced 
enough to provide the scope of capabilities required when advising higher-level 
commands within institutionalized armies on logistics, maintenance, and personnel 
systems, legal processes, and staffing systems.  As the U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command is exploring the clandestine side of unconventional warfare and persistent, 
low-visibility operations,253 the IW JOC and the Army Action Plan for Stability 
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Operations encourage general purpose forces to increase its capability and capacity to 
conduct foreign internal defense (FID) missions.254   
This is where the debate begins.255  Military analysts such as John Nagl and 
Andrew Krepinevich argue for the creation of standing, full-time advisory units.256  
Critics are quick to point out that every advisory mission will be different.  The existing 
capabilities (and short-falls) of the host-nation forces, scope and scale of U.S. 
involvement, and political situations may require vastly different skill sets by individual 
advisors or advisory teams.  When the U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan eventually 
subsides, permanent advisors will have difficulty sustaining their skill proficiencies.  
How those proficiencies would differ from those already existent in SOF is another issue.   
More important than a standing advisory force may be a competitive advisory selection 
process and tailored training as needed.  Some of the more renowned advisors in recent 
history did not come from a standing organization, but possessed innate personality traits 
and existing skills that were critical to their efforts.257  Nonetheless, through training, 
education, or structural changes, the U.S. Army must institutionalize and improve its 
ability to train and advise host-nation security forces.  Next, the Army’s capability and 
capacity to conduct civil-military operations is examined.                
E.  CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS  
Besides intelligence and security operations, stability operations and 
counterinsurgency demand other skills and capabilities directed towards the population 
and indirectly, against U.S. enemies.  In a recent Military Review article, Lieutenant 
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General Peter W. Chiarelli acknowledges numerous organizational changes the Army 
should explore—“…as the Army and Marine Corps increase their active-duty end 
strengths, we should consider increasing the number and adjusting the proportion of 
specialized units such as civil affairs, engineers, information operations, and others that 
play critical roles in stability operations.”258  His comments echo those of other analysts 
and studies presented earlier in this chapter.259  This section explores those authors’ calls 
for increasing the capacity of information operations, civil affairs, and engineers.  In 
addition, these specialists must have the correct skill sets for the contemporary and future 
operating environments (not more of the same); and those capabilites must be properly 
integrated with those of the maneuver BCTs and its subordinate units.  While this section 
provides an overview of each area, the next chapter will offer specific structural 
recommendations.           
1.  Information Operations  
Information operations (IO) must be synchronized through all levels of operations 
to maintain communication consistencies.260  Disseminating false or misleading 
information to the local populace can quickly undermine U.S. credibility in a given area.  
Units must “develop common, multi-echelon themes based on and consistent with host 
nation government policies and the operation’s objectives,” according to U.S. doctrine.261  
However, IO should by no means be limited to broad operational and strategic themes.  
At the tactical-level of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the desire to “sustain unity of 
message,” often results in an overly-restrictive approval process.  An over-emphasis on 
consistency, unity, and coordination leads to messages perceived by the local public as  
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vague, watered-down, or of no particular interest.  Information operations strategies must 
not only provide “common, multi-echelon themes,” but offer information specific to local 
areas.   
IO are tailored to address the concerns of the populace of specific areas.  
IO should inform the public of successfully completed projects and 
improvements, including accomplishments in security, infrastructure, 
essential services, and economic development.262    
Additionally, the approval and production process for messages and products in 
Iraq and Afghanistan is disappointingly slow.  One of the most consistent complaints 
from tactical operators is the bureaucratic cycle for product creation.  As noted by 
Gordon England, “units are not permitted to create and distribute their own flyers without 
approval from the generals in Baghdad.”263 He recommends enhanced leader training and 
more empowerment to local units allowing them to “develop and share a message that 
works in their neighborhoods,” stressing the importance of close communication between 
tactical units and Iraqi locals.  Top-level control and the lack of production capabilities at 
the brigade and below level, leads to a lack of tailored messages, delayed and ineffective 
targeting, and an eventual credibility gap within U.S. operations.264   
Colonel Ralph Baker vented his frustrations with the IO support his Brigade 
received in a 2006 Military Review article.265  He described the support as “too broad to 
resonate with the diverse subpopulations.”  Support and products “were typically 
approved too late to address the issue for which we had requested them.”  Baker also 
described out-dated legal precedents, doctrinal gaps, and training deficiencies that 
prevented the proper execution of IO.  He was frustrated at a process that regulated 
approval channels “at the highest command levels.”  The asymmetry of irregular warfare 
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was evident.  While the insurgents were quick to exploit the media and word of mouth to 
shape stories to their advantage, Baker’s unit was hindered by a “procedure much too 
slow and cumbersome to support our IO needs at the tactical level.”   COL Baker had his 
own recommendations:   
To overcome what was an ineffective and usually counterproductive 
attempt for IO/PSYOP agencies at higher levels of command to centrally 
control themes and messaging, we were compelled to initiate a more 
tailored IO process.  We developed products that incorporated relevant 
themes and messages far more specifically for the diverse groups and 
micropopulations in our area of operations. 
Besides training implications, Baker suggested the creation of an IO working 
group at the brigade level consisting of PSYOP and CA attachments, an intelligence 
officer, engineer officer, and the brigade fire support officer.  Baker discouraged further 
decentralization of themes and product development due to the risk of “IO fratricide,” 
citing an example of conflicting battalion messages following an operation.266  However, 
numerous officers interviewed for this paper cited the same problems (broad-based 
themes, and time consuming approval processes) at the company and battalion levels.  
Each environment will be different and unit competencies will vary, but the Army 
should explore procedures and organizational mechanisms to allow nuanced messages 
and products to be developed at the battalion (and possibly lower) level of command, 
while insuring consistency with higher-level themes, and accuracy with neighboring 
messages.267  IO, like intelligence is a “commander’s issue,” and all soldiers have a role 
in the dissemination or collection of information—resident specialists can serve as 
advisors and capable subject matter experts. 
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2.  Civil Affairs 
Civil development methodology remains a largely debated topic.  Some see heavy 
financial and material investments in supported-nation economies as a way of “winning  
hearts and minds.”  Others advocate for the military’s role to be immediate emergency 
aide, leaving development to a community of international and U.S. humanitarian, non-
government organizations (NGOs).  The military often views NGOs with distrust, while 
the NGO community criticize the military for violating “humanitarian space.”268   
Another debate involves bottom-up versus top-down methods of boosting 
economic growth.269  Many military commanders pursue numerous, small-dollar,  
localized, and immediate impact projects, while regional and national leaders seek fewer, 
expensive, longer-term, and large-impact initiatives.  Proponents of the first approach see 
funding programs such as the Commander’s Emergency Relief Program (CERP) as 
essential for them to apply a nuanced “carrot and stick” approach to counterinsurgency 
operations.  In doing so, they weave the tenants of security and economic development 
closely together.  The benefits of bottom-up, localized and sustainable programs have 
been increasingly promoted.  Recently, top-driven, large-scale projects in Iraq have been 
increasingly questioned.270  The Army Action Plan for Stability Operations, recommends  
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the Army “establish mechanisms through which USACE contracting capabilities can be 
used to support bottom-up, small scale solutions to economic and infrastructure 
problems.”271        
Besides “civil affairs” as a capability, it also describes a military job specialty.  
Civil affairs specialists have received considerable attention in light of operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  A recent Washington Post article about Iraq quipped, “inexperienced 
soldiers do their best to scrutinize millions of dollars in contracts and monitor projects 
they don't fully comprehend.”  Civil affairs soldiers interviewed said their training was 
inadequate for the tasks at hand.  One NCO was quoted stating, “I wish they had taught 
me how to spend money."  The role of civil affairs is evolving.  The selection, 
organization, and training methodology for those specialists is and should be scrutinized 
more closely.   
Proponents of maintaining most civil affairs specialists in the reserve field cite 
civilian functional areas that complement their military duties.  However, numerous 
conversations with civil affairs officers reveal anecdotal evidence that most CA officers 
are not utilized as functional specialists.272  Yet, with proper training, they can provide 
maneuver commanders enhanced abilities to conduct analyses of populations, and serve 
as economic and governance advisors.  Furthermore, increased training on project 
management, budgeting, and contract development would benefit the CA community.  
While maneuver commanders are becoming increasingly aware of the benefits of closely 
integrated lines of operations, maneuver forces lack specialized individuals and teams 
that can assist in developing host-nation governing capacity and serve as catalysts for 
economic growth.          
Historically, civil affairs specialists were essentially liaisons between military 
units and the civilian community.  Legacy civil-military structures were oftentimes based 
on linear battlefields where civil affairs specialists followed in the wake of military 
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maneuvers to establish control in recently liberated or still occupied areas.273    Their role 
was to ensure order and minimize civil interference with military operations.  They 
provided emergency humanitarian aid, controlled refugees, and interfaced with 
international and non-governmental organizations within each area of operations.  For 
fifty years, civil-military operations have been executed through ad hoc organizational 
structures.  After World War II, large-scale occupations were led by AMGOT (Allied 
Military Government of Occupied Territories) teams and a civilian administration.  These 
teams operated separately from military units.  In Vietnam, the Civil Operations and 
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Program established civil-military teams, 
drawing members from DoD, the Department of State, and USAID.274   
More recently, and common to modern irregular conflict, civil interaction can not 
be easily separated from military action.  Interaction with, and influence over the 
population is a critical effort within irregular operations.  While every soldier and officer 
must understand the relationship of civil-military operations through expanded training 
programs, specialized individuals and units are still necessary to properly advise 
maneuver leaders and collaborate with non-military organizations.     
In Afghanistan and Iraq, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have received a 
great deal of attention as the latest civil-military concept.  Although common in name, the 
teams do not have a unifying structure, manning requirements, or mission.  They 
represent continued ad hoc units established to conduct focused reconstruction programs 
and governance development.  While PRTs in Afghanistan operate mostly in permissive, 
or semi-permissive environments, many of their Iraqi counterparts have been 
“embedded” into brigade combat teams as part of General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency 
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strategy.  This program acknowledges the reality of irregular conflict—military and civil 
objectives are explicitly interdependent at all operational levels.  Military activities and 
civil-military duties do not easily differentiate into separate organizations.  Having 
combat units and disconnected PRTs serving in the same area creates functional 
stovepipes that are ineffective, if not counterproductive, to operations.  Integrating the 
civil specialists and maneuver commanders at every echelon promotes increased unity of 
effort.275  Although the PRT concept may not survive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(its namesake is already being replaced by Provincial Support Teams [PST] and State 
Department-led Forward Advanced Civilian Teams [FACTs]), the means by which civil 
specialists can be formally partnered with maneuver units should continue to be explored.    
Although civil development methodology and civil affair’s training are fields of 
study in their own right, this paper is more concerned with the integration of civil affairs 
specialists and maneuver units.  Ollivant and Chewing state, “the commander responsible 
for the security of a specific area must also be able to determine reconstruction priorities 
and control assets responsible for their implementation.”276  They support better 
resourcing tactical-unit commanders with reconstruction budgets and operational funds.  
Like many tactical commanders, they see money as influence with the local population.  
But money must be used wisely.  Development projects and labor programs must be tied 
to information operations, security requirements, and intelligence.  It must be sustainable 
by the locals and have a positive effect on economic growth.  Unsustainable projects, 
with ribbon-cutting ceremonies as their end-state, should be avoided.   
Many of the officers interviewed for this study agree with Ollivant and Chewing’s 
belief that multiple lines of operations must be integrated at the lowest reasonable levels.  
Others question the suitability of decentralized civic action.  General Chiarelli supported 
specialized task forces and units dedicated to each particular line of operation relying on 
division-level headquarters to synchronize these efforts.277  General Petraeus also 
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organized his division’s staff officers and non-maneuver commanders across functional 
boundaries within Mosul in 2003.278  He ensured these civil, functional groupings closely 
coordinated with his brigades and battalions that were organized geographically—
maintaining security through defensive meaures, area-denial patrols and intelligence-
driven raids.  The success and longevity of their efforts is beyond the scope of this study.  
But generally speaking, higher-level decision-makers lack a detailed enough 
understanding of local-level nuances, to properly determine what mix of capabilities to 
employ in a given area with any precision.  A senior commander’s desire for efficiency 
through brigade and higher functional grouping results can lead to less effective 
operations. 
Geographical grouping with integrated functional capabilities can better respond 
to local needs.  Obviously, some top-level oversight will be necessary to determine 
resource priorities.  Planning and prioritization may require higher levels of 
synchronization, but the details of execution must be maintained with lower-level 
commanders.  Functional grouping of civil projects allows better synchronization for 
technical programs that transcend unit boundaries.  Utility distribution is a good example 
of programs best aligned with functional specialists working at higher levels.  However, 
localized, sustainable programs, particularly those that are labor-heavy, should be 
supervised by corresponding geographically-aligned maneuver units.      
Currently, most brigades operating in Iraq and Afghanistan are receiving attached 
civil affairs companies.  Most battalions have a CAT-A team attached.  Some BCTs in 
Baghdad and Al Anbar province of Iraq have joint, inter-agency PRTs embedded with the 
BCTs.  This provides an ideal environment to fuse security initiatives with other lines of 
operations such as economic development and governance capacity building.  Yet, a 
common complaint is the lack of advanced, integrated collective training and the 
opportunity to build informal, interpersonal relationships between maneuver units and 
civil affairs attachments.  CA teams frequently move as senior decision-makers continue 
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to tailor their task organization to changes in their operating environments.  While 
frequent changes in task organization are expected in a fluid environment, continuity with 
the civil population is disrupted.  The Army is vigorously debating the current structure 
of civil affairs.  The debate involves the civil affairs community’s size, the allocation that 
should be in the active or reserve component, the force allocation that should belong in 
the general Army versus Special Operations Command, and whether civil affairs 
companies should establish a more formalized relationship with partnered brigade combat 
teams.279  Furthermore, civil affairs selection, linguistic capabilities, and special-skill 
training must be reviewed.   
3.  Construction Engineers 
Also in great demand are construction engineers specializing in carpentry, 
electricity, plumbing, and other trade specialties.  The current force design accounts for 
five, brigade-size construction engineer units in the active force to support theatre-level 
operations and forty-eight combat brigades.  U.S. units can continue to expect combat 
operations in austere environments where trade skills are in high demand to improve 
minimum infrastructure requirements for outpost or base protection and basic life 
support.  Much of their duties have been subsumed by contractors working in garrison 
and abroad; this is a pattern that should be re-examined from a cost and accessibly 
standpoint.  More importantly, trade specialists are essential to providing emergency 
humanitarian support to indigenous populations.  They can assist civil-military teams 
inspecting host-nation development projects and conduct indigenous craftsman training.  
Future force projections will not be limited to firepower.  U.S. Army units must have the 
capability to provide critical services amidst conflict.   
F.   INSTITUTIONALIZING CHANGE 
Discussions and analysis of the Army’s force structure often take place at the 
strategic policy level.  Military capabilities are measured by large units and expensive 
equipment platforms—interchangeable cogs in the military machine.  Many scholars 
                                                 
279 Moore and Warmack, “Civil Affairs Transformation.” Also, Boozell interview.     
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discuss capabilities as theoretical concepts without a nuanced understanding of ground-
level operations.  In an irregular environment, it is not just a question of how many 
troops, but what kind of troops, their training proficiencies, and the methods they employ.  
Planners must carefully consider the rapidly expanding number of tasks and technologies 
soldiers and officers are expected to master.  A greater number of specialists will be 
necessary at every echelon to account for the diverse intelligence, security, and civil-
military components of population-focused operations.  Accoring to Colonel Patton, 
“while attachments can fill requirements (augments from support and functional 
brigades), they can never replace the bonds of trust and confidence that come with 
organic affiliation.”280  He not only recognizes a capacity shortage, but argues for 
specialists to be fully integrated into the tactical maneuver units they support.  His 
argument is applicable to many traditional “non-combat” specialists that will continue to 










                                                 
280 Patton, “Put the ‘Police’ Back in Military Police.”  
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VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter details a mosaic of capabilities that must be integrated with 
maneuver combat units at tactical levels for effective operations in irregular conflicts.  It 
is a conceptual model tailored for irregular environments, but still capable of contributing 
to the Army’s full spectrum requirement.  This proposal does not counter the current 
“transformation” design—it adds to it.  Organizational “boxes” can always be arranged to 
provide leaders particular capabilities to conduct essential missions.  Some leaders see 
these boxes as interchangeable components—merely ingredients to task organize into ad 
hoc units.  However, in irregular warfare, this combination of specialists should form a 
network of relationships and complementary proficiencies that are better strengthened 
through consistent structural integrities and collective training opportunities.    
A.  OPTIMIZE FOR IRREGULAR WAR, MAINTAIN THE FLEXIBILITY  
According to the current FORSCOM Commander, the one point of consensus 
from “Unified Quest 2007”281 was that the U.S. Army will be in a “state of persistent 
conflict for a decade if not a generation.”282  The IW JOC acknowledges the need for the 
DoD force structure to be better designed to sustain a protracted irregular warfare effort.  
These campaigns have historically required a large number of troops.  However, what is 
even more essential is the type of troops needed and the need to increase unit 
effectiveness in irregular environments on a per capita basis.  This dynamic suggests a 
greater number of the high-yield specialties common to IW campaigns should be in the 
active force, and closely integrated with maneuver units at all echelons.  Combined arms 
warfare must be expanded to include specialized capabilities that are not historically 
included in maneuver concepts.  These capabilities should be integrated with maneuver 
units at battalion and company levels, optimizing most light infantry battalions for 
                                                 
281 Sponsored by the Army and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Unified Quest is the Army’s 
“premier wargame” to study future warfare.  See 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/04/mil-060418-arnews01.htm.   
282 General Charles Campbell, FORSCOM Commander, (Remarks at the Infantry Warfighting 
Conference, September 18, 2007, Fort Benning, GA).   
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irregular environments.  Maintaining a sustained effort over a long duration and the 
importance of team integrity, begs a force structure that institutionalizes a close 
relationship between intelligence, combat, and civil-military specialties. 
This concept is in keeping with the 2004 Defense Science Board study that 
recommended the Army “develop modules, below the brigade level, of S&R capabilities 
to facilitate task organization; and should exercise and experiment with them to 
determine where combinations of these capabilities can enhance U.S. effectiveness in 
stability operations.”283  Intelligence cells, civil-military specialists such as CA and IO 
teams, MP units, EOD specialists, and construction engineers should be thoroughly 
integrated into battalion and company teams.   With the exception of selected units that 
remain poised for strategic forced-entry and major combat operations, mobility platform 
distributions should become more flexible than the current light-medium-heavy and 
maneuver-RSTA designations allow.  For example, current airborne and air assault 
IBCTs and SBCTs could be retained in their current design as strategic forcible-entry 
units, augmented from functional and multi-functional support brigades as necessary.  
The remainder of the IBCTs should be converted into Security and Development 
Brigades, optimized for irregular warfare.  Since maintaining security is still a paramount 
function, these units maintain small-unit close combat as a primary capability.  However, 
compounded with proper training and leader education, they would be more capable at 
performing more constabulatory duties such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal 
defense, and stability operations in a contested environment.  Modular designs of 
transportation support and when necessary, additional firepower, can provide soldiers the 
mobility they need without overburdening support requirements or creating space 
concerns in small firebases central to their assigned population base.  Closely coordinated 
security and civil-military operations would be conducted at the platoon, company, and 
battalion-level, dependent on terrain and threat, with limited resources and operational 
synchronization provided by brigade and higher headquarters.     
                                                 
283 Defense Science Board, 2004 Summer Study, Transition to and from Hostilities (Washington D.C.:  
Department of Defense, 2004), vii, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-12-
DSB_SS_Report_Final.pdf.  This study is often referred to as being the impetus for DoDD 3000.05.   
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Even though the functional and multi-functional modularity brigades are intended 
to augment the BCTs, the number of active duty civil-military specialists is marginal and 
accessing the reserves often proves politically untenable.  If counterinsurgency and 
stability operations are to be protracted efforts, it does not make sense to have the assets 
most likely needed in these types of operations where they are unavailable.  Further 
analysis and experimentation should consider disbanding some of the functional and 
multi-functional support brigades, using these capabilities to optimize modified infantry 
brigade combat teams for irregular conflict.  Remaining functional and support brigades 
can “plug and play” into higher headquarters or augment heavy brigade combat teams 
when they are called upon to conduct stability missions.  The HBCTs will continue to be 
the Army’s hedge against major conventional threats that may arise.  In the meantime 
they should be carefully placed in rural and border areas, supplement light infantry with 
sub-brigade units of armor, and become a main effort in extremely high threat areas.   
This proposal does not discount the necessity to tailor forces through operational 
task organizing, nor the requirement to maintain limited functional and support units—
especially in highly-technical duties such as aviation, air-defense, or general support 
transportation and logistics functions.  But, it establishes a new baseline from which to 
structure tactical units and reshape the Army’s force-mix from the bottom-up.   
An infantry company, assigned to a security and development brigade and 
optimized for irregular warfare, consists of four maneuver platoons and an eight-vehicle 
motorized platoon.  Normal attachments would consist of an MP squad specializing in 
investigative procedures, detainee handling, and biometric technologies; a mobility squad 
with EOD and demolition specialists; and a military dog team.  Construction engineers 
would be available from the battalion’s construction and assessment platoon.  The 
company headquarters would be expanded to include an intelligence section, civil affairs 
specialists, and an information operations (to include PSYOP and public affairs) team.  
Majors or qualified senior captains would have to lead this expanded company.  See 

























































Figure 20.   Infantry Company Optimized for Irregular Environments 
An infantry battalion, optimized for irregular warfare in a security and 
development brigade has three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance company instead of a 
squadron, a main gun platoon, and a transport company consisting of armored vehicles 
with dedicated drivers and gunners.  The staff has significantly increased intelligence 
capacities, information and public affairs staff, and dedicated civil affairs.  The battalion 
would have an organic MP platoon to include a dedicated number of women.  The 
battalion would also have a construction and assessment platoon led by a civil engineer.  
In lieu of a traditional combat engineer platoon, the modified mobility platoon would 
consist of explosive ordinance disposal and demolition specialists and military dog teams.  












































Figure 21.   Infantry Battalion Optimized for Irregular Environments 
The remainder of this chapter will further explain and justify these proposals.   
This model is designed to integrate necessary specialists at the small-unit tactical level.  
The Army’s force structure as a whole should be built bottom-up, using this or a similar 
model as a starting point.  Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the force capability 
requests of geographical commanders allow for more precise operational testing and 
analysis.   
B.  INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS  
“Conducting aggressive ISR operations and pushing intelligence 
collection assets and analysts to the tactical level, sometimes as far as 
company level, therefore benefits all echelons.  It strengthens local 
intelligence, enhances regional and national reporting, and bolsters 
operations at all levels.”284   
                                                 
284 Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 3-25. 
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The Army Action Plan for Stability Operations recommends the Army develop 
intelligence systems “at appropriate levels” and “enhance the capability of the Army to 
plan, prepare, execute, and assess HUMINT operations in support of full spectrum 
operations.”285  Trained, small units and maneuver unit leaders are some of the Army’s 
best collectors of raw information.  But the time-consuming work of information 
processing and analysis should be conducted by trained specialists who work hand in 
hand with the collectors.  Further specialization will be necessary as increased technical 
training is required for emerging database and digital analysis systems.  These specialists 
should be integrated with maneuver units at every organizational level.  Furthermore, 
continuous feedback between analysts and collectors is essential.  A clear cycle of 
updated intelligence must be available to all echelons so that it may be consistently 
collaborated or refuted by all available sources.      
The previous chapter argued that integration of intelligence specialists and 
operators must occur at lower levels within the military’s hierarchy.  During irregular 
conflict, an extensive amount of information is collected from the bottom-up and analysis 
should parallel that process.  FM 3-24 states “effective operations are shaped by timely, 
specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and 
disseminated throughout the force.”286  While every soldier may be an information 
collector, raw information must also be recorded, analyzed, and synthesized.  This must 
be initially done near the point of collection where specialists have a greater 
understanding of the terrain and demographics of their area.  The Army should continue 
to aggressively explore digital intelligence software systems that allow intelligence 
specialists assigned to the lowest-level tactical units to regularly update information and 
share information laterally, thereby encouraging mutual adjustments between units.    
Maneuver companies should have dedicated intelligence teams with two 
intelligence specialists trained and capable of conducting intelligence database inputs, 
searches, and analysis.  They should also have seasoned NCOs capable of source 
operations and detainee questioning.  Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technicians should 
                                                 
285 DAMO-SSO, Army Action Plan for Stability Operations, 12.  
286 Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-23. 
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also be attached for operating and maintaining designs such as the Raven or forthcoming 
models.  Arbitrarily named the Company Intelligence Collection and Analysis Team 
(CAT), (see Figure 22) these specialists would ensure intelligence is effectively 
integrated into battalion and brigade intelligence sections and shared laterally.  A former 
platoon leader could serve as the company intelligence officer.  He would ensure the 
intelligence teams were properly supported by the company, and assist the commander in 



















Figure 22.   Company Intelligence Collection and Analysis Team (CAT) 
Maneuver battalions should have an enhanced intelligence staff structured to 
conduct current and future operations (see Figure 23).  The staff section should be led by 
a major, allowing the intelligence officer greater influence during the decision-making 
process through experience, education, and rank.  He would be assisted by a senior 
intelligence NCO, two commissioned officers, and a warrant officer.  Current operations 
would consist of a junior intelligence officer (or former platoon leader lieutenant), 
operations NCO, three radio telephone operators dual trained as analysts, a UAV section, 
and a human collection team dedicated to the battalion staff for detainee operations and 
other assigned missions.  The analysis and integration section would be focused on 




horizontally.  The warrant officer, assisted by three all-source analysts would review 
company-level collection teams’ information and provide top-down collection guidance 
as necessary. 
Besides voice intercepts, tactical signal technologies have evolved into a 
positioning weapon allowing close integration with maneuver units to make arrests 
possible.  These operations require close synchronization and current techniques are in 
keeping with FM 3-24 which notes, “pushing SIGINT collection platforms down to 
tactical units can therefore improve intelligence collection.”287  Battalions should have a 
dedicated SIGINT team that would work closely with the brigade staff to conduct 
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Figure 23.   Battalion Intelligence Section 
Brigade-level MI assets should likewise be expanded with greater HUMINT 
specialists that can facilitate brigades’ specialized needs.  In a distributed environment, 
                                                 
287 Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 3-28. 
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brigades should have their own DOCEX and TARGEX capabilities, limiting processing 
and decreasing logistics overhead for evidence transport.   
The question then becomes, where will these assets come from?  Some of the ten 
MI support brigades should be dissolved and senior intelligence staffs should be reduced, 
thereby pushing essential capabilities minus the duplicate command structures, to tactical 
units where they can be more effectively utilized.  Home station individual skill training 
can be managed by the brigade S-2 and division G-2.  Critical to this concept is for the 
Army to continue its recent program of recruiting older, experienced NCOs from 
maneuver branches for MI specialties.288  There are few positions where it would be 
prudent for a young, inexperienced MI soldier to be conducting autonomous analysis or 
source operations.  RTOs or drivers, jobs commonly conducted by junior analysts but not 
requiring a large degree of specialization, can be filled by infantrymen.  Additionally, 
recruiting MI personnel out of the existing field provides further enlistment incentives to 
experience first or second-term combat soldiers.     
Knowlingly, further analysis and testing is required.  However, the immediate 
necessity to increase the capacity of company and battalion intelligence capabilities 
should not be underestimated.  Intelligence is absolutely critical to conduct precision, 
population-focused operations in an irregular environment.  This is an area that needs the 
most immediate and revolutionary change within the Army’s current force design.                 
C.  SECURITY AND MOBILITY  
The notion that…the Army de-emphasize its strong suits (heavy units, 
massed firepower, high technology) in favor of stripped-down light 
infantry units was bound to encounter strong resistance from the Army 
leadership.289 
                                                 
288 See, “Army Looks for NCOs to Serve as Human Intelligence Collectors,” Army News Service, 
March 28, 2007, http://www.army.mil/-news/2007/03/28/2440-army-looks-for-ncos-to-serve-as-human-
intelligence-collectors.   
289 Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam, 36. 
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1.  Vehicles 
Infantry units are best suited for most security duties in irregular environments, 
able to conduct extensive foot patrols and interact face to face with the populace.  They 
are able to teach most foreign (and usually less technology-centric) armies and police 
forces security operations.  Unfortunately, they often lack necessary vehicles for troop 
transport, quick reaction forces, command and control, road-blocks, and additional 
firepower when necessary.   
Although Stryker BCTs were designed to interface those needs, it is rare that 
entire brigades would have to be mobile at a given time during a persistent conflict.  This 
questions the efficacy of sustaining such large fleets.  Even during forced-entry 
operations, Strykers are only designed to protect a toe-hold until Heavy BCTs (the force 
of choice for major combat operations) can arrive.  Balance is necessary to make armored 
wheeled vehicles, such as Strykers and new variants such as the MRAP readily available 
to infantry units without overwhelming them with maintenance, costs, and logistics 
requirements.  The strategic desire to maintain a small military signature in many 
countries of interest, and space concerns for units operating out of small fire bases or 
austere environments, limits the optimal number of vehicles for tactical units conducting 
protracted operations against an irregular threat.   
More Stryker brigades is not the feasible answer.  But more Stryker-like 
capabilities should be made available to all infantry brigade combat teams.  A modular 
approach to support those units with adequate protected transportation and firepower is 
needed.  Instead of light infantry being supported by limited numbers of anti-armor 
HMMWVs and lightly armored support vehicles such as the LMTV, they should have 
organic units of medium-armored, squad transportable fighting vehicles such as the 
Stryker or MRAP.  For example, each infantry maneuver company should have 
approximately eight, medium-armored vehicles to transport half the company at a given 
time, while battalions maintain support platoons within the forward support companies to 
conduct logistics re-supply and additional troop movements.  A battalions’ reserve of 
transport vehicles should also be armored combat vehicles.   
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Similarly, the role of reconnaissance units should be re-examined.  Battalion 
motorized companies and brigade RSTA battalions are the remnants of legacy designs 
suited for linear battlefields.  Imagery, manned and unmanned overhead surveillance, 
signals intelligence, and human collection has filled the role these units were designed to 
perform.  Joint fires, artillery smart munitions, and man-portable anti-tank weapons are 
quickly replacing the requirements for vehicle-mounted, direct-fire anti-tank weapons.  
Instead, vehicles are better utilized in an irregular, non-linear fight as modular 
transportation, gun, and surveillance capabilities available to all infantry battalions.  
Reducing the size of reconnaissance squadrons in infantry brigades to a motorized 
company would free up vehicles and maintenance personnel to be redistributed 
throughout infantry units as described previously.  As additional Stryker, MRAPs, and 
eventually, FCS-variant vehicles come on line, a greater number of HMMWVs can be 
replaced.      
2.   Military Police  
Pushing HUMINT or law enforcement personnel to the battalion level and 
below can improve TAREX and DOCEX by tactical units...units must be 
able to receive intelligence collected from the documents, equipment, and 
personnel they capture in enough time to exploit it.290        
The availability of military police should be expanded and further integrated into 
brigade combat teams beyond today’s platoon and chance attachments.  In doing so, the 
police must have skill sets other than common patrolling, weapons handling, and raiding 
techniques familiar to any infantryman.  They should hone their law enforcement and 
evidence collection capabilities and be suited to teach station administration procedures.  
Trained in detainee operations, MPs can ensure prisoners are properly handled and 
processed.  MPs should also develop technical skills in evidence collection and site 
exploitation to ensure detainee packets and evidence are well-documented and verified.      
The Army Action Plan recommends the Army “develop required capabilities to 
provide integrated biometric collection and reporting capability at the small unit level 
                                                 
290 Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 3-29. 
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within units conducting PIO (Police Intelligence Operations) and security operations, 
biometric data analysis, fusion and dissemination.”291  Biometric technologies need rapid 
fielding to assist in identifying repeat criminals and to track insurgents, despite frequent 
ID and passport changes and construction of databases of human networks.  As biometric 
capabilities become more prevalent on the battlefield, MPs should become the technical 
specialists of choice, working closely with the intelligence sections for biometric 
collection, data-entry, and investigative support.  MPs should no longer be trained as 
pseudo-SWAT teams or explicitly reserved for rear-area security details.  Furthermore, 
females assigned to military police units are nicely suited to interact with local females, 
particularly in traditional societies.  Non-linear operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
rapidly expanded the role of woman in irregular conflict.  Establishing quotas to 
deliberately man MP and intelligence units with a specified number of females should be 
considered.        
Two companies of military police should be allocated to infantry brigade combat 
teams.  They would be led by the brigade MP, who should be a major.  One company, the 
MP battalion support company, would allocate platoons to maneuver battalions while the 
MP brigade support companies would remain under the discretion of the brigade 
commander.  The squads should be smaller, but manned with more senior MPs than 
currently designed.  They would primarily serve as advisors and technical specialists, and 
less as maneuver squads (see Figure 24).  The platoon leader would work closely with the 
battalion’s intelligence section to monitor biometric databases, conduct network analysis, 
and investigative police intelligence operations.  The MPs would conduct prisoner and 
detainee handling operations and track prisoners through the prosecution system.  MPs 
could operate as a platoon, or battalion commanders could utilize MP platoon leaders as 
staff propensities and detach squads to companies.  MPs would augment partnered 
maneuver units or unilaterally embed with host-nation police when conducting advising 
as part of a FID effort.  They should be capable of teaching and assessing community 
patrolling and interaction, intelligence gathering and processing, evidence gathering 
techniques, and assist in building judicial cases against criminals and insurgents.  When 
                                                 
291 DAMO-SSO, Army Action Plan for Stability Operations, 10. 
 129
conducting police advising, MPs should focus on stations management, investigative 
work, and community databases while infantrymen train weapons familiarization, arrest 
procedures, and community patrolling techniques.  The brigade support company’s duties 
would be similar to today’s brigade MP platoons.  They would run detention facilities, 
conduct guard duties, convoy security, or foreign indigenous training.          
Platoon Leader
Squad x 1 Squad x 2 Squad x 3 Squad x 4
MP NCOIC
• Bio-metric technologies & 
data processing
• Prisoner & detainee 
handling
• Stations management & 
law enforcement training
• Investigation and evidence 
handling 
 
Figure 24.   Battalion Military Police Platoon 
3.   Combat Engineers 
Light engineers have many of the same skill sets as infantrymen, though better 
skilled at demolitions, obstacle development, and obstacle reduction.  While adequately 
trained for conducting door, wall, and wire breaches, disabling improvised explosive 
devices such as those common to Iraq and Afghanistan is beyond their skill sets.  
Complex electric and mechanical explosive devices will be the continued tool of U.S. 
enemies.  Combat engineers are generalists whose organization mirrors that of infantry 
units.  They should be restructured as smaller, mobility platoons composed of highly—
technical demolitions experts.  The mobility platoon envisioned would have EOD 
technicians able to reduce improvised explosives in a timely fashion and serve as 
technical specialists to assist and supervise in the construction of explosive breach 
materials (see Figure 25).  The execution of obstacle breaches can be performed by 
infantrymen.  At home station, demolition specialists should attend extensive school 
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programs (both military and civilian law enforcement) for technical expertise and report 
to functional units to sustain their training abilities.     
Additionally, specially-trained military working dogs have proven extremely 
useful in clearing buildings and sensing explosive materials.292  Working dogs are in high 
demand in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Improvised explosive devices are being used 
increasingly more often in Iraq to target dismounted foot patrols and soldiers entering 
buildings.  The capacity of working dogs should be rapidly expanded.  Some units 
already use dog teams to detect explosive materials and are experimenting with dogs as 
an initial entry alternative to soldiers during raids.  Traditionally reserved for military 
police, explosive-sniffing dogs may be better associated with ordinance specialists in the 
proposed mobility teams and platoons.      
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Figure 25.   Battalion Mobility Platoon 
The engineers also perform counter-mobility tasks that entail extensive force 
protection plans to support company outpost, or neighborhood defense.  In some cases, 
despite little formal training, combat engineers have been looked to as construction 
                                                 
292 A Special Operations officer who wished to remain anonymous, described his unit’s extensive use 
of military dog-teams in Iraq and Afghanistan during patrols and house raids.  He believed the dogs offer 
viable alternatives to initial entry soldiers confirming or denying the presence of explosives and enemy 
personnel.  (Interview with the author, May 5, 2007).   
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project managers.  Like many soldiers, combat engineers have tried to adapt to their 
current operating environment despite training inadequacies.  Later in this section the role 
of civil and construction engineers will be explored.  As it currently stands, combat 
engineers are generalists whose capabilities straddle the fence between infantrymen, 
EOD technicians, and civil engineers.  Greater specialization is necessary.   
4.  Advising Foreign Security Forces 
Security and development brigades, modified for irregular warfare as suggested in 
this paper can offer stand-alone packages for multinational exercises and extended 
training opportunities during steady-state operations.  During stability operations, nested 
partnerships would allow enhanced companies with organic specialists to more 
effectively embed with foreign units.   
Other steps could better prepare selected general purpose force leaders and units 
for foreign force training.  Nagl’s proposal for a Combat Advisor Course293 should be 
pursued and efforts to expand individual language and foreign immersion programs for 
the U.S. Army should be accelerated.  These skill certifications could be tagged as special 
skill identifiers on officer and enlisted personnel records to allow the military better 
tailoring when requirements for individual advising arise beyond the capacity, or 
capability of Special Forces units.   Metz and Hoffman suggest grouping the Marine 
Corps and Army’s brigade combat teams regionally, allowing language, geography, and 
cultural continuity within its units.294  This may be unnecessary for heavy brigade 
combat teams, but could be applied to the conceptual security and development brigade’s 
during steady-state operations.      
When necessary, units can be specially designed with individuals drawn from 
“advisor course” graduates who have the required technical or tactical skill sets for the 
specific job at hand.  Otherwise, an increase in age, rank, and experience for security and 
                                                 
293 Nagl, John A.  “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps.” 
294 Metz and Hoffman, “Restructuring America’s Ground Forces:  Better, Not Bigger,” 13.  This 
proposal does not prevent forces from being utilized outside their regional alignments during major 
conflict.  
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development brigade company commanders, complemented by specialists in fields such 
as intelligence, engineering, and communications offers a suitable training team for large 
indigenous units.  Similarly, bi-lateral and multi-national partnerships can be facilitated at 
other levels as well.  Companies and battalions, consisting of experienced leaders, 
certified through a comprehensive “Advisor Course,” and supported with specialized 
soldiers, would be successful at operating independent of higher headquarters for 
distributed FID missions.   
In addition to increases in intelligence capacities, this section proposed numerous 
changes to enhance the combat-related capabilities of infantry brigade combat teams 
conducting irregular warfare activities, particularly in a persistent urban environment  
(see Figure 26).  The modified infantry brigades (security and development brigades) 
would increase the number of infantry battalions while reducing reconnaissance 
squadrons to a company-sized troop.  Modular units of medium-armored wheeled 
vehicles would be assigned to battalions and companies for rapid troop movements and 
support to dismounted patrols in contested areas.  However, the number of vehicles 
should remain small enough to minimize unit impacts on  populated areas, resource 
requirements, costs, and space concerns.  As the technology matures, main-gun system 
Stryker variants (MGS), FCS models, or armor attachments should be dedicated to 
infantry battalions as a platoon-sized reaction force.  The capacity of military police in 
brigades would be increased to two companies.  One would provide general support, 
while the would attach dedicated platoons to infantry battalions.  Next, this chapter 










































         
Figure 26.   Combat Capabilities for the Security and Development Brigades295 
D.  CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS 
1.  Information Operations 
In order to execute timely and relevant information operations, maneuver 
battalions should have an attached section of trained specialists who plan, execute, and 
advise battalion leadership on information operations, psychological operations, and 
public affairs.  At a minimum, an information operations/ public affairs officer, senior 
NCO, two production specialists and a video technician could provide this support (see 
Figure 27).  Production specialists would design leaflets, posters, and other written 
products to be produced by the brigade staff.  Brigades should have production 
equipment, cutting down on the time and logistics required for producing and shipping  
 
                                                 
295 This diagram only reflects changes as discussed in this section.  It does not account for other 
capabilities already existing within the IBCT that haven’t been discussed such as artillery, mortars, medical 
units etc.   
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products from theatre staffs.  Dedicated video technicians can catalog video recordings 
from the companies to be used on internet and television mediums to preempt or counter 
insurgent propaganda.296   
Companies should have an attached IO team consisting of a mid-level NCO and 
assistant similar to tactical PSYOPs teams.  The team would advise the company 
commander and platoon leaders on information campaigns, synchronize efforts with the 
battalion staff, and conduct tactical voice broadcasts.  Additionally, these specialists 
would assist in polling and analysis to properly target messages and determine proper 
dissemination techniques.  Like intelligence gathering, information operations is not 
meant to be constrained to a handful of specialists, it must be integral to every soldiers’ 
actions and conversations.  Yet, trained specialists can work with maneuver leaders to 
construct and disseminate effective IO campaigns that are consistent with higher themes, 
but tailored to address local concerns.     
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Figure 27.   Battalion Information Operations Sections and Company IO Teams 
                                                 
296 Lt. Gen. Chiarelli provides a vignette from 2006 when a combined U.S.-Iraqi SOF raid killed 17 
insurgents.  However, after security forces departed, the enemy moved the bodies and staged the scene to 
look as though security forces had executed the insurgents.  Increased PAO capacities in tactical units can 
insure operations such as this are filmed and quickly broadcast to preempt insurgent misinformation 
campaigns.  Chiarelli and Smith, “Learning from our Modern Wars,” 10.    
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2.  Civil Affairs 
Civil Affairs teams should establish a formal partnership with maneuver units and 
be participants in regular collective training.  Civil affairs specialists should be subject 
matter experts in contract proposals, civil development, economic growth, and 
governance capacity-building.  According to Chewing and Ollivant, “civil affairs soldiers 
should be attached to the maneuver commander, acting more as staff proponents and 
subject-matter experts than as primary actors.”297 Most of the maneuver commanders 
interviewed described the CAT-A teams as limited by the strength of one individual.  The 
team leader conducted project site visits, met with local community members, and 
worked government and economic development issues.  In some cases, the other team 
members simply served as a driver, gunner, and assistant for the team leader.  Instead of 
autonomous teams, CA specialists should serve as integrated advisors to maneuver 
leaders and their staffs.  As needed, they can be used as senior pay agents, project 
managers, and NGO intermediaries serving as the administrative headquarters and quality 
control for contracts with local entrepreneurs.  Battalion CA members should act as 
liaisons between the brigade’s CMOC, B-Team, and inter-agency representatives.  
Companies should have civil affairs specialists serving as CMOC liaisons, advisors to the 
company commander, and project managers.  The CA officer should also be able to 
assess and advise local governing bodies.          
3.  Construction Engineers  
Construction engineer unit capacities need to be increased, and their capabilities 
expanded.  Civil and heavy engineers who are able to support force protection and civil 
affairs initiatives are in high demand.  The future environment suggests a growing 
demand for engineers, both mobility and construction, and a need for greater technical 
specialization.   
Instead of constructing and breaching wire obstacles, combat engineers need to 
become increasingly more specialized in a greater number of technical skills to include 
                                                 
297 Chewing and Ollivant, “Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN,” 57. 
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construction specialties and civil engineering.  The Navy SEABEES provide an 
exceptional model for these skills.  Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB) are 
one type of SEABEE unit.  They consist of seven occupational specialties assigned to one 
of three companies in a construction battalion.  NMCBs provide standard concrete, 
masonry, steel, and wood construction as well as specialized tasks such as water well 
drilling.  The equipment group is composed of heavy equipment operators and 
mechanics.  The utilities group contains utility specialists such as plumbers and 
construction electricians.  The structural group has steelworkers, engineering aides, and 
builders.298  Many of the officers are civil engineers with contract and project supervision 
tasks.  When they’re not deployed, the construction battalions are utilized by base public-
works departments.      
While the scale of work supervised or conducted by Army combat units should be 
kept to a necessary minimum (instead encouraging local host-nation development), a 
company of construction and utility specialists per brigade would greatly benefit Army 
operations.  When necessary, construction companies could provide emergency services 
directly to indigenous populations.  To further host-nation development, they could offer 
limited vocational training and supervise foreign civil projects.  Each brigade would have 
an increased self-sustainment capacity with dedicated construction and utility engineers.  
Like other specialized capabilities, construction companies could report to larger 
functional battalions and brigades for home-station technical training.  While deployed, 
mixed-trade platoons could be tasked to infantry battalions as needed.   
E.  FURTHER PROFESSIONALIZE THE FORCE 
The evolutionary changes that have been posed herein are not, for the most part, 
based on technological solutions.  They are human-capital intensive investments in the 
current force structure.  The Army needs to transform its skill sets and organizational 
forms with the same effort it is investing in future weapon systems, vehicles, and 
hardware.  Expanding the capacity of numerous “non-combat” related specialties and 
                                                 
298 Lieutenant (USN) Justin Perry, civil engineer, (interview with author, October 15, 2007).  See also, 
https://www.seabee.navy.mil/index.cfm/4135 for further information. 
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increasingly integrating multiple dimensions of military expertise at lower levels within 
the military hierarchy will help units conducting sensitive, population-focused military 
operations become more effective.  However, increasing job positions and changing 
organizational structures is not enough.  Many of these specialties, such as IO, CA, MP, 
and engineers, must make significant capability adjustments (through profound changes 
in their training and educational curriculums) to ensure the right skill sets are 
materializing within the Army.   
Irregular conflicts demand a higher caliber of leader at every level.  The combined 
arms fight is rapidly expanding to include specialists and units beyond combat arms.  
Management challenges increase with larger and more diversified units as proposed in 
this paper.  Meanwhile, the age and years of experience for most company commanders 
is decreasing due to accelerated promotion timelines, fast command turnovers, and post-
command staffing requirements.  A careful examination of the Army’s promotion system 
is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, anecdotal evidence suggests that more 
education, training, and preparation are needed by many company-level leaders to truly 
excel in the contemporary battlefield.  This takes time, perhaps the most difficult resource 
to generate.   
To manage the diverse capabilities and increased capacity of specialists advanced 
in this paper, infantry companies should be led by a senior captain (O-3), or junior major 
(O-4).  They would be assisted by a captain (O-3) operations-executive officer and 
potentially, former platoon leaders as intelligence or effects planners (refer back to Figure 
21).  Battalion and brigade operations and executive officers would then be selected from 
among post-company command majors.299  Captains would have more time for graduate 
education, language schools, and senior staff experiences to broaden their understanding 
of tactical, operational, and strategic operations.  Captains could continue to command 
garrison companies such as recruiting and training companies where they would further 
prepare themselves for combat unit tours.  They could also fill many of the staff positions 
currently manned by majors.   
                                                 
299 This promotion structure would be similar to U.S. Army Special Forces where O-4s command 
companies and then serve as battalion and group staff officers.   
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Expanded opportunities for education, non-operational time and delaying the 
coveted company command position may encourage junior officers to stay in longer.  An 
incremental retirement package beginning prior to the current twenty-year mark could 
provide a financial benefit to those who would otherwise separate.  Increasing the number 
of platoons in a company, companies in a battalion, and battalions in a brigade as 
proposed, would flatten the command structure and reduce the number of headquarters, 
thereby reducing requirements for captains and majors on senior command staffs.   
Defense planners could take personnel and organizational change one step further 
by cutting an entire layer of hierarchy out of the Army’s force design.  This would be 
truly transformational.  Macgregor proposed the idea of decentralizing the Army’s force 
design and making it more flexible through the creation of combat groups.300   He 
reduced the brigade and division headquarters to one level of command.  Groups (which 
could be designated as regiments) would consist of six to eight maneuver battalions 
(twice the size of today’s brigades), led by a general officer and larger staff.  The Groups 
would in turn, report to a corps-based Joint Task Force.  In addition to greater flexibility 
in an increasingly dynamic environment, colonels (O-6) would be able to broaden their 
understanding of national security by serving in inter-agency and foreign military 
positions, seeking greater educational experiences, and further enhancing their 
knowledge of economic systems, governance, and strategic communications prior to 
assuming command of a combat group.   
A further decentralized command structure, led by more experienced officers, 
would provide the tactical flexibility necessary in complex and politically sensitive 
conflicts.  There are solutions to meeting the manning requirements of today, and those 
suggested by this proposal.  The question is how much the Army is willing to part from 
its legacy personnel and promotion requirements to ensure combat units have the 
manpower they need.   
Combined-arms concepts must progress beyond traditional maneuver and 
firepower assessments.  By increasing the dedicated capacity of intelligence personnel, 
                                                 
300 Macgregor, 69-86. 
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mobility assets, and population-focused capabilities in infantry units, the Army will be 
better suited for irregular warfare.  Having these specialists organic to the units would 
promote greater effectiveness than the adhocracy generated by the current brigade 
modular design.   
 140
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
The United States, a military and economic hegemonic power, has been humbled 
by low-tech guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Future conflicts will likely include 
similar types of enemies, socio-economic variables, and political conditions.  In the 
muddied waters of stability operations and counterinsurgency, face-to-face interaction 
with the population is necessary.  Information and situational awareness is gained from 
the bottom up, and more rapid and lateral communications are necessary.  Flexible, agile 
forces, decentralized and dispersed throughout an area for extended periods of time, are 
essential.  Military efforts should be focused on securing the population, developing 
indigenous security forces, promoting economic growth, and assisting in the development 
of viable political systems. Acknowledging security as paramount, firepower should be 
used sparingly, while intelligence, information operations, and civil affairs should be 
employed exceedingly more.  The Army’s force structure should reflect this paradigm 
shift.   
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the Army’s current organizational structure is 
optimized for combined arms maneuver warfare against conventional enemies.  Its 
current hierarchy stems from the Napoleonic Era, and its organizational design has 
remained relatively unchanged since the U.S. prepared for war with the Soviet Union 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century.301  Firepower and mobility have been 
the hallmarks of warfare, embraced by the Army and exemplified in the helicopter attacks 
and tank battles of Operation Desert Storm.   
Since the majority of military operations are executed at the lowest levels of 
command (while following operational and strategic guidance), alternative models for 
                                                 
301 Wilson, Bureaucracy, Chapter 12, outlines four major changes the Army has made to its war-
fighting doctrine and structures since WWII:  traditional structure;  “pentomic” division; Reorganization 
Objectives Army Division (ROAD); Active Defense; and AirLand Battle.  While the Army saw each of 
these initiatives as major reorganizations, Wilson notes that “at a deeper level, very little changed…the 
army limited its innovations to thinking about better ways to counter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.”  
While the battlefield scenario changed from Europe to Asia in the 1990s, the assumptions regarding future 
enemy tactics were still predominately conventional in nature.  As argued earlier in this paper, brigade 
modular organizations (the latest organizational change), and its strategic underpinning—expeditionary, 
“net-centric warfare” were no different.   
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force structure must consider how essential counterinsurgency and stabilization tasks can 
be optimally performed at those levels (platoon, company, and battalion).  As shown in 
Chapter IV, scholars and policy makers who have proposed adaptations to the Army’s 
force structure are lacking this level of organizational analysis and detail.  Alternative 
organizational models need to be designed and field-tested.  These models can then be 
evaluated in the context of irregular warfare and conventional combat operations.  A new, 
more adaptive, full-spectrum force may emerge from the analytical testing, or further 
support for greater specialization may become evident.  The security and development 
brigade concept could simply serve as a testing ground for capability increases to all 
brigade combat teams.  Nevertheless, previous assumptions about the utility of forces 
designed for “rapid decisive operations” performing optimally in counterinsurgency and 
stabilization tasks need to be further examined.   
The U.S. military can continue to expect increased participation in irregular 
environments.  Its participation may be in a partnered capacity to limit conflict in allied 
weak states; as a contributing participant in multinational operations; or, as a unilateral 
effort when a threat is eminent and critical U.S. interests are vital.  Witnessing the 
difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are many critics who negate the need for taking 
a profound look at the U.S. military’s current capabilities.  They do not see a capability 
gap, but a problematic foreign policy.  One critic of the Iraq War stated: “Militaries are 
built to fight and win wars, not bind together failing nations.”302  That same mentality has 
survived within the institutional Army despite operations in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, 
Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  The nature of warfare has changed beyond 
traditional classifications, and post-conflict stabilization and transitions will always be 
inextricably linked to warfare.  Less, the U.S. continues to risk “losing the peace” and 
further empowers its potential adversaries.  Foreign policy is fickle and Americans are 
often quick to forget (or misunderstand) history’s lessons.  Despite its track-record, the 
Army must be capable of succeeding in any environment should national interests (and 
those of her Allies) be at stake.   
                                                 
302 Chuck Hagel, “Leaving Iraq, Honorably,” Washington Post, November 26, 2006, B7. 
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Chapter II described the Department of Defense’s strategic policies for adapting 
to changes in the U.S. threat environment, and summarized operating concepts for 
conducting irregular operations in the future.  The Army states its current organizational 
plan, the modular brigade concept, is as poised for stability operations as it is for 
conventional offensive operations.  However, a brief review of the Revolution in Military 
Affairs debate and defense transformation concepts in Chapter III demonstrated 
incongruence between transformation’s initial concept of rapid decisive operations 
against a regional competitor, and today’s notion of sustained, protracted warfare against 
irregular opponents.  While the Army is making substantial headway in doctrine and 
training initiatives, its organizational details have remained unscathed.  Chapter V 
outlined numerous shortfalls of the current design in the areas of intelligence, mobility, 
military police, information operations, civil affairs, and construction capabilities.     
The Army continues to promote the maintenance of a “full spectrum” generalist 
force, able to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations.  It negates any 
concepts of “specialized forces,” dismissing the fact that the Army is already specialized 
to the degree that is has heavy, Stryker, light, functional, and multi-functional support 
brigades.  Internal to brigades, battalions and companies have unique capabilities.  While 
each type of brigade is capable of conducting full-spectrum operations across the 
spectrum of conflict, they are designed for particular threat environments, terrain 
conditions, and task specialties.  Based on evidence collected from interviews, 
presentations from subject matter experts, archival analysis of the contemporary 
battlefield, historical insights, and organizational theory, this paper proposes numerous 
conceptual, and more detailed structural recommendations to the Army’s force structure.   
A majority of the SBCTs and IBCTs should be converted into security and 
development brigades (SDBs), optimized for stability operations in irregular 
environments focused on controlling (and protecting) populations, defeating guerrilla 
fighters, and conducting initial indigenous governance and economic capacity 
development.  The units would still be full spectrum capable (in fact, establishing and 
maintaining a secure environment through offensive and defensive operations is critical),  
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but they would be designed with stability operations as their core task.  These units would 
be no more “specialized,” than a heavy brigade is for conventional offensive and 
defensive warfare.  
The security and development brigades would have three infantry battalions and a 
reconnaissance company instead of a squadron.  As described in Chapter VI, they would 
be organized as follows:   
• Infantry companies would be led by a major, or qualified senior captain.  
His headquarters would have a small, but highly-trained support team of 
intelligence and civil-military specialists such as all-source analysts, 
HUMINT collection specialists, UAV technicians, civil affairs, and 
information operations specialists.  Instead of young, newly trained initial-
entry soldiers, these specialists would be former maneuver NCOs and 
officers who conducted specialty skill transfers.    
• Infantry companies would have an organic motorized platoon consisting 
of medium-weight vehicles such as the MRAP, Stryker, FCS, or other 
variant of armored vehicle that could be tailored to missions for troop 
transport and crew-served weapon employment.  Additional armored 
combat vehicles could be resourced by the battalion’s transport company 
or higher-level modular units.    
• The infantry battalions would have four companies, a reconnaissance 
platoon, and a main gun (or attached armor) platoon.   
• The battalion staff would have significantly increased intelligence 
capacities, information operations and public affairs specialists, and 
dedicated civil affairs.  
• Battalion capabilities would also be enhanced with an organic MP platoon, 
specializing in investigative procedures, detainee handling, and biometric 
technologies.  A dedicated number of women would be included in the 
MP unit.   
• The battalion would have a construction and assessment platoon, led by a 
civil engineer and composed of trade-craft specialists.   
• The battalion would have a mobility platoon consisting of explosive 
ordinance disposal (EOD) and demolition specialists, and military dog 
teams.    
• Mobility squads, military police squads, civil affairs, and construction 
engineers could be attached to companies as directed by the battalion 
commander.   
• Non-combat specialists would belong to a functional chain of command 
for home-station technical training.  During combat operations, this chain 
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of command would provide functional advising and staff support to 
brigade and higher echelons.  
Selected Stryker brigade combat teams, Airborne, and Air Assault brigade combat 
teams tailored for strategic missions such as rapid deployment and forced-entry 
requirements could remain in their current design.  The heavy brigade combat teams 
would continue to be America’s dominant force in major conventional operations, 
conflict in open terrain, and as necessary, resourced to conduct urban and population-
focused operations.  Limited numbers of support and functional brigades would maintain 
stand-alone capabilities.  They would provide theatre support and detach sub-brigade 
units to heavy brigade combat teams as necessary.   
The proposed force structure would still allow security and development brigades 
to conduct conventional offensive and defensive operations where its small unit 
proficiency would be capable of defeating an adversary in a close fight, or utilizing stand-
off joint air, man-portable, and indirect weapons against distant targets.  These tactics are 
as essential to irregular operations as they are conventional ones.  However, they are not 
sufficient to properly protect a given population, defeat or marginalize guerrilla fighters, 
train indigenous security forces, or promote the development and stability of an area 
before or after conflicts occur.  Besides surge capabilities, an additional benefit of 
creating more autonomous, multi-functional units with higher rank, education, and 
experience levels is their ability to participate in steady-state multi-national partnerships 
and bilateral foreign internal defense operations.       
Manpower required for this restructuring would be derived from “flattening” the 
command and control system by increasing the number of maneuver companies per 
battalion, battalions per brigade, and reducing the number of brigade and higher 
headquarters.  Reconnaissance squadrons would be reduced to troop size allowing 
manpower and equipment to be reallocated to company vehicle platoons.  Fewer brigades 
would be available for rotational pools, but fewer brigades would be necessary.  The 
numbers would be negated by enhanced effectiveness on a per-capita basis.   
Evidence from practitioners of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan suggest that command relationships, intelligence, and specialized 
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capabilities within the brigade combat team are still confined to a steeply hierarchical and 
top-down driven organizational structure.  Battalions and their subordinate maneuver 
units have remained largely untouched, lacking critical skill capabilities for population-
focused operations.  Despite the Army’s proclamation of “the most comprehensive 
transformation of its force since World War II,”303 this study challenges the notion that 
incremental steps taken by current modularity initiatives are bold enough to allow Army 
ground forces to properly prepare for, and face the future challenges of conducting 




                                                 
303 Army Transformation Office, 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap.  
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